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In the following project, I look closely at three living American writers whose work explores the 
important relations between the religious and ecocritical “turns” in American literature, with 
particular attention to ways religious belief might inform human understandings and interaction 
with the material world. 
 The opening chapter explores the ways that the human-nature relationship is configured 
in a post-Enlightenment “secular” age that has given rise to the current Anthropocene era. 
Alongside Charles Taylor, I argue that the secular age is funded by a narrative, or lived “myth,” 
of disenchantment that has left many ill-at-ease with the ongoing destruction of the natural 
world. This uneasiness has led many to envision new “myths,” or narratives, of re-enchantment 
along a host of postsecular lines. The postsecular options under investigation in this project are 
particularly those that return to religious claims in general, and confessional Christian claims in 
particular.  
 In this context, I look closely at variations of postsecular Christian myths of re-
enchantment on offer in contemporary American poetry and prose through three writers:  
Christian Wiman, Marilynne Robinson, and Wendell Berry. I argue that each of these writers has 
articulated a confessionally Christian narrative of re-enchantment that challenges dominant 
forms of secularism while also taking issue with other-worldly, disembodied forms of 
Christianity that exhibit a low view of the material world. The choice of these authors and their 
arrangement in this project is not to suggest a clear aesthetic movement in contemporary 
American writing, but rather it is to note subtle progression in how the myth of disenchantment 
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What we do about ecology depends on our ideas of the man-nature relationship. More 
science and more technology are not going to get us out of the present ecological crisis 
until we find a new religion or rethink our old one.  
 
Lynn White Jr. “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis.” 1967. 
 
The nature of the ecological crisis is principally moral and theological rather than 
technological.  





Growing up in Southern Ontario in the Niagara region within a largely Christian, largely 
conservative, largely agrarian community, I experienced the environmental movement as 
something often associated with leftist politics, Buddhist/pantheist spiritualities, or socialist 
economics—all of which were highly suspect. How we were to relate to the earth—or, rather, the 
creation—was talked about in church on Sundays in abstract, theological language about 
stewardship as mandated in Genesis, or by interpreting nature as the “second book” of God’s 
self-revelation. That the Bible talked about the natural world was clear, but how—or if—it 
impacted our actual practices in Vineland, Ontario, in the twentieth century remained 
unarticulated and, to me at least, unclear.  
In retrospect, I realize that the Christian community of my youth rarely, if ever, addressed 
the methods of our farming community—one which largely relied on heavy pesticide and 
insecticide use, industrialized farming technologies, and chemical fertilizers. Waterways could 
be contaminated and the air made toxic by our practices, and even when increasing numbers of 
our community were diagnosed with infertility or lymphoma cancers (termed “farmer’s cancer” 
by local doctors) many in the community continued to deride environmentalists for their 
progressive political bent, so-called socialist economic assumptions, and misguided, pagan 
spiritualities of the earth. We did not see ourselves as culpable for what was happening to the 
ecosystem we inhabited, nor did we see our religion as a resource that had much in the way of 
offering practical advice for how we might imagine the world and our place in it differently. 
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What, if anything I wondered, did our religion have to say about our responsibilities to this 
environment, to this place? 
When I started graduate school at the University of Ottawa, I was introduced to Wendell 
Berry through his novel Jayber Crow and guided through it by a wonderful scholar and teacher, 
Dr. Dominic Manganiello. Wendell Berry, I learned, is a Kentucky poet and farmer who from 
the late-1960s until today has created a large body of poetry, essays, and fiction about his small 
town of Port Royal, Kentucky (although the fictionalized version is Port William). Even though 
rural Niagara and rural Kentucky are very different regions geographically, socially, and 
historically, there was something in Berry’s writing that resonated with my own experiences of 
small-town Ontario. I began reading everything Berry wrote, and soon found that his rural 
experience is, in many ways, quite similar to mine. Moreover, he writes explicitly as a Christian 
who is uneasy with cultural expressions of Christianity that are often naïve and complicit with 
(even participating in) the destruction of the world.  
Remaining in the tradition of Christian faith, Berry is nevertheless critical of Christian 
gazes fixed on some abstract paradise “beyond” this world and recognizes that such forms of 
religion pay no attention to—and thus give no proper or responsible affection for—the material, 
embodied, carnal life of particular places by particular people in particular times. In one of his 
Sabbath poems, “How to be a Poet,” Berry advises poets of the land, and “to remind himself,” 
that “There are no unsacred places; / there are only sacred places / and desecrated places.”1 
Berry’s words struck a chord, debunking my unarticulated assumption that restoration of the 
environment was something taking place elsewhere or, more likely, in another future time (likely 
when God came back to restore the creation to himself). Berry’s words, however, were profound 
 
 1 Wendell Berry, “How to be a Poet,” Given: Poems (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2006), 18. 
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in their simple practicality. There are no holier, more sacred places than others. Port Royal, 
Kentucky or Vineland, Ontario are both intrinsically sacred with or without human use. As I 
would discover (and as this project explores) this insight is inextricably linked to Berry’s 
understanding that the world, all of it, is God’s ongoing creative utterance. Vineland or Port 
Royal or any place for that matter are equally capable of being loved and revered and served 
well, or of being dishonoured, ignored, abused, and desecrated.  
I continue to be intrigued by ways Berry manages to be both critical and respectful of the 
religious tradition in which he continues to identify. He draws deeply from the wells of historic 
Christian teaching (in addition to other religions and schools of thought) in order to challenge 
destructive ecological, economic, and technological practices that damage the earth. By turning 
to the past, Berry’s writing affirms that Christianity has this-wordly implications for the present.  
And Berry is not alone in this. A recent trend in contemporary American literature that I explore 
in this project is the persistent attempt to articulate this-worldly theological visions that challenge 
Christians focused too narrowly on some form of life beyond material reality while also speaking 
to the concerns of many secular skeptics who seem convinced that Christianity (or any religion) 
is not equipped to address ecological concerns. Both groups, I maintain, have been conditioned 
by a post-Enlightenment secularism that has often exacerbated their differences and cultivated 
tension and conflict.  
The rise of what I am calling this-worldly theological visions in contemporary American 
literature, of which Berry’s work is just one manifestation, is perhaps fitting for an age that has 
been deemed “secular” by sociologists, philosophers, and theologians alike.2 In some ways, the 
 
 2 In the first chapter I will unpack this more closely, looking primarily at the work of philosopher Charles 
Taylor whose magnum opus, A Secular Age (2007), helpfully unpacks various strands of secularization theory while 
also making a unique and significant offering to secularism theories. As will become evident, I think Taylor’s work 
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secular has always signified this-worldly concerns. Secular, in its etymological roots in Latin, 
comes from saeculum which in Antiquity simply meant “of a generation, belonging to an age.”3 
The saeculum was, at first, a mere demarcation of the time it took for one generation to live and 
die, which was between 90 and 100 years.4 During the Christian Middle Ages, however, the 
meaning of saeculum shifted significantly in order to distinguish between a temporal, worldly 
realm of creaturely affairs and the eternal realm of the creator God that existed beyond the world 
of time and change.5 The secular, therefore, began to connote this-wordly affairs in 
contradistinction to the otherworldly affairs of the church and (primarily Christian) religion. This 
shift did not necessarily entail conflict. In fact, that the church is not concerned with issues like 
poverty, oppression, and injustice in this world, would confound many in the Medieval and the 
Modern church alike. However, the premodern demarcation of “secular” and “sacred” spheres 
helped give rise to a post-Enlightenment, secular society that was increasingly suspicious—if not 
outrightly dubious—of the usefulness of religion and belief for the affairs of this world.  
Today, when there is talk about the “rise of secularism” or “secularization,” it is often 
done so in this post-Enlightenment context where the polarity between secular concerns with this 
world and the ecclesial concerns of some eternal, other world are often perceived to be not 
merely distinct, but severed from one another. Indeed, the conflict between religion and science, 
faith and reason has become a hallmark of secularization according to most mainstream theorists. 
In the recent Oxford Handbook on Secularism, for instance, editors Philip Zuckerman and John 
Shook note five forms of modern secularism: political, economic, educational, scientific, and 
 
helps clarify the current cultural moment and, for this project in particular, illuminates how the secular age has 
shaped and given rise to “this-worldly” theological visions in contemporary American literature. 
 3 Phil Zuckerman and John Shook, “Introduction,” The Oxford Handbook of Secularism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 4. 
 4 Ibid 
 5 Ibid, 5 
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ethical. It is not necessary to unpack all of these, but the descriptions of each form of secularism 
is indicative of the pattern of conflict supposed to exist between each of these spheres and 
religion. For example, they write that political secularism champions a government “independent 
of religion”; educational secularism demands that education be “free of indoctrination and 
proselytizing”; and ethical secularism wants a “scientific explanation of morality.”6 These forms 
of secularism occur alongside consistent rhetorical and polemical attacks on religion in the hope 
of diminishing religion’s influence on public, secular life. Religion, such rhetoric suggests, has 
no place for shaping the concerns of this world. In its more strident forms, this particular 
narrative around secularization—whether bemoaned or lauded—expects an eclipse of faith as the 
world modernizes and progresses or, according to another take on the same phenomenon, it 
declines into irreligious licentiousness. 
Yet what confounds secularization theorists is the persistence of religious beliefs as the 
world modernizes. In fact, the past half century has given rise to sociological research that 
consistently bears out the fact that people in the globalized Western world today are hardly free 
from religious beliefs of some sort. A national survey conducted out of Baylor University, for 
instance, noted that 81 percent of American respondents believe in angels, 68 percent in 
Demons.7 A Gallup poll in 2011 revealed that 92 percent of Americans still believe in God.8 And 
a 2013 survey by the think tank Theos revealed that 77 percent [of Britons] believe that there are 
things in life that we simply cannot explain through science or any other means.”9 And in the 
World Values Survey of 2014, which “represents approximately two-thirds of the world’s adult 
 
 6 Ibid, 11 – 12. 
 7 Baylor University, “The Baylor Religion Survey, Wave 1,” (Waco: Baylor Institute for Studies of 
Religion 2005). 
 8 Frank Newport, “More than 9 in 10 Americans Continue to Believe in God,” Gallup News Service, 2011. 




population,”10 researcher Ariela Keysar notes the remarkable finding that across the world the 
vast majority of adults are still overwhelmingly religious.11 
Religious and non-religious adults are almost evenly split worldwide with 53 percent 
defining themselves as religious, 33 percent as nonreligious, and 11 percent as atheists. 
However, if we look at the religious composition of countries around the world without China, 
which dominates with its sheer population size and large nonreligious segment, the religious 
population rises remarkably to 71 percent while the share of nonreligious drops to 22 percent and 
atheists are estimated as comprising only 4.2 percent.12 Keysar’s analysis of the World Values 
Survey is worth digging into more fully; however, for my purposes, it simply reveals that 
religious belief today is ongoing in the supposedly secularizing times in which we live. 
What intrigues me, as a literary scholar, is identifying within contemporary American 
literature the peculiar tenor and thrust of such religious belief—Christianity in particular—as it is 
manifest in the creative expressions of poets, novelists, and essayists. If we have not done away 
with religion as some secularization theorists predicted and the polling data suggest, has the way 
belief is expressed and understood changed? In contemporary American literature, there are 
signs it has. In the fraught space of belief and doubt that characterize the secular age, writers who 
still maintain some confessional stance as Christians often figure Christianity distinctly as a this-
worldly religion. More intriguing for my particular project is that in terms of how they figure 
material reality, such writers stress that matter is charged—indeed, enchanted—with the ongoing 
presence of its Creator. Such figurations challenge otherworldly manifestations of Christianity 
 
 10 Ariela Keysar, “Religious/Nonreligious Demography and Religion Versus Science: A Global 
Perspective,” The Oxford Handbook of Secularism, Eds. Philip Zuckerman and John Shook (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 40. 
 11 For the purposes of the study here, Keysar notes that “religious” people are those who “attend religious 
services.“ See Keysar, 41. 
 12 Ibid, 42. 
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beholden to Enlightenment thought as well as the materialism of secular skeptics dubious that 
religious belief might add anything of benefit to our understanding and perception of this 
material world. 
This story of secular skepticism towards belief is well told by historians, cultural 
theorists, and sociologists. What is less well known is that the Enlightenment and, later, even the 
“new” science were made possible by shifts within Christian theology. In my opening chapter I 
will explore some of the deeper Christian roots to the Enlightenment since they help to 
contextualize the particular projects of the contemporary American writers who are the focus of 
my study. Understanding some of the theological underpinnings of modern thought and practice 
reveals how shifts within Christian theology as manifested in American literature might still be 
considered with seriousness in a secular context that might remain dubious of religious 
discourse. 
In recent literary criticism, understanding how belief has shifted in the secular age has 
garnered increased attention. A few recent scholars of American literature have put their finger 
on this pulse. Amy Hungerford’s Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 
1960 makes a compelling case that belief never went away in the secular age, but as one reads 
contemporary literature one realizes “how our ways of speaking both about religion and about 
literature have become elliptical” in the sense that authors are consistently attempting to “present 
us with logical and imaginative structures that bridge the gaps between conviction and 
relativism, doctrine and pluralism, belief and meaninglessness.”13 Hungerford’s work, to which I 
will return throughout this project, is important for thinking about how belief in a secular context 
 
 13 Amy Hungerford, Postmodern Belief: American Literature and Religion since 1960 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), xxi.  
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is often shot through with doubt, contingency, relativism, and even a confrontation with the great 
abyss of meaninglessness and unknowing.  
John McClure, in Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Morrison and 
Pynchon, believes that this ongoing fascination with religion and belief in contemporary 
American literature is part of a much longer postsecular American literary tradition characterized 
by “the turn back towards the religious.”14 Yet this turn is marked by a distinct distrust of the 
dogmatism of Christianity still beholden to Enlightenment epistemologies. Both McClure and 
Hungerford’s work on contemporary American literature suggest that a more helpful take15 on 
secularization is needed, one that does not try to show whether or not theological renderings of 
the world are on the way out, but rather how such renderings have changed in this new secular 
context.  
In this dissertation, I explore what writers like Berry have to offer our secular moment, 
particularly in terms of how humans might better perceive and relate to the places they inhabit 
and for which they are responsible. I explore, in particular, how Berry and other contemporary 
American writers draw on and confront the Christian faith in particularly postsecular ways that 
unsettle the assumed narratives about just what reality is and what the human relationship to it 
might be.  
  Before diving in to such an exploration, however, I want to clarify something before we 
start. And to do so, I want to draw on a short book that helps preface my dissertation. In his 1940 
treatise entitled The Problem of Pain, Oxford medievalist and popular Christian apologist, C.S. 
 
 14 John McClure, Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Morrison and Pynchon (Atlanta: 
University of Georgia Press, 2007), 3. 
 15 I will explain the concept of “take” more fully below, but the importance that secularization is a matter of 
one’s “take” comes from Charles Taylor, who, in A Secular Age, contrasts “open takes” with “closed spins.” For 
Taylor, understanding secularization as an ineluctable diminishment of religious belief, for instance, is to render it 
through a particularly closed “spin” that the Academy cherishes. To understand this as a “take,” however, renders it 
open and contestable to other narratives. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge: Belknap, 2007), 551. 
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Lewis, addressed a question commonly understood to cast doubt on the Christian faith: how does 
the existence of a benevolent and omnipotent Creator-God account for the reality of pain and 
suffering in the world? If there is such a being, he either does not desire to relieve creation of its 
apparent torment and is therefore malicious, or he desires the world to be at peace, health, and 
wholeness but is unable to actualize this and is, therefore, impotent. In short, the argument 
asserts that God cannot be both good and powerful while the world continues as it is, “red in 
tooth and claw.”16 
What is of importance in The Problem of Pain, for my purposes at least, is the short 
introductory preface to the book. Lewis understands that the “problem”—so called—of pain only 
becomes a problem if a few basic assumptions are in place. First, Lewis notes, one must have 
some belief, understanding, or experience of “the Numinous,” an inkling that “the universe is 
haunted by spirits.”17 Second, one needs a sense of morality, a sense of the right one “ought” to 
perform and the wrong one ought not to perform. Linking these first two points, Lewis argues 
that readers will also need to think that “the Numinous power to which they feel awe is made the 
guardian of the morality to which they feel an obligation.”18 Once this relational and 
communicative connection occurs between “the Numinous” and human behaviour, the reality of 
suffering in the world starts to become less of a troubling fact and more of a troubling 
 
 16 This phrase first occurs in Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “In Memoriam” (1850) where he writes, “Nature, red 
in tooth and claw,” to refer to the wild ferocity of nature that contradicts more pastoral depictions. See Alfred 
Gatty, A Key to Lord Tennyson's "in Memoriam,” Fourth ed. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1905). 
 17 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1940), 5 – 6. 
 18 Ibid, 12.  It is also worth noting here that Lewis admits this third step is the most “unnatural” and 
throughout history few groups of people have ever committed to it entirely, but it breaks in upon Stoicism, 
paganism, and even pantheism in various ways. Lewis believes there was only a “single people, as a people, who 
took the new step with perfect decision,” which was the Jews (and later Christians) who “fully and unambiguously 
identified the awful Presence haunting black mountain-tops and thunderclouds with ‘the righteous Lord’ who 
‘loveth righteousness’ (Psalm 11:8).” Ibid, 13. 
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conundrum. Just why does a Numinous realm concerned with what “ought” to be allow the 
present reality to persist? 
  I have no desire to explore Lewis’ theodicy here, but Lewis’s introductory note is 
instructive. He is not attempting to exclude readers, but only to make them aware that what 
follows will make sense (or not) depending on how they relate to the various preconditions he 
lays out. Lewis, writing in the mid-twentieth century, is keenly aware that in the context in which 
he writes there are many who will come at this problem from very different starting points and 
very different experiential backgrounds. Some will completely discount the possibility of the 
Numinous, while others might discount that the Numinous, if there is such a thing, has any 
connection to human morality or the way things ought to be. Whatever the case, if one is 
interested in understanding suffering as a problem, it will help to become aware of the 
foundational understandings and belief systems that even allow it to become a problem in the 
first place. 
In a similar way, the situation and argument of this project become more accessible if one 
is aware of their—and my—pre-existing assumptions. In what follows, I argue (alongside many 
others) that a key feature of the secular age briefly outlined above is the pervasive “myth” of 
disenchantment. Crudely stated, this is an imaginative rendering of the material world, catalyzed 
in the Enlightenment but by no means unique to it, that the material world is mechanical and 
inert and its value is derivative of human use, control, and manipulation. 19 I will explore this 
“myth” (and my particular choice of phrasing) more fully in the opening chapter; however, at 
 
 19 It should be noted that many in the hard sciences simply do not see the world in such a fashion. However, 
I agree with Jason Josephson-Storm’s assessment that the “mechanized world picture” wrought through 
disenchantment has become “an ahistorical and universal “Real” against which other myths [narratives of the world] 
are shattered.” See Jason Josephson-Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the 
Human Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 5. 
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this point it is worth noting that by “myth” I do not mean a false story, but rather, more broadly, 
a story that orients us in the world by making sense of, among other things, who we are, where 
we are going, what the earth is, and what our relationship to it should be. The “myth” of 
disenchantment, I argue, is a lived narrative that has generated many technological marvels yet 
has fostered a destructive stance toward the world, to others, and ultimately to ourselves. And 
this narrative has shaped both post-Enlightenment science and religion. A healthier relationship 
between humans and nature requires many things, of course, but fundamentally it must involve 
some form of re-enchantment, an alternative or revised myth by which we might live.  
I maintain that the theological visions in contemporary American literature provide some 
of the possible re-narrations—or myths of re-enchantment—in the secular age that are worthy of 
serious attention. In particular, there are three contemporary American writers who draw 
specifically on the challenges and possibilities within Christian religion as it exists within a 
postsecular secular culture in order to reimagine the relationship between humans and nature. 
These writers are Christian Wiman, Marilynne Robinson, and Wendell Berry. Each of these 
authors write against particular aspects of our disenchanted, secular condition that they find 
inadequate for understanding and relating to the natural world. They counter the lived mythology 
of disenchantment, and often quite explicitly. They confessionally identify within the tradition of 
Christianity, yet they also write against contemporary versions, often heavily dogmatic or 
fundamentalist, that they find inadequate for addressing this world. Because of this, each of these 
writers has also not found themselves to be “at home” in certain Christian communities. I am 
drawn to these writers because their calls to re-enchant the earth are not simply nostalgic 
longings to recover a “more Christian” world that has departed. Rather, their calls for re-
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enchantment involve articulating and imagining the ways in which Christianity can be inflected 
and informed by the disenchanted, secular age. 
I understand that the particular argument and focus of this project might sound 
tendentious for those who disagree with some or all of the claims of Christianity. Yet my intrigue 
remains in how Christianity—as mediated in contemporary American literature through the 
writings of Wiman, Robinson, and Berry—poses significant challenges both for Christians whose 
practices are undergirded by the perduring myth of disenchantment and for anyone else who 
remain unsettled and unsatisfied by this myth and haunted by a natural world that does not seem 




























CHAPTER ONE: THE MYTH OF DISENCHANTMENT 
 
Living by Myths in the (Post)secular Age 
____________________ 
 
“A human community,” Wendell Berry writes in “The Work of Local Culture,” “must collect 
leaves and stories, and turn them to account. It must build soil, and build that memory of itself—
in lore and story and song—that will be its culture.”20 Berry’s reflection comes as he looks upon 
a seemingly simple compost bucket which is silently undertaking “the greatest miracle [of] 
making earth” from the nuts, leaves, rain water, and branches that have, over the years, 
accumulated within it.21 From the death of such earthy things emerges life-giving soil. This is the 
mundane miracle upon which all human life and, by extension, all human culture, depends. 
While it might seem so at first glance, this bucket “is not trivial,” but remains, Berry writes, “one 
of the signs by which [he] knows [his] country and [him]self.”22  
 What Berry calls the “miracle of life”23 witnessed in the cultivation of soil is but one 
example of the complex ecological reality in which humans find themselves from birth to death. 
We need food to eat, water to slake our thirst, air to breathe, soil in which to cultivate food, 
sunlight and rain and fire. We are made of matter and depend on it for our ongoing life. For 
Berry, the relationship between humans and humus—between humans and the material world— 
is a key marker of whether a culture is healthy or diseased.  
 
 20 Wendell Berry, “The Work of Local Culture,” What are People For? (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 1990), 
154. 
 21 Ibid, 153. 
 22 Ibid, 154. 
 23 Wendell Berry, Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition (Washington: Counterpoint, 
2000), 6. 
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Humans are, unlike other animals, also storied creatures. And the shared memories and 
narratives of our past form and inform the cultures we make and pass on. How we story, or 
mythologize, our situation and experience impact how we orient ourselves in the world and how 
we behave. For Berry, preserving the world requires, at least, two forms of local work: the active 
cultivation of good topsoil and the active remembering and passing down of shared stories and 
traditions. What becomes manifest in our culture and in our soil is an accounting of what was put 
in. What concerns Berry and the other writers who are the focus of this project is that the 
ecological destruction that permeates American culture is a manifestation and symptom of a 
diseased culture. Healing requires better inputs. It requires better practices of land use, to be sure, 
but it also requires cultural memory and more life-giving narratives that might better orient 
humans to each other and to their world.  
In the latter half of the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, it has become clear 
that the global culture and economy Berry feared in works such as A Continuous Harmony and 
The Unsettling of America would erode and destroy local American culture and local bioregions 
has attained a potency unique to human history. Indeed in “The Ecological Crisis as a Crisis of 
Agriculture,” one of the early essays from The Unsettling of America, Berry’s warnings about 
wilderness depletion, the death of small towns and communities, the fracturing of families, and 
the growing inability of most Americans to produce and prepare food let alone to know where it 
comes from are all symptoms of a disease that today has come to full fruition.24  
The destruction of the natural world is so unique that a growing consensus is emerging 
around a new term for our epoch: the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene—like soil made in a 
compost bucket—did not come from nothing. Rather, we got precisely what we put in. And in 
 
 24 Wendell Berry, “The Ecological Crisis as a Crisis of Agriculture,” The Unsettling of America: Culture 
and Agriculture (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 17 – 27.  
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this dissertation, I want to argue that the current moment of the Anthropocene which so unsettles 
American culture—that is, makes it a culture of dis-ease—is the consequence of post-
Enlightenment religious and scientific narratives—lived mythologies—that encourage humans to 
take a destructive stance over and against the natural world.  
In American literature today, the writings of Christian Wiman, Marilynne Robinson, and 
Wendell Berry are only several of many voices indicating there is ongoing and growing 
dissatisfaction with these post-Enlightenment lived mythologies that seek to separate humanity 
from nature, defining humans in a relation over-and-against it. There is a growing desire to 
envision and articulate new lived mythologies, new narratives, that might help us better 
reimagine this world and the human place in it.  
In this opening chapter, I begin by exploring just how the Anthropocene functions as an 
extension of the Enlightenment project in two significant and interconnected ways. First, there is 
a cultivation of the technological and scientific stance towards the material world. Second, there 
is an anti-religious bias encoded into this stance. Without getting too far afield in the 
complexities of the Enlightenment project, I briefly explore these twin threads through one of the 
paradigmatic Enlightenment proponents: Francis Bacon. After unearthing a small section of 
these deeper Enlightenment roots to our Anthropocene malaise, I will suggest that there are even 
deeper roots to the entire Enlightenment project that are Christian.  
There are primarily two related reasons that I explore the longer story of the 
Anthropocene in this chapter. First, if the Christian alternatives to disenchantment we find in 
contemporary American literature are to make sense, it will have to be with the understanding 
that Christianity is complicit in the very problems some of its practitioners attempt to address. 
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Therefore, second, this story helps us to move beyond simplistic and reductive conflict narratives 
of religion and science, faith and reason and towards the more productive middle spaces. 
As noted in the Preface, the specific focal point of this project wherein religion and 
ecology and literature intersect in important ways is what I am calling the myth of 
disenchantment. This lived mythology, I argue, permeates the Anthropocene and is one of the 
deepest sites of unease that has catalyzed various attempts towards a new lived mythology of re-
enchantment. I will therefore first address clearly what I mean in regard to “lived mythology” 
and then turn my attention to the particular features of disenchantment. These features are 
articulated early in the 20th century by the sociologist Max Weber whose popular account 
persists. However, I will look much more closely at the ways in which philosopher Charles 
Taylor frames disenchantment in the context of the secular age in which belief and unbelief exist 
in a creative —and arguably sometimes quite hostile—tension with one another. Taylor’s 
situating of disenchantment is, I argue, a helpful and necessary entryway for exploring the 
distinctly postsecular forms of Christianity—and re-enchantment—on offer in the writing of 
Wiman, Robinson, and Berry.  
 
The Anthropocene: Our Post-Enlightenment Malaise 
To better understand the context in which Wiman, Robinson, and Berry are articulating their 
particularly Christian narratives about material reality, it will help to understand the malaise that 
pervades contemporary thought in the Anthropocene era.  While the Anthropocene is a relatively 
new development, the term itself has longer historical roots. In 1870, the Italian geologist 
Antonio Stoppani proposed that a new geological era had dawned: the “age of man.” His 
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proposed “Anthropozoic” never caught on,25 yet over a century later, when the Dutch chemist 
Paul Crutzen declared that the Holocene—the post-glacial age which dates back about 12,000 
years ago—was over and the Anthropocene had begun, the notion stuck.26 In textbooks and 
academic conferences, niche academic journals and popular magazines, a growing consensus 
emerged that we are indeed living in a new epoch, one in which human activity is so pervasive 
and so potent that it has drastically altered the course of the entire human and non-human 
world.27  
As Crutzen explains it, the Anthropocene is marked by “human dominance of biological, 
chemical, and geological processes on Earth.” 28 From genetic modification of food to the 
poisoning of the rain to the increase of greenhouse gases and the destruction of the ozone layer, 
the fingerprints of humans, for better and for worse, are on everything. In an article written ten 
years after he popularized the term, Crutzen clarifies just how significant this new epoch is in 
terms of its unprecedented reformulation of the human relationship to the natural world: 
In the 20th century, new technologies, fossil fuels, and a fast-growing population resulted 
in a “Great Acceleration” of our own powers. Albeit clumsily, we are taking control of 
Nature’s realm, from climate to DNA. We humans are becoming the dominant force for 
 
 25 Elizabeth Kolbert, “Enter the Anthropocene—The Age of Man,” National Geographic (March 2011), 
Accessed July 2020, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2011/03/age-of-man/ 
26 Paul Crutzen, “The Anthropocene,” Earth System Science in the Anthropocene, ed Eckart Ehlers and 
Thomas Kraft (Springer Berlin: Heidelberg, 2002), 14. 
 27 It should be noted that the term Anthropocene is also under continuous debate since it “provides a new 
lens through which age-old narratives and philosophical questions are being revisited and rewritten” and has “the 
potential to radically revise the way we think of what it means to be human” (4). For more on this, see Erle C Ellis, 
Anthropocene: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
 28 Paul Crutzen and Christian Schwagerl, “Living in the Anthropocene: A New Global Ethos,” Yale 
Environment 360 (2011), Accessed Summer 2020:  
https://e360.yale.edu/features/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos 
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change on Earth. A long-held religious and philosophical idea — humans as the masters 
of planet Earth — has turned into a stark reality.29 
The techno-industrial advances of the Anthropocene have inarguably bestowed benefits on the 
human world. Increased life-expectancy, agriculture productivity, and disease control are but a 
few of the most obvious and profound accomplishments made possible by relatively recent 
human technologies. But Crutzen’s prose is hardly characterized by unfettered optimism. And 
perhaps what is most telling is that the current stark reality of the Anthropocene is, according to 
Crutzen, the endgame of both a scientific and religious narrative in which humans render 
themselves “masters of planet Earth.”30 Crutzen does not explicitly state it here, but he has both 
the post-Enlightenment narrative of scientific mastery and the Christian “cultural mandate” of 
Genesis 1: 26-2831 in his crosshairs. These twin narratives, according to Crutzen, have created 
the conditions in which the Anthropocene even became possible. And Crutzen, like many today, 
is not optimistic about what this has meant. 
In ecocritical literature, a very well-known and often referenced lecture32 by Lynn White 
Jr. asserts the same point as Crutzen’s, albeit more explicitly, about the religious beliefs that 
catalyzed the ecological problems inherent in the Anthropocene. In “The Historical Roots of our 
Ecological Crisis” White argues that  “what people do about their ecology depends on what they 
 
29 Ibid 
 30 Ibid 
 31 Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the 
fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every creeping 
thing that creeps on the earth. So God created man in his own image, / in the image of God he created him; / male 
and female he created them. And God blessed them. And God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the 
earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every 
living thing that moves on the earth.” Genesis 1: 26 – 28, English Standard Version (ESV). 
 32 As a sign of how influential White’s essay has been in ecocritical discourse, I should note that it was 
included as the first essay in Glotfelty and Fromm’s The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology 
(Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 1996), a collection which identified ecocriticism as a new critical 
methodology that was truly interdisciplinary. In addition, White’s essay was included in Ken Hiltner’s Ecocriticism: 
The Essential Reader (Routledge, 2015) and received extended treatment in Lawrence Buell’s The Future of 
Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and the Literary Imagination (Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). 
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think about themselves in relation to things around them.”33 To frame this as Berry might, a 
healthy culture is manifested by how the land is treated and the narratives from which such 
ecological thinking and behaviours emerge. The problem for White, like Crutzen, is that the 
religious narrative of the West is predominantly a dualistic form of Christianity that has 
encouraged humans to see themselves as set apart from nature. Humans, in this Christian 
figuration, exist in a relationship defined by mastery and control over a nature whose goodness 
and value requires the cultivating work of human hands and the meaning making work of human 
minds. And this relationship is not only endorsed, but mandated, by God. 
White writes: “Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions, 
[…] not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that 
man exploit nature for his proper ends.”34 For White, “more science and more technology are not 
going to get us out of the present ecological crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink our old 
one.”35 While there are numerous contemporary American writers thinking about ecology from 
the perspective of “new” religious formulations or non-Christian religions; my interest is how 
(and why) writers like Berry, Robinson, and Wiman undertake the task of rethinking 
Christianity. 
The Anthropocene has inarguably given rise to many of the technological advances that 
most of us enjoy today, yet it is marked by dis-ease. The past century has witnessed a rise in 
nuclear technologies that can power the world and wipe out civilization as we know it. It has 
provided us with the nitrogen fixation that allows for an abundance of food for a growing 
population but also hypoxic zones and infertile topsoil that make life untenable. It has catalyzed 
 
33 Lynn White Jr., “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155, no. 37 (1967): 1204. 
34 Ibid 
 35 Ibid 
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the creation of new roads and forms of connectivity and the rising pollutants that make air unsafe 
to breathe and water unsafe to drink. Species are going extinct and ecosystems are collapsing at 
unprecedented rates. This ongoing and intensifying destruction of the natural world is one of the 
most potent sources of malaise in our late-modern world. And while we might revel in the 
benefits that the Anthropocene has bestowed on humans, many are rightfully alarmed that such 
advances are anything but, if they are created through the unsustainable destruction of the natural 
world on which all life—humanity included—depends.  
The rise of increasingly potent and pervasive technologies has long been understood to be 
a particular consequence and inheritance of post-Enlightenment applications of the scientific 
method to the betterment of humanity and it is often, somewhat problematically, conflated with 
the Christian belief, rooted in Genesis 1: 26-28, that the earth is to be subdued and dominated by 
humans. Both Crutzen and Lynn White Jr. make this conflation. Yet separating the historical 
Christian tradition from its post-Enlightenment rendering is not to excuse it, but to create a much 
more productive way of understanding how contemporary American writers are attempting to 
recover certain Christian insights regarding ecology in a secular age.  
This recovery project is not merely difficult to do, but also difficult to understand and 
take seriously, in a post-Enlightenment world conditioned to see a conflict and tension between 
science and religion, reason and faith. Without going into too much detail, the seeds of this 
conflict are already evident early in the rise of the Modern age in the writings of Francis Bacon. 
While Francis Bacon wrote numerous tracts and essays, perhaps no other text quite captures the 
feeling of the Enlightenment’s unfettered optimism than his unpublished and incomplete 1626 
novella New Atlantis.36 In the work Bacon envisions a utopian society, Bensalem, that is built on 
 
 36 Francis Bacon, New Atlantis and The Great Instauration, ed Jerry Weinberger (Wheeling, IL: Crofts 
Classics, 1989). 
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both Christian and humanistic principles and dedicated to uncovering—or, rather, extracting—
the secrets of nature through repeated experimentation and observation. Historian Morris Berman 
argues that “Bacon pointed out that one had to question nature directly by putting it in a position 
in which it was forced to yield up its answers.”37 Through Bacon’s writing we not only get a 
sense of  a new scientific optimism, but we start to sense a new posture towards nature emerging. 
This posture characterizes the post-Enlightenment, Modern world.38 Thinking retrospectively 
about this posture in the world, Romano Guardini argues that through Bacon and other 
Enlightenment theorists of the “new” science arises the possibility for the “technological man 
[who] experiences nature neither as a strand of value nor as a living shelter for his spirit [but] as 
an insensate order, as a cold body of facts, as an object of utility, as raw material to be hammered 
into useful shape.”39 Guardini’s point is worth reiterating: the technological man of the post-
Enlightenment world only becomes really possible when the very nature of material reality and 
humanity’s relationship to it is reconfigured through a new, lived mythology that shapes one’s 
very stance toward the world. 
The Enlightenment’s new rendering of the earth also emerged alongside a new skeptical 
attitude towards the inherited knowledge of religious tradition, particularly Christianity in the 
West. Bacon is also one of the chief Enlightenment articulators for distrusting religious beliefs in 
the pursuit of this-worldly knowledge. In his magisterial Novum Organum, which articulates the 
“new” scientific method, Francis Bacon also theorized that attaining this new posture to the 
world required removing various “idols of the mind” that, in earlier ages, were hurdles to a true, 
 
 37 Morris Berman, The Re-enchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 28. 
 38 To be clear, the “counter-Enlightenment” impulses of ecocriticism are well documented. For a full 
overview of this literature, see L. Hinchman and S. Hinchman, “Should Environmentalists Reject the 
Enlightenment?” The Review of Politics vol 63, no. 4 (2001), 663 – 692.   
 39 Romano Guardini, The End of the Modern World, Trans. Joseph Theman and Herbert Brooke (Delaware: 
ISI Books, 1956), 55. 
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more useful knowledge of reality. Among these Bacon included “idols of the theater,” which 
were the performed idols and narrative practices attached to religious dogma and ancient 
tradition. In Bacon’s assessment, unverified beliefs, myths, and superstitions were uncritical and 
naïve ways of apprehending the world that more careful and progressive quality of attention 
could undo. Bacon writes: 
Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas 
of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the 
Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, 
representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only 
of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; 
for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed and in like artificial manner 
set forth; seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the 
most part alike. Neither again do I mean this only of entire systems, but also of many 
principles and axioms in science, which by tradition, credulity, and negligence have come 
to be received.40 
Attention to Bacon’s thought helps to explain a particular anti-religious sentiment that runs 
through the Enlightenment. As intellectual and cultural descendants of the Enlightenment, we 
recognize how similar anti-religious sentiments still exist today. Among the idols of the theater, 
Bacon includes “superstitions” which are an “unwholesome mixture of things human and divine” 
which causes both “fantastic philosophy” and also “heretical religion.”41 Bacon believed 
Christianity (Catholicism in particular) was a particular form of this unhelpful superstition that 
 
 40 Francis Bacon. The New Organon, Book 1. Trans James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas 
Denon Heath. The Works of Francis Bacon. Vol 8 (Boston: Taggard and Thompson, 1863). 
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impeded scientific thought.42 Within Bacon’s argument one sees that the rise of the 
“technological man” that Guardini describes as the embodiment of the Anthropocene has 
emerged at least partly within a conflicted space between reason and faith, science and religion 
that was cultivated by the Enlightenment. And it is this conflicted space that becomes a hallmark 
of the rising post-Enlightenment secularism that is the dominant context in which contemporary 
American fiction must be read. 
But this is only part of the post-Enlightenment narrative, one that focuses solely upon the 
rise of a modern science reimagining what material reality is while also attempting to detach 
itself from religious belief. However, to get a more complete narrative, it is important to also 
remember that modern science became possible because of shifts within Christian theology and, 
in turn, Christian theology became inflected by this new narrative of the world. There are 
multiple accounts of this, some of them referenced below, but for this particular aspect of the 
narrative I rely on the work of Charles Taylor. He notes in A Secular Age that well before Bacon, 
the ground was being prepared for the Novum Organon by theological discussions of the high 
middle ages about the nature of nature. It was not scientists but theologians such as William of 
Occam and Duns Scotus who were worried that an Aristotelian-inspired Thomism actually put 
limits upon God.43 
As a counter to Thomism, Scotus and Occam proposed nominalism, a theological 
movement which attempted to create distance between a God who was not bound by the world of 
time and change and His creation which was; they argued that “the super-agent who is God 
relates to things as freely to be disposed of according to his autonomous purposes.”44 Therefore 
 
 42 See Howard B. White, Peace Among the Willows: The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Springer 
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nominalists sought to exclude final causation, or teleology, as a category of knowledge for the 
natural world. This was not to deny God’s existence nor even his free involvement in the world. 
Rather, it was only to suggest that the material, formal, and efficient causes of Nature were alone 
worthy of intellectual, scientific pursuit. Such a move created an intellectual climate wherein the 
mechanized world of modern science is far from inevitable, but much more plausible. This is the 
first step towards a form of Christian Deism in which distinct spheres of secular and sacred, 
natural and supernatural are emerging. In such a framework, the church and Christianity’s role 
truly become otherworldly. And once God is removed from the ongoing processes of nature, the 
myth of a disenchanted world becomes much more plausible. The myth of disenchantment, then, 
is partially a consequence of Christian theology.  
Disconnecting God from the earth and, by extension, science from religion and belief, is 
not, according to James K.A. Smith, some sort of “virgin birth” of modernity; “Even modernity,” 
Smith notes, “has an unrecognized father: the late middle ages.”45 Indeed both modernity and 
postmodernity are marked by an inability—or unwillingness, Smith admits—to look at these 
fathers and better understand them since it is Scotus who leads the way to “a radical separation 
of Creator from creature, entailing a discrete, secular order.”46 The theological shift wrought by 
nominalism is significant for the story I want to tell because in reconfiguring nature as an 
autonomous realm, rather than as a God-controlled and God-sustained realm, a new stance to the 
world is also being introduced via Christian theology that paves the way for the forthcoming 
Enlightenment disposition. A new self is emerging: “We, the dependent, created agents have to 
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relate to these things [nature] not in terms of the normative patterns they reveal, but in terms of 
the autonomous super-purposes of our Creator. The purposes things serve are extrinsic to them. 
The stance is fundamentally one of instrumental reason.”47 Contrary to some narratives of the 
Enlightenment, this stance did not emerge simply in resistance to Christian thought, but through 
a subtle shift within Christian thought. Indeed, it is shortly after these theological shifts, John 
Milbank argues, that Christian conceptions of the cultural mandate in Genesis are largely co-
opted: “Adam’s dominion over creation is now defined in terms of power, and more specifically, 
a power over things in terms of property.”48 In the final chapter of this project, Wendell Berry’s 
re-engagement with the cultural mandate within the strictures of a disenchanted world is nothing 
less than a hacking at these theological and cultural roots which are centuries deep.  
While the posture of control over the world is often understood as a consequence of 
modern science, it is important to understand when we turn to religious alternatives that this 
stance was originally made possible by shifts within Christianity. And this stance is possible 
because both post-Enlightenment science and Christianity have often inhabited a shared lived 
mythology. 
 
The “Myth” of Disenchantment 
The American naturalist E.O. Wilson49 notes, when it comes to “Enlightenment founders, 
[Bacon’s] spirit is the one that most endures. It informs us across four centuries that we must 
understand nature both around us and within ourselves in order to set humanity on the course of 
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 48 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 12 – 13. 
 49 I make particular mention of E.O. Wilson here because he becomes a key sparring partner with both 
Wendell Berry and, to a lesser extent, Marilynne Robinson. 
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self-improvement.”50 E.O. Wilson and Francis Bacon span four centuries, but they are both 
representative of variations of a particular story about the modern world. This story, or myth, has 
profoundly shaped the ways in which nature is perceived, imagined, interacted with, used, and 
subsequently abused. It has even informed theological interpretations of Genesis, as noted above, 
that continue to animate various Christian communities in America today. This myth, this 
narrative, is a true accomplishment of Western thought and has allowed for all the technological 
ingenuity that characterize the Anthropocene, to be sure. However, I argue that this myth has 
also been the source of our increasing unrest and dis-ease as environmental degradation threatens 
to undo us. The post-Enlightenment myth that has so shaped perceptions of nature is the myth of 
disenchantment. 
Before unpacking what is entailed by this myth, I want to make clear that to argue 
disenchantment is a myth is not to suggest that it is untrue or has never happened. Rather, what I 
mean is that as myth, disenchantment provides a potent, orienting narrative for those who are 
intellectual descendants of the Enlightenment, now living in the modern world. When it comes to 
talking about myth on narrative terms, I am taking my cues, in part, from Jason Josephson-Storm 
and his recent scholarship in The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of 
Human Sciences. Josephson-Storm acknowledges that the notion of “myth” does not have the 
proper connotations for a contemporary audience, yet he suggests our reticence about the term is 
indicative of how beholden to a certain story of the world we remain. Our reticence has deep 
roots.  
He maintains that suspicion towards the truth of “myths” is due in large part to how the 
German Romantics framed the Enlightenment as “an anti-myth, a myth that described itself in 
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terms of longing, absence, and mythlessness.”51 As the Romantics understood it, and as just 
noted in the passage from Bacon, the Enlightenment had self-consciously sought out to abolish 
mythic tradition, casting doubts on the validity and necessity of these false, shared narratives—
these mythologies—which indeed gave cultures their coherence and rooted them to particular 
places, but were not helpful in properly understanding the nature of reality. The Enlightenment 
project, as articulate by Bacon and others, sought to liberate individuals from these superstitious 
stories in order to more fully comprehend the world in ways that tradition, religion, and 
superstition inhibited.  
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno also argue that the 
Enlightenment project was ultimately about “the dissolution of myths and the substitution of 
knowledge for fancy.”52 Yet even though the Enlightenment aimed at liberating men from fear 
and establishing their sovereignty through such a dissolution of mythology, it failed to deliver on 
its promises. Rather, and this is Horkheimer and Adorno’s central argument, it became the 
source of a new regnant mythology: 
In the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane. In its blank purity, the 
reality which has been cleansed of demons and their conceptual descendants assumes the 
numinous character which the ancient world attributed to demons. Under the title of brute 
facts, the social injustice from which they proceed is now as assuredly sacred a preserve 
as the medicine man was sacrosanct by reason of the projection of his gods.53 
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In the act of stripping away myth, superstitions, and religious belief, the Enlightenment merely 
gave rise to a powerful, new mythos, one that demanded belief in the omnicompetence of 
utilitarian reason, empirical observation, the “new” science, and new technological applications 
rather than in traditions and beliefs, a pantheon of gods, or the unobservable spirits of some 
numinous realm.  
Horkheimer and Adorno note that an enduring characteristic of the Enlightenment mythos 
is the disenchantment of the world, which “is the extirpation of animism. […] [Such categories 
as spirits] were abandoned as idola theatri of the old metaphysics and assessed as being even 
then memorials of the elements and powers of the prehistory for which life and earth disclosed 
their nature in myths and became interwoven in them.”54 As noted earlier, this myth of 
disenchantment catalyzed a particular stance to the world wherein many “want to learn from 
nature how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men.”55 Far from being sanguine 
about the illumination human reason has shed upon the earth, Horkheimer and Adorno maintain 
that “the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.”56 In other words: the triumphant 
disaster of ecological degradation is now a potent source of our malaise in the post-
Enlightenment Anthropocene. This enlightened disenchantment of the world has led to the 
world’s desecration. 
To say disenchantment is a myth is to appreciate its potency as a narrative capable of 
shaping the contours of thought and experience. However, it also suggests that disenchantment 
can remain open to counter-myths or counter-narratives. When the disenchanted world is 
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assumed to simply be verified as “the way things are” and no longer a shared narrative is when it 
becomes most potent and most debilitating: its contestability is forgotten.  
That such myths are lived narratives is the central premise of Mary Midgley’s The Myths 
We Live By in which she maintains that “myths are not lies [but] imaginative patterns, networks 
of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world. They shape its 
meaning.”57 For Midgley, “our imaginative visions are central to our understanding of the 
world.”58 Such a claim, she acknowledges, runs counter to an age proceeding from the 
Enlightenment that has “saved us this trouble [of being guided by our imagination] by 
completely eliminating myths and fairy-tales from our thinking.”59 But for Midgley—much like 
for Horkheimer and Adorno—the Enlightenment did not put an end to mythology, but merely 
replaced certain mythologies for other ones: “What the Enlightenment did was to develop its 
own set of myths, striking pictures whose attraction usually relies on the lure of reduction.”60 
Several features of this reduction, particular in reference to the myth of disenchantment, will start 
to emerge in this chapter. 
To reiterate, that disenchantment is a “myth” is not to say that disenchantment never 
happened. My argument in this project is precisely the opposite: it is because disenchantment 
functions as a “myth we live by” that it has become such a powerful way of orienting behavior, 
directing perception, and informing experience. And it involves a lot more (although, no less) 
than simply imagining the numinous, spiritual realm away.  
The myth of disenchantment creates a particular hermeneutic, or interpretative lens, 
through which the world and humanity’s relationship to it are perceived and enacted. It shapes 
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our views on the locus of meaning in the world, it shapes our views on ourselves, and it shapes 
our views on our relationship to the entire world that is not human. Overall, this myth relies on 
the assertion that nature, the world beyond our heads, is inert and this mechanistic, law-bound, 
non-human environment can be—and should be—fully grasped by the human mind and hand. 
This myth of a disenchanted world has catalyzed a stance of human control and dominance over-
and-against non-human nature that has given us undeniable power for creation and destruction. 
Both science and Christian theology have been complicit in its perpetuation. And it is this 
particular aspect of the “enlightened earth” that causes our dis-ease and for the past centuries 
“radiates disaster triumphant.”61 But because it is a myth, there remains hope: counter-myths are 
always on offer. 
That the myth of disenchantment has led to a problematic stance over-and-against the 
world is to suggest that our ecological problems today are not simply solved by better technology 
and science, as Lynn White Jr. noted. While these will obviously be necessary, they are 
downstream of the deeper problems about our perception of the world, the presuppositions 
undergirding it, and the technologies and practices that perpetuate and encode it. “The source of 
the environmental crisis,” Neil Evernden noted in the early 1990s, “lies not without but within, 
not in industrial effluent but in assumptions so casually held as to be virtually invisible.”62  He is 
likely overstating the case. We need both. However, the “invisible assumptions” about the world 
inherent to the myth of disenchantment are difficult for those who inhabit the modern world to 
see clearly. In many ways, myths act like lenses. We may think that we simply look through 
them, but they colour all we see. Until we are forced to look at them. And we are only forced to 
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look at them when we get the uncanny feeling that they are no longer adequately revealing the 
world to us as they should. The growing concern about our unravelling natural world has been 
bringing many, for quite a while now, to such a moment.63 We are the least likely to understand 
the myth of disenchantment that has become so pervasive in the day to day experience of modern 
life.  
It is precisely the modern experience of life that led the 20th century sociologist Max 
Weber to articulate the distinct features of our disenchanted age. Just over a century ago, Weber 
examined modernity’s disenchantment in his 1918 lecture “Science as Vocation.”  
In the context of the entire essay, Weber’s claim was that the increased intellectualization and 
rationalization of the post-Enlightenment West gave a certain hegemony (at least in the 
Academy) to the notion that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but 
rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.”64 According to Weber, such a 
posture towards the world becomes possible through a disenchantment of material reality that 
alters experience. People might still believe in spirits inhabiting matter or be intrigued by the 
possibility—that is, there are still religious believers, for instance—but they do not experience 
the spiritual world in the same ways most did several centuries prior. The fear or reverence or 
awe that marked a material world infused by an unseen, spiritual realm is lost in a world 
illuminated by utilitarian reason and subjected to human control for human purposes.  
This new posture is confident in its belief that one no longer has to have recourse to 
magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the modern occult participants or 
 
63 It cannot be stressed enough, however, that such reimagining (or re-mythologizing) has been underway 
for centuries. The Romantics, the Transcendentalists, and most recently the new materialists have all sought better 
ways to figure the world and challenge the myth of disenchantment.  
64 Max Weber, “Science as Vocation,” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (Oxford: 1981), 140. 
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even religious adherents for whom such powers continue to exist and operate. In the 
disenchanted world, Weber argues, “Technical means and calculations perform the service.”65 
Alongside this impulse to control nature was an ineluctable diminishment of awe and wonder as 
an intelligent response to the world. Or as naturalist Robert MacFarlane quips: “Mastery usurped 
mystery.”66  
But this is not to say that scientists were not constantly pushing up against the edges of 
all they did not know and confronting the “mysterious” realm of the unknown behind the 
appearances. What changed, in Weber’s account, was a new confidence in humanity’s power to 
know, and the implicit assumption that simply with more time and better techne the unknown 
aspects of the world would, eventually and inevitably, be understood. Anybody today who has 
survived diabetes because of insulin knows this attitude has had undoubted human benefit. Yet 
Weber notes that the contingency and the limits of human knowledge which may very well have 
led to a posture of humility and restraint, were increasingly lost in the new scientific attitude 
sweeping through European research universities after the Enlightenment.  
 
American Literature in the (Post)Secular Age 
This familiar story of disenchantment been told by many and in The Enchantment of 
Modern Life, Jane Bennett maintains that “Weber’s version [of disenchantment] is the most 
influential.”67 Bennett’s claim, however, is now a bit dated given that the philosopher Charles 
Taylor’s sprawling account of disenchantment in A Secular Age has done more to revive and 
reshape the conversation around disenchantment today, influencing a wide swath of academic 
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disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, intellectual history, and, most significantly for this 
project, literary theory.68 In some ways, Taylor’s account of the myth of disenchantment69 
follows roughly the same contours as Weber’s, which I will not rehash. Yet what is of particular 
importance for Taylor is how disenchantment functions as a central feature of our secular age.70 
In Taylor’s particular narrative about secularization, I argue, we gain a valuable hermeneutic 
framework for reading contemporary American writers who offer important counter-myths of re-
enchantment.  
The American writers who are the primary focus of this project, I have noted, are 
Christian Wiman, Marilynne Robinson, and Wendell Berry, each of whom draw explicitly upon 
the Christian tradition in order to develop what I term “myths of re-enchantment.” Christian 
Wiman, for starters, is an acclaimed American poet who served as the editor of the prestigious 
Poetry magazine from 2003 to 2013 and (at the time of writing this) is teaching at Yale Divinity 
School. He has received numerous awards, including The Commonwealth Prize for his 2010 
collection Every Riven Thing, a Guggenheim Fellowship, and a National Book Critics Circle 
Award for his poetry collection Once in the West. Wiman is far from a fringe voice in 
contemporary American thought and poetry. Apart from his poetry (and noted throughout his 
poetry) is the fact that Wiman suffers from an excruciatingly painful and rather rare form of 
cancer. In My Bright Abyss: Meditation of a Modern Believer, Wiman wrestles with this difficult 
diagnosis and painful treatments that push him to the edge of his physical limits. In his 
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meandering and provocative collection of fragmented essays, Wiman ponders just what death, 
that final human limit, might reveal about the world:  
…to die well, even for the atheist, is to believe that there is some way of dying into life 
rather than simply away from it, some form of survival that love makes possible. I don’t 
mean by survival merely persisting in the memory of others; I mean something deeper 
and more durable. If quantum entanglement is true, if related particles react in similar or 
opposite ways even when separated by tremendous distances, then it is obvious that the 
whole world is alive and communicating in ways we do not fully understand. And we are 
part of that life, part of that communication—even as, maybe even especially as, our 
atoms begin the long dispersal we call death.71 
Wiman, at the time of writing this, has converted from Atheism to Christianity. In a sense, he has 
found a new myth by which to live. Yet what is intriguing in the previous passage is that his 
rendering of an afterlife does not invoke some other realm of disembodied spirit. Rather, he 
articulates a vision of this material world as a place that is alive and communicative in non-
human ways. In Chapter Two, I will explore more fully Wiman’s understanding of matter as the 
ongoing site of God’s communicative presence. At this point, however, it is simply worth noting 
that death, for Wiman, is the absorption of life back into a communicative, living, re-enchanted 
material reality. And this new rendering is accompanied by a new posture to the world. Wiman 
repeatedly notes how this reality ultimately eludes one’s intellectual and linguistic grasp. Human 
knowledge and human language are contingent and limited.  
Wiman’s (re)conversion to the Christian faith becomes a conversion to a new myth by 
which to live. Yet the Christianity he articulates in his spiritual memoir, My Bright Abyss, is a 
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distinctly postsecular form of Christianity. In it, Wiman explores how his faith shapes his 
understanding of poetic language and its ability to open up possibilities of the world’s re-
enchantment. For Wiman, words become the way that humans respond to a world that is, first, 
the ongoing utterance of its Creator. All language, for Wiman, is such an attestation to the 
Christian myth of re-enchantment. 
 Facing death well is actually the driving force behind the American novelist Marilynne 
Robinson’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel Gilead (2004). Gilead is composed of letters (or journal 
entries) written by the dying Pastor John Ames for his young son Robby. Like Wiman, Robinson 
uses death—the seeming end of material life—to explore just what material reality might be. In a 
passage early in the novel, Ames shares a rather bizarre childhood memory, that of baptizing a 
litter of cats with water: 
I still remember how those warm little brows felt under the palm of my hand. Everyone 
has petted a cat, but to touch one like that, with the pure intention of blessing it, is a very 
different thing. It stays in the mind. For years we would wonder what, from a cosmic 
viewpoint, we had done to them. It still seems to me to be a real question. There is a 
reality in blessing, which I take baptism to be, primarily. It doesn’t enhance sacredness, 
but it acknowledges it, and there is a power in that. I have felt it pass through me, so to 
speak. The sensation is of really knowing a creature, I mean really feeling its mysterious 
life and your own mysterious life at the same time.72 
Through Ames’ recollections and reflections, Robinson consistently evokes a natural world 
whose sacredness is not constructed by humans, but only acknowledged and responded to (or 
not). Ames suggests that to offer a human blessing like baptism—simply the placement of water 
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on the head of another creature—is not some hollowed out ritual upon which humans give 
meaning; rather, it is a charged act because the world in which it occurs is already infused with 
blessedness and meaning. Robinson repeatedly attempts to recover the theological notion from 
the Protestant Reformer John Calvin that the natural world can be experienced as the theater of 
God’s ongoing presence. By doing this, Robinson’s vision of re-enchantment is nothing less than 
a recovery of the notion of God’s continuous sustaining presence in and among the material 
world, His creation. The locus of significance and blessedness is not the experiencing human—
even if their experience is what opens up the possibility of re-enchantment—but the material 
world that is always given before it is received or constructed. There is a sacredness, Ames 
maintains, that permeates the material world because the world exists in such a relation to its 
source before and after it exists in relation to humans. Robinson’s fiction, even more so than 
Wiman’s poetry, is hardly marginal in American letters. Her work has received remarkable 
critical and popular recognition, including the PEN/Hemingway Award for Housekeeping and a 
Pulitzer Prize for Gilead.  
 Finally, the Kentucky farmer and writer Wendell Berry has been one of the most vocal 
and influential voices concerning how we relate to the natural world in the latter twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries marked by techno-industrial advances and a capitalism built on the 
premise that the earth is a limitless standing reserve of resources to be transformed into 
commodities for our use and enjoyment. From his earliest collections of essays to his most recent 
The Art of Loading Brush, Berry has been an unequivocal advocate in articulating that any 
attempt to heal the world from our abuses must first counter the reductive narratives of post-
Enlightenment science and technology that have shaped not only our behaviors and thought, but 
even the Christian religion in which he claims his uneasy membership. In Life is a Miracle: An 
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Essay against Modern Superstition, Berry offers his most concise argument against such forms 
of environmentalism that do not go below the surface to the invisible assumptions behind our 
language that, in turn, shapes our actions in the world: 
…we have a lot of genuinely concerned people calling upon us to “save” a world which 
their language simultaneously reduces to an assemblage of perfectly featureless and 
dispirited “ecosystems,” organisms,” “environments,” “mechanisms,” and the like. It is 
impossible to prefigure the salvation of the world in the same language by which the 
world has been dismembered and defaced.73  
Berry’s argument is that to fail to see life as something spirited, or “miraculous,” and “beyond 
us”74 will perpetuate ecological destruction. Repeatedly over the last several decades in his 
poetry, essays, and fiction, Berry’s mantra that all of life is a miracle in which humans 
participate counters the myth of disenchantment and it does so not by rejecting religious tradition 
as a barrier to true knowledge, but by drawing deeply from its wells. Berry’s vision of a whole, 
healthy, and holy world is indebted to soil science and microbiology as much as it is to literature, 
philosophy, and Christian theology.  
 There are likely countless other writers I might have chosen for this project. However, I 
chose these three because they are contemporaries and have each, in their own way, reached an 
exulted status in contemporary American culture by audiences who are Christian and otherwise. 
As confessing, self-described Christians, their stature in American letters in a secular age bears 
attention and, given the critical scholarship (particularly around Robinson and Berry), they have 
received such attention.  
 
 73 Life is a Miracle, 8. 
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Yet how their projects interact with each other in terms of rearticulating the human-
nature relationship along confessional lines that unsettle both Christian communities and secular 
materialists has not been noted. Therefore, I have chosen and arranged these authors in this 
project in order to note a subtle progression in, first, how the myth of disenchantment is 
challenged along postsecular Christian lines. For this I will turn first to the poetry and prose of 
Christian Wiman. Next, I turn to Marilynne Robinson’s writing which moves us subtly towards 
ecological concerns by suggesting that a Christian myth of re-enchantment inculcates a new, 
healthier, posture and attention to the natural world by recovering the importance of human 
experience of both the world and, potentially, of the Divine. Finally, when I conclude with 
Wendell Berry, the movement towards sustainable practices in the earth are much more explicit 
and pronounced; indeed, Berry returns us to a sharp look at the Anthropocene and how 
recovering a postsecular Christian notion of stewardship, freed of its post-Enlightenment 
assumptions of mastery and control, might be a way that a counter-narrative becomes a counter-
culture (or counter-agriculture). 
The progression in my argument is, to be clear, in no way to suggest that there is any easy 
movement that is taking place more broadly in American letters among Christian writers such as 
these or any other. As noted, there is a lot of overlap between these authors, and in terms of age 
and popularity, Berry is, if anything, a precursor to Wiman and not vice-versa. The only 
movement here, then, is in terms of my own argument which is ultimately to understand how the 
myths by which we live might be renegotiated, might encourage new postures, and, finally, 




Disenchantment and the Secular Age 
Charles Taylor’s understanding of secularism helps frame the myth of disenchantment 
not merely as an outworking of some steady decline of religious belief. As indicated above, the 
statistics do not bear this out. Rather, what Taylor reveals is that disenchantment as lived 
mythology of the secular age impinges upon both belief and unbelief.  By framing 
disenchantment in such a way, Taylor’s study of secularism provides a necessary context for 
understanding the projects of Wiman, Robinson, and Berry. Taylor’s unique account of the 
secular illuminates why these three contemporary American writers who identify with 
Christianity are never satisfied with strictly materialist accounts of reality, but also remain quite 
uncomfortable within mainstream forms of American Christianity that have been co-opted by, 
and often Christianized, various aspects of the myth of disenchantment. What interests Taylor is 
how religion—Christianity in particular—has not gone away but, instead, shifted in its new 
secular context.  
It will be helpful to note here, too, how Taylor’s account of the secular differs from 
others. Perhaps the most common narrative around secularization is that it has involved a general 
decline in religious belief and practice. Amy Hungerford notes that the sociologist Peter Berger, 
in The Sacred Canopy, argued, for instance, that the decline of religious belief in America in the 
postwar years was a “triumph of secularity.”75 Berger would eventually change this thesis, but 
through such accounts of the secular, it is easy to associate enchantment with religious belief and 
disenchantment with unbelief. Any claim to desire (or detest) re-enchantment becomes entangled 
in the seemingly fraught “conflict” between religion and science, faith and reason.  
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Yet Taylor does not accept the notion that faith or religion ever really left and so there 
was never a “triumph” of the secular on these grounds.76 What interests Taylor is the creation of 
a secular condition in which belief and unbelief simultaneously occur in ways that are drastically 
different from several centuries ago. Taylor’s project is difficult to summarize succinctly without 
getting lost in the long and winding history he provides as a contour map77 of our secular age; 
however, I simply want to draw attention to some of the main features of his project and unpack 
a few key terms from his rather idiosyncratic lexicon78 in order to better situate the myth of 
disenchantment as a key feature of secularism and, thus, create the hermeneutical framing 
through which the remaining chapters, each focusing on one of the aforementioned authors, can 
be read productively. 
Like Weber, Taylor also understands disenchantment to be a narrative that shapes our 
experience of the world. And this experience is marked by a certain uneasiness. Already in his 
1991 CBC Massey Lectures The Malaise of Modernity, Taylor notes that the world’s 
disenchantment “widened the scope of instrumental reason” and removed the “sacred structure” 
[that is, notions of God as creator and earth as creation] that had previously provided meaning 
and purpose for individual modes of action and social arrangements. In the disenchanted world, 
Taylor goes on, “creatures that surround us lose the significance that accrued to their place in the 
chain of being [and] are open to being treated as raw materials or instruments for our projects.”79 
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While it may seem so on the face of it, Taylor’s version of disenchantment is actually not quite 
such a simple narrative of decline and loss. Taylor argues that “there is a widespread unease that 
instrumental reason has enlarged its scope and threatens to take over our lives,” but he also 
maintains that disenchantment “has been liberating.”80  
Taylor’s understanding of disenchantment is complex and, indeed, the major project that 
would unfold in Taylor’s thought over the next decade was to complicate such simplistic, 
reductive narratives about not only disenchantment, but the entire secular age in which this myth 
becomes realized. Taylor calls these reductive accounts “subtraction stories,” by which he means 
“accounts that explain ‘the secular’ as merely the subtraction of religious belief, as if the secular 
is what’s left over after we subtract superstition.”81 John Teehan points out that it is obvious 
“that ‘secular’ society is not a society without religion; it is a society in which religion is held to 
be a private issue, separate from the public sphere.”82 But even this would not satisfy Taylor’s 
account because religious expressions and belief are still made publicly and manifested in public.  
James K.A. Smith explains that Taylor’s interpretation of secularism is mixed (i.e. both 
positive and negative) because he is attempting to capture the lived complexities of modern life 
when it comes to questions of belief in a disenchanted age. Taylor’s perspective might disorient 
those, Smith suggests, who are already given to subtraction narratives that only see 
secularization as a loss or, conversely, only a gain. Smith maintains that it is both the New 
Atheists and Christian fundamentalists whose potted accounts of the modern secular age are 
inadequate guides. This insight is helpful in understanding the precarious, liminal position that 
Wiman, Robinson, and Berry occupy between such polarized groups. 
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Taylor maps out the complex story wherein the West moved “from a society in which it 
was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest 
believer, is one human possibility among others.”83 By orienting his study in such a way, Taylor 
is making a pivot from other historical uses of the secular. The first use being the classical and 
medieval accounts in which secular simply meant “of the world,” and was distinguished from 
the sacred or transcendent.84 Taylor calls this Secular1.85 The second account of the secular is one 
in which we are more familiarized. Secularism2 is a particular product of modernity which, in the 
wake of the Enlightenment, “associated [the secular] with a nonsectarian, neutral, and areligious 
space or standpoint.”86 Secularism2 is perhaps the most common understanding of secularism 
today, manifested in schools and public squares that are deemed secular because they are not 
affiliated with any religion. This second understanding of the secular belies much secularization 
theory today that maintains modernization and technological advancement lead to a decline in 
religious belief and, for our purposes, an acceptance of the myth of disenchantment. In many 
ways, when we turn to postsecular theory, it is, in Taylor’s language, really post-secular2.  
Yet Taylor’s unique construal of the secular is borne from his hunch that this second 
version of secularism fails to properly account for the ongoingness of belief. More troublesome, 
this form of secularism also becomes its own self-perpetuating metanarrative.87 For this reason, 
Taylor tries to articulate a new understanding, which he terms Secularism3. Taylor argues that 
the secular age is really one in which belief and faith, magic and superstition continue to exist 
 
 83 A Secular Age, 3. 
 84 A Secular Age, 1- 2. 
 85 Ibid 
 86 How (Not) to be Secular, 21. 
 87 In the framing above, it’s precisely the hangover of the Enlightenment and its self-understanding to be a 
“mythless” movement. Taylor will address this more A Secular Age by what he calls “takes,” which I will turn to 
more fulsomely. 
 43 
and find willing practitioners, yet they are now contestable and contested88 in ways that differ 
from the pre-modern world in which such disbelief was more difficult.  
Unbelief becomes much easier in the Secular3—or the secular age—because new 
plausibility structures have been introduced. A plausibility structure, for Taylor, is simply the 
horizon of possibility that is generated with either a new technology or ideology. Unbelief today 
becomes increasingly plausible in the secular age (and unlike in earlier centuries)  because of the 
introduction of what Taylor calls “exclusive humanism,” a “humanism accepting no final goals 
beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing.”89 To live 
enclosed within a world that makes no recourse to any potential life or reality “beyond” what we 
experience in the material is, Taylor argues, to live within the “immanent frame,” which is a 
constructed social space that frames our lives entirely within a natural (rather than a 
supernatural) order.”90 Again, it is well beyond the parameters of this paper to re-narrate Taylor’s 
sprawling historical account that delves into the historical contingencies and lived complexities 
that lead to the immanent frame, yet a few aspects are worth considering since they provide 
context to the projects of Wiman, Berry, and Robinson. 
While many construals of secularism can sound fairly abstract and theoretical, Taylor 
tries to counter this impulse by describing and analyzing what he terms the “social imaginary,” 
which is less a coherent system of thought than it is “the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their 
social surroundings.”91 Taylor is trying to give an account not for intellectual history (alone), but 
for how experience is lived, and lived by a tacit understanding of the world that is pretheoretical. 
Much of the archeological work of A Secular Age involves Taylor’s digging through “images, 
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stories, legends,”92 to uncover how this social imaginary has changed, slowly and subtly, over 
time to lead us to this particular moment. 
The most notable change in the secular3 social imaginary, at least for Taylor, is that it has 
now become entirely plausible to construct meaning and significance without any reference to 
the transcendent. This is obviously a far cry from the premodern, Medieval social imaginary “in 
which atheism is unthinkable.”93 Taylor maintains that there were three primary obstacles to 
unbelief that characterized the Medieval social imaginary and, therefore, kept unbelief 
implausible. Again, these obstacles were pretheoretical, part of the furniture of the Classical and 
Medieval imagination very broadly understood.  
The first obstacle was that the natural world was understood to be a cosmos that was 
ordered and functioned semiotically, pointing beyond itself to what was more than nature; the 
second obstacle was the belief that society was grounded in a “higher reality,” all “earthly 
kingdoms were grounded in a heavenly kingdom”; finally, the third obstacle to unbelief was that 
people understood themselves to inhabit an enchanted world that was “charged with presences,” 
and the self was “open and vulnerable” to their activity.94 Particularly the first and third points 
here are important to keep in mind when we turn to Wiman, Berry, and Robinson and the counter 
“social imaginary” on offer in their works, “social imaginaries” that, I will argue, have important 
ecological implications.  
Taylor then explores the consequences of disenchantment as a central feature of the 
secular social imaginary, clarifying how this new “default understanding” not only affected how 
the world is understood, but what place humans have in it. The “dis-godding” of the universe 
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does not only remove God and spirit and leave us with some machine-like material world. Taylor 
argues that what actually shifted was the location of meaning from the outer world to the inner 
mind.95 Smith helpfully explains that “to sense the force of this shift, we need to appreciate how 
this differs from the ‘enchanted’ premodern imaginary where all kinds of nonhuman things 
mean—are loaded and charged with meaning—independent of human perception and 
attribution.”96  
Taylor introduces two more important words in his lexicon to help readers better 
understand this shift from the premodern to modern imaginary when it comes to a lived 
mythology of disenchantment, and these terms relate to the type of self we understand ourselves 
to be in relation to the world of things. In the premodern, enchanted world, Taylor claims, the 
social imaginary involved a “porous self,” one “open to an outside (whether benevolent or 
malevolent), open to blessing or curse, possession or grace.”97 The premodern self is open to 
forces and intelligences that do not originate in the mind but communicate to us nevertheless.  
The modern social imaginary, however, replaces the porous self (and, by extension, the 
haunting nature of an intelligent, communicative non-human reality) with what Taylor terms the 
“buffered self,” a self that is “insulated and isolated in its interiority.”98 The myth of 
disenchantment involves not simply a re-location of meaning away from things and into the 
mind, but an entirely new concept of the mind and the self in relation to those things. There is an 
ecological dimension to all of this. The porous self knows no hard edge between the subjective 
inner world and the objective, exterior world. Indeed, for Taylor the premodern porous self 
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consists of a “very different existential condition.”99 As will become clear—particularly with 
Wiman and Robinson—the postsecular counter-narratives of re-enchantment will have to 
negotiate this turn inward, often employing it in service to the articulation of new myths. 
This is not, for Taylor, so much an abstract, intellectual position as it is a lived reality. 
Such a self not only remains open to, but experiences “a landscape that is alive, aware, and 
expressive.”100 In other words, the porous self exists alongside an enchanted world. While such a 
self, from our vantage, might seem unreasonably fearful of a material world that is largely 
beyond control and comprehension, such fear appropriately attends a humbler posture towards a 
nature charged with non-human meaning, life, and intelligence. The porous self is not simply a 
being who experiences a world filled with gods and spirits; rather, the porous self is 
characterized by a stance towards the world of being “at attention.”101 If the world possesses 
forms of meaning and contains a form of non-human intelligence, it is not a world one stands 
over; it is a world one seeks to understand. It is not something one takes, but something one 
receives. 
 The secular condition Taylor maps out, guides one through the writing of Wiman, Berry, 
and Robinson, particularly in terms of how their ecological insights about the nature of material 
reality are always contextualized within the contested space of belief and doubt that mark the 
secular3, or the secular age. In the following chapters, I will move through the poetry and essays 
of Wiman, and then the novels and essays of Robinson and Berry to indicate that in our current 
moment, Christian ecological, literary thought has been conditioned by the secular age to 
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articulate counter myths of re-enchantment meant to envision a different way of inhabiting this 
world.  
Wiman, Berry, and Robinson each experience and give expression to what Taylor calls 
the “cross pressure”102 of the secular age, the space of tension between a pure immanence (of the 
disenchanted world) and a haunting transcendence (of a re-enchanted world). This cross pressure 
creates poignant moments of “fragilization”103 in which the myth of a disenchanted world 
becomes tenuous, doubtable, unsatisfactory. After such moments, other possibilities open up. 
 Which brings us back to the question of dis-ease and malaise. The myth of 
disenchantment has led to significant moments of fragilization in an Anthropocene beset by 
ecological destruction. Taylor never uses the term “myth” in reference to disenchantment, but 
when he talks about “spins” versus “takes” in A Secular Age, he is arguably in agreement with 
the way I am employing the term in this opening chapter and throughout the remainder of this 
project.  
Taylor’s framing of the secular maintains that for religious or irreligious people, the issue 
is never whether or not we inhabit the immanent frame, but how. Taylor offers two broad 
options, both of which are, again, usually pre-theoretical. The first option is to accept that you 
have a “take”104 on things, which means that you recognize that how you understand the world is 
always contested and contestable. A “take” is, Taylor suggests, a “[William] Jamesian open 
space [where] you can feel the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to unbelief.”105 Obviously 
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for Taylor this can unsettle fundamentalists on both sides of the religious-irreligious divide, but 
is a much healthier (albeit more fraught) position to inhabit.  
When people fail to understand their positions and perceptions as dependent on a “take” 
on—or a myth of—reality, they are susceptible to “spin,” which Taylor notes “is a way of 
convincing oneself that one’s reading is obvious, compelling, allowing of no cavil or 
demurral.”106 Taylor believes it is a rather unfortunate situation that the Academy in particular is 
most given to the “spin of closure”107 in which a secular fundamentalism fails to see that the 
“closed reading” is, indeed, just another reading. The immanent frame and even the disenchanted 
world are, to use Midgley’s language, myths by which we live. They are powerful, but also 
susceptible to contestation and counter-myths. Although Taylor does not use this language, 
Smith gets closer by suggesting that “Taylor is bent on demythologizing the supposed 
‘naturalness’ of the take (spin?)”108 of the secular2 narrative that puts religion in conflict with 
science, belief in conflict with reason.  
In American literature of the past several decades, it seems that there is a growing interest 
in the fraught spaces of the secular age. Contemporary fiction reveals new negotiations between 
faith and doubt, religion and science in the contemporary social imaginary. John McClure makes 
note of a significant “postsecular” trend in contemporary fiction that gives voice to the 
dissatisfactions arising with contemporary secular thought. In response and reaction, American 
authors are providing “religiously inflected alternatives to secularism.”109 (As noted above, 
“postsecular” in this context is specifically post-Secular2 as defined by Taylor; that is, it is “post” 
the type of secularization that sees a waning of religious belief as societies become more modern 
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and technologically advanced.) The “religiously inflected” visions of reality on offer in 
contemporary postsecular fiction, McClure notes, do not shun, but rather draw on the resources 
of religious tradition, but offer no simple return to a lost, pre-modern, golden age of naive belief. 
McClure categorizes postsecular fiction by attributing to it the following characteristics: 
[T]he stories it tells trace the turn of secular-minded characters back toward the religious; 
its ontological signature is a religiously inflected disruption of the secular constructions 
of the real; and because its ideological signature is the rearticulation of a dramatically 
‘weakened’ religiosity with secular, progressive values and projects.110 
The writing of Wiman, Robinson, and Berry are unique from each other and do not all entirely fit 
this description of postsecular literature equally. However, they all challenge “secular 
constructions of the real” via “religiously inflected disruptions”111 and, thus, can be considered 
postsecular under McClure’s framing.  
How “weakened” their religiosity is would likely be a matter of contention and, 
ultimately, subjective perspective.112 However, McClure’s framing of postsecular American 
fiction explains just why Wiman, Robinson, and Berry occupy such a precarious position in the 
contested space of the secular age. Each of these writers are not comfortable among America’s 
religious establishment communities—what McClure terms “fundamentalists”113— nor are they 
at home among the strict materialists whose visions of the world they challenge. When McClure 
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claims that postsecular characters occupy an “ideologically mixed and confusing middle 
zone,”114 this is precisely the space of Taylor’s secular3, a space of contested and contestable 
“myths” about reality. 
 In Varieties of Religion Today, Charles Taylor argues that an “essential feature of our 
divided age” is how “intimations and intuitions” of a “profound desire that has been ignored” of 
“some greater reality that has been closed off by secularism”115 haunts many. McClure suggests 
that this puts many in the “border zone between the secular and religious” which is “producing 
new, complexly hybridized forms of thought and life.”116 The prompting towards such new 
forms of thought and life are often felt strongest “when worldly life becomes intolerable.”117 At 
the opening of this introductory chapter I noted that the malaise of the Anthropocene is, indeed, 
experienced as one such moment of ecological reckoning, leading many to consider postsecular 
myths of re-enchantment.  
In what follows I want to look closely at the life and work of the three aforementioned 
American writers, each of whom narrates a postsecular myth of re-enchantment within 
confessional, Christian lines. Each of these writers articulates a vision of the real within the 
fraught tensions of the secular age between belief and unbelief and between otherworldly 
Christian theologies and strictly materialist accounts skeptical and suspicious of public 
manifestations of religious belief. 
As I noted above, there is a narrative arc to this project. In the next chapter, my reading 
of the poetry and prose of Christian Wiman will focus almost explicitly on two his works: the 
poetry collection Every Riven Thing and the prose essays in My Bright Abyss. Within these 
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works, Wiman unfolds his own journey as a poet who wrestles with the claims of Christianity on 
what is real and struggles through what that means for his cancer diagnosis. In his preface to My 
Bright Abyss, Wiman articulates well the postsecular tension of someone who is “frustrated with 
the language and forms of contemporary American religion” yet “nevertheless feels the burn of 
being that drives us out of ourselves, that insistent, persistent gravity of the ghost called God.”118 
Wiman’s attention to “language and forms” become the crack in the secular through which he 
begins to rearticulate what the “real” is in a world where meaningful communication is even 
possible. More than this, Wiman is fascinated by the ways in which the material world invokes 
the human desire to respond to it and then exceeds the human ability to speak for it. By attending 
to this aspect of material reality, Wiman discounts some of the post-Enlightenment theories of 
representational language that assume postures of mastery and control in favor of a theory that 
submits to contingency, partial knowledge, and a posture marked by humility and awe. Primarily 
through these two works, Wiman begins to articulate a distinctly this-worldly theological vision 
in which language becomes a key site of re-enchantment in the secular age. Meaningful, poetic 
communication, for Wiman, is how humans can find their place in the world, re-embedded with 
the earth, with each other, and with the creative source of meaning that makes communication 
possible. 
In Marilynne Robinson’s essays and primarily in her novel Gilead, we come across a 
writer who is not only serious about the Christianity she identifies with, but also about the 
findings of astrophysics and quantum science. Both, according to Robinson, help to reveal the 
unsatisfactory nature of disenchantment as a secular explanation of the real. By looking closely 
at her collection of essays in Absence of Mind: The Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern 
 
 118 Christian Wiman, My Bright Abyss: Meditation of a Modern Believer (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & 
Giroux, 2013), viii. 
 52 
Myth of the Self, Robinson articulates her most strident argument against a disenchanted 
materialism that has completely rejected the importance of the human soul, the site, in 
Robinson’s rendering, of our experience of the world. For Robinson, taking experience 
seriously—something the phenomenologists of the twentieth century did—re-opens one to the 
claims of Christian belief in a secular age. In the novel Gilead Robinson voices the experience 
and inward self of the dying pastor John Ames. Through his collection of fragmented letters to 
his son, Ames not only imparts deathbed wisdom, but reveals a rich inner life that is steeped in 
Christian thought and deeply attentive to and affectionate for “this life, this world.”119 But 
Robinson’s novel is not simply a call to attention and love for the material world, but for an 
entirely new postsecular myth of re-enchantment. Through Ames, Robinson explores life 
experienced as if the natural world were both a gracious gift and the theatre of God’s grandeur 
and glory. In Gilead, Robinson creates a narrator who embodies the “porous self” that Charles 
Taylor speaks about, but he is only made possible by a re-narration, a re-mythologizing, of what 
this world might be. 
Finally, the fiction and essays of Wendell Berry explore the rather troubling question of 
Christianity’s cultural mandate that explicitly commands humans to dominate and control the 
world. Particularly in the Anthropocene, this aspect of Christian theology needs to be understood 
if any Christian re-enchantment is supposed to offer a more healing narrative.  As noted earlier, 
scholars like John Milbank, James K.A. Smith, and even Charles Taylor, argue that this 
understanding of the cultural mandate is largely a post-Enlightenment (mis)reading of Genesis. 
Through Berry’s writing, a new agrarian hermeneutic can be applied to this passage in ways that 
help render it, in a postsecular context, as a new way to envision the human-nature relationship. 
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Indeed, for Berry the Genesis call to work in the world is the essential thrust of a Christian myth 
of re-enchantment.  
One of the most drastic consequences of disenchantment in terms of our ecological 
relationship to the earth has been the rise of disembodied, abstract forms of life and practice and 
the general disembedding of humans set apart from the world. Yet Wendell Berry’s essays, and 
particularly his novel Jayber Crow, explore a new form of life and a new way of perceiving the 
world as the home humanity must cultivate and live within through faithful loving work.  
Of course, the visions presented by writers like Wiman, Robinson, and Berry, will likely 
not satisfy everyone. But that is inevitable in the secular age where various takes on reality are 


























CHAPTER TWO: CHRISTIAN WIMAN 
 
Postsecular Ways to Say God  
____________________ 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, subtraction narratives of secularization assume that 
secularization is the steady decline and eventual disappearance of religious belief as civilization 
modernizes and separates itself from religious experience and even the language of belief. Yet 
such narratives, I argue in the previous chapter, are inadequate for explaining the ongoingness 
and even growth of religious belief and practice in contemporary American culture. They are 
also inadequate for explaining the persistence of conversions to religious belief in the secular 
age. Conversion experiences are significant because, in the context of this project, they involve a 
transformation and revaluation of the myths by which one lives. Conversions, in the secular age, 
can help reveal the delineations of particularly postsecular myths of re-enchantment.  
It might go without saying, but religious conversions are also not a one-way street in the 
secular age. Conversions away from belief are possible. In fact, Taylor’s project is keenly 
interested in why such conversions are much more likely now than they were five centuries 
earlier. Taylor is clear that the tension, or cross pressure, comes from both sides, creating “a 
pressure between the draw of narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the sense of their 
inadequacy on the other120 […] We are torn between an anti-Christian thrust and a repulsion 
towards some (to Christians) extreme form of reduction.”121 Taylor is not denying that 
conversions away from religion and towards a more secular or even atheistic materialism 
happen. They often do. Taylor is more intrigued, however, with how even these conversions can 
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occur under the exact same cross pressures. This, for Taylor, is a way of understanding the 
fraught tensions of (un)belief in the secular age. Being haunted by the possibilities of contested 
and contestable narratives, or myths, is for Taylor what life in a secular age is fundamentally 
about.  
These moments of felt cross-pressure (and even consequent conversions), Taylor argues, 
are not proofs of anything; rather they are merely indications that there might be something 
more—or other—behind the appearances than a human can know by means of positivism or 
verification. Yet such moments of cross pressure destabilize the myth of disenchantment and 
lead some to ultimately “break out of the immanent frame.”122 Taylor provides a litany of 
individuals, such as Ivan Illich and Jacques Maritain, as exemplars of what a conversion to 
Christianity in the secular age might feel like. Most of these conversions are initiated by a felt 
malaise, or uneasiness, that certain closed takes—whether fundamentalist Christianity, or 
secular, materialistic science—are inadequate to make sense of certain aspects of lived 
experience.  
One of the most poignant sites for such malaise is the confrontation with physical 
suffering and the reality of death.123 Taylor argues that in the face of death, humans feel the cross 
pressure as a potent desire for eternity, a yearning for there to be a more-ness to this life and this 
world that is “not trivial or childish.”124 As material animals, humans know death is inescapable, 
but in many cases “the sense that there is something more presses in.”125 A Christian convert, for 
Taylor, is someone who responds to this pressure by becoming open to another “take” on reality 
that includes what humans have defined as immanent and transcendent expressions of reality.  
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Such cross pressures, Taylor maintains, not only fragilize one’s “take” on reality, but can 
lead to a “nova effect,” which is an “explosion of different options (‘third ways’) for belief and 
meaning.”126 Understanding these conversions as “third ways” is a helpful reminder that these 
are no simple recoveries of premodern Christian belief or vocabulary. As I argued in the first 
chapter, re-enchantment does not require a conversion to Christianity or some other religion. 
There is no going back to enchantment, only the possibility of a re-enchantment that will be an 
evolutionary expression of the inherited reality. 
Taylor’s insights regarding conversion are reminiscent of Paul Ricoeur’s work, which 
among other things is an attempt to articulate how Christianity manifests itself in a secular 
context and desacralized world. For Ricoeur religious studies no longer simply needed 
“rationalist justifications [or] a confessionalist defense of traditional doctrines.”127 Rather, 
Ricoeur placed a “premier value on mythopoetic forms of expression […] for understanding the 
meaning of human being in a world charged with the presence and absence of the sacred.”128  
But recovering a new mythopoetic structure—for Ricoeur, this is Christianity—is not simply a 
matter of returning to the realm of what he called “primitive [or first] naivete.”129  Ricoeur 
maintains that no such return is possible:  
In every way, something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of belief. But if we 
can no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the original 
belief in them, we can, we modern men, aim at a second naivete in and through criticism. 
In short, it is by interpreting that we can hear again.”130  
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It is for this reason that fiction and poetry are so significant in the secular age because they 
contain the possibilities for ushering in new postsecular mythologies—or what Taylor would call 
“open takes”—and their attendant symbolisms and vocabularies for a second naivete of belief. 
And even if the “first naivete of primordial openness to religious symbolism has long been lost to 
modern people,” it is in contemporary fiction and poetry where this “second naivete of belief 
founded on the traces of the sacred in the world of the text is possible.”131 Enchantment is no 
longer possible, only re-enchantment. Such conversions to new lived mythologies, I maintain, 
provide postsecular ways of saying God, and as we will see in Wiman’s poetry, this way of 
saying God is fundamentally (and quite literally) grounded in connecting God as a real presence 
in the material world. This involves reformulations of old beliefs into new language.  
These conversions are distinctly postsecular and more akin to what John McClure in 
Partial Faiths calls “partial conversions” that “do not deliver those who experience them from 
worldliness into well-ordered systems of religious belief [but rather] strand those who experience 
them in ideologically mixed and confusing middle zones.”132 Indeed, these middle zones are 
precisely the space of the postsecular, where religion and secularism co-exist and generate new 
options. These postsecular forms of Christianity react against post-Enlightenment privileging to 
objective knowledge, rationalism, certainty and an autonomy that disembeds humans from the 
natural world.  Such values have affected both science and other forms of Christianity in the 
modern world. However, in these “middle zones” of postsecular conversion, one does not find 
strident dogmatists, but rather religious converts comfortable with uncertainty, contingency, and 
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even doubt, seeking “to reconcile secular and religious intuitions”133 rather than merely pit them 
against one another. 
Taylor’s exploration of the cross pressure experienced by a realization of death in the 
secular age helps contextualize my particular interest in the life and writing of the American poet 
and essayist Christian Wiman. At the age of 39, after years of working as a poet, journalist, and 
the editor of Poetry magazine, Wiman was diagnosed with a rare and incurable form of blood 
cancer. The cancer and its treatment brought on years of intense physical pain and suffering for 
the middle-aged poet. In My Bright Abyss: Meditations of a Modern Believer, Wiman documents 
his bodily suffering and evolving faith during these years, writing after one particularly 
harrowing treatment that “[the hospital] skinned me on the inside, leaving me so bloody and 
abraded from mouth to bowels that I couldn’t even eat an aspirin.”134 Multiple times Wiman was 
brought to the brink of his physical limits, confronting death “that crashing cataract that comes to 
us, from this distance, as the white noise of life, that ur-despair that underlies all the little prickly 
irritations and anxieties that alcohol is engineered to erase.”135  
Wiman’s brushes with death are a rather stark confrontation with the dis-ease of bodily, 
material life. Yet for Wiman, I argue, this nearness to death profoundly shaped his conversion to 
Christianity, and a distinctly postsecular vision and vocabulary for a re-enchanted world. As will 
become clear in this chapter, Wiman’s postsecular form of Christianity leads him to a radical 
love of and attention to material, this-worldly existence. 
In one of Taylor’s explorations of conversion, he deals closely with a figure who inspired 
Wiman: Gerard Manley Hopkins. Taylor maintains that Hopkins’ poetry provides a way out of 
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the closures of the immanent frame and, thus, a way towards potential re-enchantment. As I 
noted in the previous chapter, this might seem anachronistic, but postsecular writers are not 
merely writing “after” secularism, but against it. Therefore, “post” might be an unhelpful prefix 
since it suggests a temporality to such projects that have much longer historical roots. 
Nevertheless, Taylor’s fascination with Hopkins is that some of the post-Romantic theories of 
poetry provided a way out of the myth of disenchantment and its stance of control over the 
natural world. Poetry, Taylor argues, is “performative,” and as such it “creates symbols and 
makes new meanings. Poetry is a kind of world making.”136 Taylor even argues that this view of 
poetry helped it escape more scientific and rationalist theories of representation and designation 
in which words were understood to have a desired univocity between signifier and signified.137 
The Romantic “take” on poetic language is that it creates “ruptures in the immanent frame.”138  
Language, in this formulation, reveals realities that can resonate with readers; however, 
this creates the possibility that a re-enchanted reality that disrupts the immanent frame also 
depends on the audience: “The language may go dead, flat, become routinized, a handy tool of 
reference, a commonplace, like a dead metaphor.”139 Taylor is fascinated that this leads to a 
modern obsession with finding “new languages that can resonate within us.”140 Again, these 
words echo those of Ricoeur, who believed that the metaphorical imagination was essential to 
articulating faith because “metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the 
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power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality.”141 Words do not grasp material reality, at 
least not fully. Rather, in their attempt to reveal it they encounter an excessiveness they are 
inadequate to speak for. What accounts for this? In the postsecular theological vision of Wiman, 
this is because material reality is inextricably linked to its source. More, the material world is the 
ongoing language of the Creator. Human language, in such a theocentric frame, is but a 
participant in this broader, cosmological communication. 
Wiman’s poetic language is an invitation not merely for new descriptors of God in a 
secular age, but into a new form of life in which such language’s ability to speak about reality 
seems possible. The beginnings of this new language are recorded in “Love Bade Me Welcome,” 
an essay written one year after Wiman’s diagnosis and then included in his collection Ambition 
and Survival: Becoming a Poet. Wiman’s initial impressions of his conversion are significant for 
laying out the contours of the postsecular, this-worldly theological vision that comes to dominate 
the prose and poetry of Wiman’s later work. Wiman’s conversion is not simply a conversion 
from an atheistic materialism, but also from the excarnational form of Christianity in which he 
was raised and eventually left. Wiman’s conversion is to a new form of faith, a second naivete, 
that stems from being dissatisfied by both of these ways of life for similar reasons. While 
lengthy, this passage from “Love Bade Me Welcome” is worth quoting in full: 
…one morning we found ourselves going to church. […] What I remember of that 
Sunday, though, and of the Sundays that immediately followed, is less the services 
themselves than the walks we took afterwards, and less the specifics of the conversations 
we had about God, always about God, than the moments of silent, and what felt like 
sacred, attentiveness those conversations led to: an iron sky and the lake so calm it 
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seemed thickened; the El blasting past with its rain of sparks and brief, lost faces; the 
broad leaves and white blooms of a catalpa on our street, Grace Street, and under the tree 
a seethe of something that was just barely still a bird, quick with life beyond its own. 
I was brought up with the poisonous notion that you had to renounce love of the 
earth in order to receive the love of God. My experience has been just the opposite: a love 
of the earth and existence so overflowing that it implied, or included, or even absolutely 
demanded, God. Love did not deliver me from the earth, but into it.142 
This essay gives voice to Wiman’s distinctly postsecular rendering of Christianity. In the wake 
of the devastating reality  of his cancer, Wiman and his new wife are inexplicably drawn to a 
church, upending their more secularized Sunday routines.143 Death and physical suffering are the 
points of cross pressure in which Wiman considers and accepts the possibility of an encounter 
with “the ghost called God.”144 Death puts a crack in his buffered self, rendering him more 
porous, more open, to the possibilities of the transcendent.  
But this God is not simply an illusory salve for his psychological and physical wounds. 
The particular form of Christianity Wiman articulates provides no simple consolations of 
escaping to another immaterial and disembodied world free of pain and suffering. Indeed, 
Wiman even acknowledges that the “first service was excruciating, in that it seemed to tear all 
wounds wide open.”145 Wiman’s draw to God and the Christian faith is accompanied by 
embracing this-world in all its pain and suffering in contradistinction to the “poisonous” form of 
world-renouncing faith he grew up within and later rejected.  
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“Love Bade me Welcome” is a prime example of how postsecular renderings of the 
Christian faith remain, as literary critic Lori Branch argues, “constituted by the logic of 
secularism”146 in the sense that they are “this worldly” and not offering some escape hatch to an 
otherworldly heaven. In Wiman’s case, Christianity answers a poignant desire to live in this 
particular world, even if it burns his flesh. 
In the following chapter, I will look more closely at the body of writing that follows 
Wiman’s conversion to Christianity in the secular age. I will focus primarily on the essays in the 
fragmented, autobiographical My Bright Abyss: Meditations of a Modern Believer and Wiman’s 
collection of poems Every Riven Thing. I maintain that these two works, written in close 
proximity to one another and to Wiman’s diagnosis and conversion, interact with each other in 
productive ways that help readers interpret the poetic and theological project Wiman is 
undertaking as a self-described “modern believer.” The ecological aspects of Wiman are muted, 
to be sure, and it might seem like his writing is far afield from the concerns I raised in regard to 
the Anthropocene context at the outset. However, I want to reiterate that his work reveals a first 
step in articulating a this-worldly theological vision that is shared by the more ecologically vocal 
writers like Robinson and Berry. Wiman establishes a helpful first step in understanding how 
postsecular Christianity moves towards a new myth of re-enchantment. How this informs one’s 
experience of the world is more pronounced in Marilynne Robinson’s works, and how this, 
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My Bright Abyss: A Postsecular Form of Belief  
As a poet, Wiman’s provision of a new myth of re-enchantment comes not in the form of 
narrative fiction as is the case with Robinson and Berry. Rather, Wiman’s project is concerned 
more with finding a new language and poetics of belief adequate to the context of twenty-first 
century secular culture. When I turn to look more closely at some of the poems in Every Riven 
Thing, I argue that Wiman’s postsecular language for a re-enchanted reality in which God 
remains present is grounded in the physical, material world. The reason for this move is 
articulated more clearly in My Bright Abyss, the fragmentary collection of essays Wiman 
composed during a long period of writer’s block (at least concerning poetry) following his cancer 
diagnosis and his return to a different form of Christianity. In this collection, Wiman reveals that 
his conversion is no simple recovery project of Christianity or an apologetic to rationalize how 
and why God allows suffering and pain. Rather, Wiman provides an articulation of a distinctly 
postsecular form of Christianity that challenges a disenchanted materialism, but also modern 
forms of Christianity that have denied the world and favored abstract, propositional doctrine over 
attention (and affection) for this world. 
Wiman opens My Bright Abyss by referring to the aforementioned essay, “Love Bade Me 
Welcome.”147  Wiman writes that this earlier essay was “about despair: losing the ability to 
write, falling in love, receiving a diagnosis of an incurable cancer, having my heart ripped apart 
by what, slowly and in spite of all my modern secular instincts, I learned to call God.”148 
Wiman’s “secular instincts” are significant, particularly as, I argue, they transform throughout 
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this series of essays into postsecular instincts that lead him to seek a new language for faith in an 
age in which God is the “ghost”149 who continues to haunt those who no longer believe in or 
experience Him as a real presence. And this language for faith and for God, Wiman realizes after 
the deluge of letters he received in response to his unlikely conversion, is something that many 
contemporary Americans desire. He writes:  
There is an enormous contingent of thoughtful people in this country who, though they 
are frustrated with the language and forms of contemporary American religion, 
nevertheless feel that burn of being that drives us out of ourselves, that insistent, 
persistent gravity of the ghost called God. I wanted to try to speak to these people more 
directly. I wanted to write a book that might help someone who is at once as confused 
and certain about the source of life and consciousness as I am.150 
Wiman already has contemporary forms of American religion in his critical sights. Yet what he 
moves towards is, like Taylor, the experience of religion rather than just the doctrine or teaching. 
This move leads him to embrace the paradox of being both “confused and certain.”151  
Being at home in uncertainty, a position Wiman articulates several times in My Bright 
Abyss, situates him clearly within the postsecular framework that John McClure lays out. Wiman 
is obviously no fictional character, yet his life and ideas contain several important postsecular 
traits that McClure finds in contemporary American fiction. There is a conversion of a “secular-
minded character back toward the religious,” a “religiously inflected disruption of secular 
constructions of the real,” and, finally, a “weakened religiosity.”152  
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A “weakened religiosity,” to clarify, is, for McClure, a form of religious belief which is 
open to doubt and uncertainty as opposed to “stronger” forms of dogmatic, religious 
fundamentalism scaffolded with propositions of absolute truth. “Christ is contingency,” Wiman 
tells a 65-year-old woman, Adele, who has “lost” her faith; “Contingency. Meaning subject to 
chance, not absolute. Meaning uncertain, as reality, right down to the molecular level, is 
uncertain. As all of human life is uncertain.”153 Wiman is acutely aware that to “think of God in 
these explicitly immanent terms might seem for some people deeply troubling (not to mention 
heretical),”154 but what Wiman is after is a God who is always deeply attendant and active and 
present in this material world, not “floating over the chaos of pain and particles in which we’re 
mired […] gliding among our ancestors like some shiny sinless superhero.”155 If God exists and 
is to “mean anything”156 for real human experience, then he must be embedded in material 
existence as humans know it. This is a far remove from post-Enlightenment Deisms. However, 
God is also invisible, silent, absent, and transcendent. He is a ghost who has, seemingly, gone. 
This creates tension that opens one up to living with a faith couched in uncertainty. 
Lori Branch picks up on how uncertainty manifests itself in postsecular belief with a 
helpful focus on language. Drawing on Derrida, Branch asserts that “faith and knowledge 
configured as opposites in the Enlightenment; [however] the binary by which Enlightenment 
knowledge defines itself over and above belief is impossible to maintain because faith haunts the 
very nature of language.”157 Branch, via Derrida, is referring to the linguistic turn in philosophy 
that, after Saussure and Wittgenstein  revealed “the most important matters we all interpret and 
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believe with reasons better or worse but never sufficient to constitute proof or to relieve our 
responsibility for belief, interpretation, and action, when we might always have chosen 
otherwise.”158 Branch’s insight here opens a path for understanding Wiman’s own comfort with 
the relativism and contingency of his postsecular Christian belief.  
This postsecular space opens up a “middle zone” in which Wiman’s liminal position 
between religious and irreligious fundamentalisms. Both sides claim a language for God that 
assumes certainty about His existence or non-existence. Yet both sides of this equation, 
according to Wiman, have an inadequate language for the real experiences of God which are 
always couched in uncertainty. These experiences do not occur outside of material existence on 
some mystical plane of transcendence but are grounded in the confrontation and encounter with 
material reality by limited, material creatures. 
In the next chapter I will look much more closely at the important role of experience and 
why phenomenology opens up the possibility for religious belief in the writing of Marilynne 
Robinson. However, with Wiman, my intention is less to explore the importance of his 
experiences and more to explore how such religious experiences are transcribed in a new 
language. As Paul Ricouer notes in “Philosophy and Religious Language,”: “Whatever 
ultimately may be the nature of the so-called religious experience, it comes to language, it is 
articulated in a language, and the most appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to 
inquire into its linguistic expression.”159 And as Rowan Williams, theologian and literary critic, 
recently suggests  in his Gifford lectures, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language,  
when we closely attend to how our language interacts with our material experience, we come to 
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realize the limits—or edges—of representationalist accounts of language since language suggests 
“an abundant or excessive reality engulfing our mental actives.”160  
For Williams (and for Wiman), attending closely to how language and material reality 
interact open up a space for new ways of saying—or trying to say—God in the contemporary 
world. This requires entering the postsecular middle zone where experience cross-pressures us to 
speak for a reality whose meanings exceed our linguistic capabilities. In My Bright Abyss, 
Wiman explores how his suffering and his proximity to death reveal the limits of disenchanted 
materialism, but also the failures of fundamentalist Christianity to speak for and about God. 
After exposing those, Wiman articulates his “third way,” which I argue is his way of re-
enchantment. 
For Wiman, the limitations of a disenchanted materialism are made apparent through the 
cross-pressure of his imminent death. The myth of disenchantment fails to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the longing humans have that death is not ultimately meaningless. This is a longing 
that unites Christian and atheist; Wiman argues,  
we, the living, want to believe in this possibility: that death could be filled with 
promise, that the pain of leaving and separation could be, if not a foretaste of joy, then at 
least not meaningless. […] Forget religion. Even atheists want to die well, or want those 
they love to die well, which has to mean more than simply a quiet resignation to complete 
annihilation.”161  
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Wiman is ill at ease with the “polite nihilism”162 that undergirds secularism. “To say that there is 
nothing beyond this world that we see,” Wiman says in reference to those operating under the 
myth of disenchantment, “is to make death the final authority of our lives and to sow a seed of 
meaninglessness into that very insight.”163 If death is to mean something, then God is. So Wiman 
wonders if there is a more satisfactory account in which one can die “into life rather than simply 
away from it.”164  
Wiman does not make an apologetic move towards a religious doctrine of heaven or the 
afterlife. To quote Marilynne Robinson, an author Wiman admires, Wiman is not “distracted by 
the supposed need to translate religion into terms a rationalist would be find meaningful.”165 
Rather, Wiman is keenly interested in religious experience, and why human experience of life 
includes a longing for meaning. While death makes this longing more poignant, Wiman 
maintains that “to project ourselves beyond it is to violate not only the terms of this life, which 
include a clear-eyed awareness of the end no eye can pierce, but also, [he] suspect[s], of the 
next.”166 Just as he asserts there is an afterlife, Wiman undercuts the claim by admitting nothing 
about it can be known and to attempt that would violate its very terms. All language for heaven, 
Wiman asserts, will “sound preposterous to modern scientific sensibilities.”167  
 For Wiman, death—and its relationship to religion—needs a reconfiguration, a new 
language, in contemporary writing. Wiman argues that death became prominent as a subject of 
art in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries precisely because of a rise of secularism 
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that cast doubt on the very existence of God. Through such a radical shift in the conditions of 
belief, Wiman argues that “death became an ultimate concern [of writers like] Dickinson, 
Stevens, Beckett, and Camus – the great devotional poets of death.”168 Postmodernism, Wiman 
continues, reacted against this and “sought to eliminate death in the frenzy of the instant.”169 The 
way forward, Wiman argues, is to “imagine ourselves into and out of death”170 because 
secularism has rendered it a meaningless return to the nihil from which humans emerge. While 
reductive materialism, for Wiman, might not satisfy the deepest longing for a life beyond this 
one, Wiman’s “quite certain that the old religious palliatives, at least those related to the 
Christian idea of heaven, are [also] inadequate.”171 And if the secular narratives of modern life 
are limited, Wiman is equally (if not more) nonplussed by various forms of contemporary 
American Christianity. 
 Although My Bright Abyss is Wiman’s meditation as a self-described modern believer, 
his critiques of Christianity are much more pronounced than his critiques of a disenchanted 
secularism. As I noted above, drawing on Lori Branch, Wiman’s largest critique is against a form 
of Christianity that has been beholden to post-Enlightenment epistemological projects that have 
made it heavily dogmatic, apologetic, rationalistic, and reliant upon a language seeking to verify 
God with absolute certainty. Wiman worries that “the minute you begin to speak with certitude 
about God, he is gone.”172 In the secular age, Wiman understands that the posture of dogmatic 
certainty has made Christians forget the original experience, the “burn of being,”173 which first 
haunted their lives as God’s “first call.”174 Forgetting this experience, Wiman argues, “there is no 
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sense in arguing for God in order to convince others.”175 Wiman is not interested in the 
apologetic mode and rationalist stance of certain strains of Christianity.  
 This is not to say that Wiman is against dogma and doctrine, or traditional Christian 
teaching. He later notes that doctrine and dogma are the “ropes, clips, and toe spikes whereby 
one descends into the abyss”176 of meaninglessness that all humans must confront. Wiman is not 
discarding the need for teaching, but framing it as the provisional foothold by which one moves, 
cautiously, through a world cloaked in uncertainty. What accomplishes this is when theological 
teaching is incarnated into the fresh expressions of living, poetic language. The problem for 
Wiman is when doctrine becomes rigid and inert through dead metaphors and a tired language, 
or the tool of fundamentalists meant to contain the uncontainable. When this happens, the 
footholds are no longer provisional touchpoints into the abyss, but clear-cut paths through life 
shearing it of uncertainty and mystery. This particular form of Christianity disenchants. 
Such dead language about God and religious belief expose the rifts, even conflicts, 
between secular and religious people, but Wiman argues a third way is needed: “We need to be 
shocked out of our easy acceptance of—or facile resistance to—propositional language about 
God. Besides being useless as any definitive description of God, such language is simply not 
adequate for the intense and sacred spiritual turmoil that so many contemporary people feel.”177 
Robinson will address this as well, but the inadequacy of language and propositions to fully 
speak for God and the resulting turmoil one feels because of this needs to be accepted, not 
suppressed. What shocks one into the possibility of this second naivete is a charged, new poetic 
language. 
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Confronting failed attempts to contain God within propositions, Rowan Williams points 
out, is a way that “language points us towards a dimension that systematically eludes final 
expression.”178 However, Williams maintains that even “our (quasi-)representing of God is least 
off the mark when we are furthest from anything that looks like a fully coherent schema.”179 
This, for Williams, does not “excuse slackness” in trying to say God, but does make “an implicit 
case for our words about God to be—as it were—carefully calculated shocks.”180 Such poetic 
language understands its necessary limits, but still contains a dynamism and energy that can 
startle one to seeing the world and themselves in a strange new light. It is this type of language—
this way of saying God—that marks Wiman’s postsecular poetic expression of belief. 
According to Wiman, Christian doctrine and language cannot be static but must remain 
dynamic and living. Such a living language is, for Wiman, connected to a living God. God as the 
living source of truth and life is why the experience and language of God always remains in flux. 
Wiman writes that “Truth inheres not in doctrine itself, but in the spirit with which it is engaged, 
for the spirit of God is always seeking and creating new forms.”181 For Wiman, if God is, then 
God is dynamic and moving and uncontainable by the imaginative and linguistic structures 
humans give.  
But the very desire to say God, Wiman suggests, is itself a particular form of movement 
within the self. This movement that causes the poet and theologian to speak about God partially 
helps clarify Wiman’s own distinction he makes between belief and faith:  
Faith is nothing more—but how much this is—than a motion of the soul toward God. It is 
not belief. Belief has objects […] faith does not. Even the motion of faith is mysterious 
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and inexplicable: I say the soul moves “toward” God, but that is only the limitation of 
language. It may be God who moves, the soul that opens for him. Faith is faith in the 
soul. Faith is the word “faith” decaying into pure meaning.182 
If God is always on the move, as enacted in the poetic line, so too is the restless soul in search of 
a language that can speak for the transcendent experiences that rupture life in the immanent 
frame. Wiman names this restless movement faith. It surprises me that Amy Hungerford’s work 
on Postmodern Belief makes no mention at all of Christian Wiman since her articulation of the 
postmodern shape of religious belief situates Wiman’s restlessness and articulation of faith so 
precisely. While she is talking about the work of Mark C. Taylor, Hungerford’s analysis is 
equally applicable to Wiman: “…the notion that God is on the run indicates both God’s vitality 
and the vitality of the faith that sprints after him.”183 The “ghost of God” that haunts Wiman’s 
conversion is such a moving God that moves Wiman. 
The question, though, is where does this God on the move go? For Wiman, this is another 
large problem with contemporary American Christianity: God goes to some ambiguous heaven 
beyond the world. In one of his chapter titles, Wiman clearly suggests that “God is not 
beyond.”184 And Wiman maintains that “God is not absent. He is everywhere in the world we are 
too dispirited to love.”185 Assuming God’s absence from this world—whether out of a secular 
materialism or a gnostic Christianity—relegates God to some otherworldly realm which is 
inaccessible to material creatures. In a way, such theories even within Christian faith, leave the 
world of physical objects disenchanted: God has gone from them. 
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Wiman’s project is to get beyond this default disenchantment and articulate a vision of 
Christianity that remains open to mystery. However, mystery is one of these nebulous words in 
Christian and mystical traditions that, for Wiman, is part of the other-worldly disease that inflicts 
secularized forms of Christianity. “Nothing is more frustrating,” Wiman argues, “than listening 
to an inept or unprepared preacher (or poet!) defer to the ‘mystery’ of existence and God when 
more mystery is the last thing in the world his words need or can bear.”186 Wiman is not opposed 
to mystery; however, in this particular register, Wiman argues, mystery “abstracts us from the 
physical world” and is thus “of the devil.”187 For Wiman mystery and mystical experiences of 
God are possible, but only if God is something (or someone) attached to this world: “What I 
crave—and what I have known, in fugitive instants—is mystery that utterly obliterates reality by 
utterly inhabiting it, some ultimate insight that is still sight. Heaven is precision.”188  
To challenge contemporary world-renouncing forms of Christianity, Wiman reframes 
mystery—especially the mystery of God—as remaining deeply contingent on the material world. 
He notes that “the meanings God calls for us […] does not demand a renunciation of life in favor 
of something beyond it. The call itself is always composed of life. […] It is life calling to life. 
[…] Any meaning we arrive at in this life is composed of the irreducible details of the life that is 
around us at any moment.”189 For Wiman, a postsecular faith is grounded in a mystery of which 
this life and this world are participants.  
 To be a believer in the secular age, Wiman argues, one must believe “in a God who is not 
apart from matter (or not merely that) but part of it, a God who does not simply enjoin us to 
participate fully in life, and specifically in the relation within our lives, but a God who inheres 
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wholly within those relationships.”190 As will become more evident in Wiman’s poetry, this is 
the form that re-enchantment takes in his Christian thought. Matter is meaningful not simply 
because the human mind constructs it to be so, but because matter and the human mind each 
participate in a greater, inherently meaningful reality of a God whom language cannot contain.  
I maintain that My Bright Abyss provides Wiman’s distinctly postsecular form of belief 
that is at home in uncertainty and challenges secular materialism and the forms of Christianity 
that have accepted various post-Enlightenment premises and been fixated on rational argument 
and other-worldly concerns. Yet Wiman’s real attempt to reframe the world as something that 
participates in the dynamic being of God through a new, subtler, poetic language is a project he 
undertakes in Every Riven Thing, the collection of poems he wrote during the composition of My 
Bright Abyss as he struggled with his mortality and the conversion to a Christian myth by which 
to live. 
 
Every Riven Thing: Naming the God that Goes 
Wiman’s postsecular poetry of re-enchantment seeks to embed visionary, mystical 
experiences within material reality. Even Wiman’s admission that he doesn’t “respond as deeply 
to William Carlos Williams as [he does] to T.S. Eliot” is because poetry that is only concerned 
with things in the world does not have the visionary effect which is a “higher achievement.”191 
Wiman goes on to argue, in language akin to Charles Taylor’s, that the poet’s task as he 
understands it is one deeply connected to a certain re-enchanted vision of the world and, 
furthermore, a responsibility to open up an audience to its possibility: “Some poets—surprisingly 
few—have a very particular gift for making a thing at once shine forth in its “thingness” and 
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ramify beyond its own dimensions. […] What happens [in such poems] is some mysterious 
resonance between thing and language, mind and matter, that reveals—and it does feel like 
revelation—a reality beyond the one we ordinary see.”192  
Wiman’s use of mystery here is not simply the mysteriousness of human ignorance. 
Rather, it is the belief that the material world participates in a more complex ontological order 
that the human mind only grasps partially. As Wiman notes later, “To have faith is to 
acknowledge the absolute materiality of existence while acknowledging at the same time the 
compulsion toward transfiguring order that seems not outside of things but within them, and 
within you.”193 This view of mystery—one largely shared by Robinson and Berry—is connected 
to his myth of a re-enchanted reality. 
And Wiman’s myth of re-enchantment comes to us in the particular language and form of 
poetry. For Wiman, any acceptance or openness to a particularly Christian myth of re-
enchantment in the secular age will require that one attempt to inhabit, or dwell within, 
communities of people who speak a certain language. “You can’t know a religion from the 
outside,” Wiman argues, “To have faith in a religion, any religion, is to accept at some primary 
level that its particular language of words and symbols says something true about reality.”194 
Wiman is reticent to say these “words and symbols are reality (that’s fundamentalism), nor that 
one will ever master those words and symbols well enough to regard reality as some fixed 
thing.”195 This, for Wiman, is the hermeneutical stance one might take to his poetry. To 
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understand the vision of reality he proposes requires one “submit to certain symbols and 
language that may be inadequate in order to have those inadequacies transcended.”196  
Poetry, in the language of this project, creates an interesting space in which a secular 
audience can feel the cross pressure that fragilizes the immanent frame and opens one up to new 
possibilities, a second naivete of belief by hearing a language infused by it. For Wiman, he is 
aware that his poems will likely not help most readers re-envision reality in such a way, but he 
maintains that, at least as a poet, “You have to believe that poetry has some reach into reality 
itself, or you have to go silent.” 
Silence is precisely where Wiman begins to rethink the function of his poetic language. 
In “A Piece of Prose,” Wiman notes: “Of all the many and mostly noble reasons why a poet 
might turn to prose, there is one which is often primary, personal and occasionally conscious: it 
staves off the silence. […] The time between poems can become a time of some peril, of 
encroaching unreality and increasing confusion. It can seem like silence is steadily claiming 
everything.”197 Sure enough, the opening (and title) essay in the collection My Bright Abyss 
begins with such a moment of silence. Wiman, confronted by writer’s block, is unable to 
complete the following poem: 
My God my bright abyss 
Into which all my longing will not go 
Once more I come to the edge of all I know 
And believing nothing believe in in this:198  
     
Then silence. And one that lasted several years for Wiman while he sought to find the right 
words for just what it was that he believed given his uneasiness with atheism and contemporary 
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Christianity. This opening is followed by a series of attempts—which is the etymological root of 
essay—to find fitting words to fill and end this silence. 
 Wiman’s poem “Late Fragment” is perhaps his most articulate expression of the poet’s 
seeking after words—however fragmentary—in the haunting silence that stopped his writing: 
How to say this— 
My silences were not always mine:  
Scrabbled hole and the black beyond; 
Vaporous pond 
As if water wanted out of itself; 
Tip of the sycamore’s weird bare reach: 
Some latency in things leading not so much to speech 
As to a halting, haunted art 
Wherein to master was to miss— 
How to say this, how to say this…199 
 
The “latency” within material things Wiman refers to here suggests an excessiveness of potential 
meanings within matter that leads both to the attempt at finding right words and the 
understanding of the limits of every attempt. Mastery of words—and of “these things”—is not 
the ideal but a misguided wrong turn, and the poet (as all who attend closely to words) is left to 
confront the endlessly repeated question: How to say this? This is not yet making any easy 
ecological claim, but it is opening up a different posture to the world and our relationship to it. 
The inability of language to speak for reality brings us to a central concern in Wiman’s 
poetics and theology, which is the relationship between matter and the God who enchants it. In 
his Gifford lectures on language and God, theologian Rowan Williams argues that such silences 
are not meant to “deliver us from the specificity of the world we inhabit but […] oblige an ever-
deeper attention to it.”200  Indeed, as “Late Fragment” goes on, Wiman writes with beautiful 
attention to the “creekbed creases” and “moss-covered rock” of the places he knew intimately 
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and loved in childhood. Wiman’s writer’s block—all writer’s block—is an important indication 
of the limits of language (and the human self) to speak for a reality that always exceeds it. This, 
and not language’s inadequacy to properly represent reality, is what gives language its 
“unfinished character.”201 Or as Wiman questions in the conclusion of “Late Fragment”: “What 
name is not a horizon?”202 All names—all words—simply point to the more-ness that is beyond 
them and in which they participate. 
Thus, our language is unable to ever attain the impossible—and arguably misguided—
ideal of pure representation. Williams suggests that this contingency of our language, revealed to 
us through silence, suggests something about the reality in which all our utterances occur. There 
are clear echoes of Wiman’s ideas laid out earlier in My Bright Abyss when Williams states: 
If our language is systematically indeterminate, incomplete, embodied, developed 
through paradox, metaphor and formal structure, and interwoven with a silence that opens 
up further possibilities of speech, it is a reality which consistently indicates a ‘hinterland’; 
as if it is always following on, or always responding, living in the wake of or in the 
shadow of intelligible relations whose full scale is still obscure to us.203  
The ecological insight here is subtle, to be sure, but critical: the vast web of interrelationships 
and just how—and possibly why—they interrelate, ultimately eludes the grasp of any community 
of speakers. The ecological insight in Wiman’s text is that the desire to communicate is a desire 
to respond to an intelligible and communicative non-human world. But more than this, attending 
to language should, Wiman points out (and Williams agrees), lead to a humbler posture towards 
the material reality in which communication is even possible.  
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This is not to say that all our language is meaningless. Far from it. It is, however, to 
suggest that the stance to the world which implies humans will eventually and inevitably 
understand everything in some conciliar theory complete with static, univocal descriptors for all 
of it, proceeds from the epistemic hubris of the post-Enlightenment, disenchanted condition. 
Such a stance fails to see that a “pure language” of univocal meaning is not simply undesirable, it 
is largely impossible. Robinson and Berry will extend this insight in their own particular work 
with much clearer ecological implications. 
As I argued above, this contingency of vision and language pervades Wiman’s writing 
and we see it in both the first essay of My Bright Abyss and the first poem in Every Riven Thing. 
In Wiman’s first essay, the penultimate paragraph jumps back in time to one of Wiman’s 
childhood memories of Texas in a sandstorm. He recalls: 
Soon tumbleweeds began to skip and nimble by, a dust devil flickered tirelessly in the 
vacant lot across the street from our house, and birds began rocketing past with their 
wings shut as if they’d been flung. Worse than snow, worse than ice, a bad sandstorm 
shrinks the world to the slit of your eyes, lifting from the fields an inchoate, creaturely 
mass that claws at any exposed skin as if the dust remembered what it was, which is what 
you are—alive, alive—and sought to return.204  
The memory is a remarkable reflection on an encounter with one of the more fleeting “things” in 
the natural world. The dust whipped up into a storm forms a dust devil, and Wiman, through the 
slits of his eyes, must rely on his limited, contingent perception to understand it.  
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If the dust devil is some “thing” in a Heideggerian sense,205 just what exactly is it outside 
of its continued movement from chaos to order and back to chaos? The dust devil is held as a 
unitary object in the imagination—a noun in the English language—but it is really only a process 
that unfolds in time. A dust devil is more a verb, an action that moves through time. It is only a 
thing as it moves and changes form. But precisely what whipped this into being brings one to a 
particular edge of language and what can be known with certainty. And trying to articulate this, 
that is, trying to respond to the question it poses, suggests that there is something communicative 
and intelligible within the material world that resonates with the human mind and demands 
response. This is where, for Wiman, poetry plays a critical role: exploring these edges and 
seeking to find the fitting words. It is also what becomes the grounds for a secular experience of 
a re-enchanted reality. 




mystical hysterical amalgam of earth and wind 
and mind 
 
over and of 
the much-loved 
 
dust you go 
through a field I know 
 
by broken heart 
for I have learned this art 
 
 
 205 In “The Thing,” Heidegger talks about the thingness of a jug and how the artist’s role is to simply give 
form to the void, writing “…the potter who forms sides and bottom on his wheel does not, strictly speaking, make 
the jug. He only shapes the clay. No—he shapes the void. For it, in it, and out of it, he forms the clay into the form. 
From start to finish the potter takes hold of the impalpable void and brings it forth as the container in the shape of a 
containing vessel. The vessel’s thingness does not lie at all in the material of which it consists, but in the void that 






wherein to live 





wild untouchable toy 
called by a boy 
 
God’s top 
in a time when time stopped206 
 
Each couplet of “Dust Devil” alters the rhythm to generate an uneven pace where slow, 
tripping lines are coupled with more rapid lines. The first couplet is a good instance, but this 
recurs throughout. Lines like “over and of” (3) and “through a field I know” (6) are coupled with 
more rapid moving lines, such as “the much-loved” (4) and “dust you go” (5). The pacing and 
movement of the language, again, mimic the cyclical movement of the dust devil. 
But what exactly is this dust devil? The poet’s observations are as different in form as 
they are in content from a natural scientist’s detached, objective explanation. Indeed, the poet 
here suggests throughout that whatever this ephemeral thing is, a totalizing explanation must 
remain elusive. As the opening line suggests, this dust devil is something “mystical,” eluding 
human rationality and quite possibly uniting it with a transcendent reality. It is also “hysterical,” 
uncontrolled and wild.  
Even this poem, this small act of speaking for and about it, is undercut by an admission 
that the brief life of the dust devil, momentarily coherent and momentarily and partially 
observed, cannot be adequately contained by human thought or language since its rapid 
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“flourishing/vanishing” occurs in a world “wherein to live/ is to move” (9 – 12). This theme of 
the ever-changing, ever-moving world comes up repeatedly in Every Riven Thing and is one of 
the ways Wiman attempts to defamiliarize how we understand both the natural world and the 
God who undergirds it. Both God and the material world are, in Wiman’s formulation, infinitely 
complex and both are in a state of perpetual motion that humans are always already caught up in 
as material creatures. 
The poet also recognizes that this dust devil is composed of “earth and wind / and mind.” 
But just whose mind remains an open question. It could be the poet’s or God’s or even the 
readers’. The poem allows the possibility that it is all three. The line division in this opening 
couplet, however, moves from a potentially strict materialism and recovers the possibility of a 
more participatory ontology. That is, it starts to suggest more explicitly an understanding of a re-
enchanted world in which humans and all material life that exists participate in the God who is 
the ongoing source of all Being. If the dust devil is some mysterious amalgam of earth and wind, 
it is also only understood by being joined with the poet’s perception. However, if the mind 
referred to is God’s (a reading which the last stanza of the poem leaves open), the natural world 
is one marked by God’s ongoing attention and presence in the world. But the dust devil is not 
pure nature since it can only ever be rendered to the human through experience and perception 
and language. 
In a more recent work, He Held Radical Light, Wiman reflects upon the poetry of Denise 
Levertov and praises her ability to create “forms that seem to merge the mind and its perceptions, 
as if a very particular world came to life by means of the gaze that was cast upon it.”207 Going 
further, Wiman suggests that there is a pervasive interdependence between the world and the 
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poet’s perception, for it is only in “durable poetry [that] a world becomes real as it realized in 
these particular words.”208 Still reflecting on Levertov, Wiman articulates poignantly the 
connection between the poet’s response to the world and how the desire to express something 
within formal constraints is nothing other than the acknowledgment that all material reality has a 
life and an energy and a dynamism that demand response. In order to write poetry “you have to 
believe that an object or person has some ‘essential energy,’ first of all, and secondly, that 
language can share it.”209  
Yet if the ephemeral dust devil is called into being by Wiman’s particular words, he is 
only making this real in a derivative mode. His work as poet is a participation into the prior force 
that called it into being. As such, material reality is also always something radically other than 
human, and in no way contingent on human perception. The poem opens up the possibility that 
this dust devil is also something perceived and attended to by God, its ultimate source. Before it 
exists in relation to man it exists in relation to its Creator. This idea is suggestive of the 
possibility that the poet’s limited attention and vocabulary—however particular and world 
forming—work within the mind of a God who not only attends to all matter (which is different 
than inhabiting it, as some animists would claim), but has also addressed it: “wild untouchable 
toy / called by a boy / God’s top / in a time when time stopped” (13 -16). These final lines turn 
the dust devil into one of God’s moving and movable playthings he has called, echoing the 
creative proclamations throughout Genesis: “Let there be…” In a subtle allusion to Genesis, 
Wiman generates an image of God as the boy who set it all spinning and continues to attend to 
its ongoing movement. Seeing this as God’s toy—as terrifying and mysterious as it may be—
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allows the joy that was so essential to Wiman’s conversion to be understood as a proper response 
to the world.  
This reading sheds some light on the central (albeit subtle) biblical allusions within the 
poem. The “amalgam of earth and wind” is a faint echo of the creation of the first man, Adam, 
who is fashioned from the earth’s clay and then animated by having the creator God breathe into 
him. Robert Alter’s translation of Genesis 2:7b notes: “then the Lord God fashioned the human, 
humus from the soil, and blew into his nostrils the breath of life, and the human became a living 
creature.”210  The human/humus wordplay is to show that man is part(icipant) of the material 
world, yet set apart by having the Divine wind-breath-spirit (the Hebrew ruach) blown into his 
nostrils.211 This theme returns in “Every Riven Thing” in which I will unpack the fuller 
significance of God’s spirit as an abiding “presence” of his ongoing utterance of the Genesis 
command to “Let there be…” The call into being of something out of nothing—creatio ex 
nihilo—is not a one-time event from an otherwise detached God. As Wiman will suggest in his 
poetry—building on creation theology that is often ignored—the created order is nothing other 
than his language and, as such, is vitalized and animated by the ongoing utterance of ruach, the 
breath, wind, spirit of God. 
If the dust devil then becomes a microcosm of humankind, and arguably of all living 
beings who are some “mystical hysterical amalgam” of earth and wind, Wiman ushers his 
readers towards a vision of a world re-enchanted along particularly Christian lines. Wiman is 
undertaking—even recovering—a type of symbolic and allegorical reading of the cosmos 
rendered regressive and obsolete within the strictures of the disenchanted world picture. By 
attending to the particulars of the dust devil it becomes much more than itself, participating in a 
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larger reality that allows the author to reflect upon his own status as an animated material being 
with real finite limits, and to explore just what might make such a thing as his improbably 
existence possible. 
 The “natural object” that is the dust devil, in fact, becomes Wiman’s gateway to an 
encounter with both the earth and with God, not as some infinite and abstract Being outside the 
world of time and change, but as a God who communicates himself through the material world. 
This is not, to use Charles Taylor’s term for disembodied, post-Enlightenment forms of 
Christianity, “excarnational” theology.212  In fact, immediately following his recollection of the 
dust devil in My Bright Abyss, Wiman meditates on how God, whatever He is, makes Himself 
known through material reality. This is the only way in which he can commune—and 
communicate—with material creatures: 
Lord, I can approach you only by means of my consciousness, but consciousness can 
only approach you as an object, which you are not. I have no hope of experiencing you as 
I experience the world—directly, immediately—yet I want nothing more. Indeed, so great 
is my hunger for you—or is this evidence of your hunger for me?—that I seem to see in 
you in the black flower mourners make beside a grave I do not know, in the embers’ 
innards like a shining hive, in the bare abundance of a winter tree whose every limb is lit 
and fraught with snow. Lord, Lord, how bright the abyss inside that “seem.”213 
The tension in the “seem” is that Wiman’s contingent vision, his ignorance, must keep the 
possibility of doubt and unbelief as viable options even as he strives to live by faith. It is 
precisely the tension that Taylor notes is a hallmark of belief in the secular age. Faith, Wiman 
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notes, “must pass through a crucible of doubt.”214 Yet the “seem” is also a playful and slippery 
homophone of “seam” and Wiman meditates on why the material world seems to reveal the 
seams through which the re-enchanted reality of God and the source of the world’s meaning lies. 
Wiman fleshes out the connections between the material world and God much more fully 
in “One Time,” which is a pair of place-oriented poems: “Canyon de Chelly, Arizona” and “2047 
Grace Street.”  
 
I. Canyon de Chelly, Arizona 
 
Then I looked down into the lovely cut 
of a missing river, something under 
dusk’s upflooding shadows  
claiming for itself a clarity 
of which my eyes were not yet capable:  
fissures could be footpaths, ancient homes 
random erosions; pictographs depicting fealties 
of who knows what hearts, to who knows what god. 
To believe is to believe you have been torn  
from the abyss, yet stand waveringly on its rim. 
I come back to the world. I come back  
to the world and would speak of it plainly, 
with only so much artifice as words 
themselves require, only so much distance 
as my own eyes impose 
on the slickrock whorls of the real 
canyon, the yucca’s stricken 
clench, and, on the other side, 
the dozen buzzards swirled and buoyed 
above some terrible intangible fire 
that must scald the very heart 
of matter to cast up such avid ash.215 
 
In this first poem of the pair, the poet is once again situated as an observer of a natural scene, 
surveying a dried-out canyon bed in Arizona. The poem opens with the poet trying to see an 
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absence, “something” invisible: a “missing river.” The speaker admits of being “not yet capable” 
for any clarity of sight and goes on to explain that this task requires not the certainty of direct 
vision, but the contingent uncertainty of hermeneutics. Interpretation of this place is required if 
there is to be any knowledge of the place. 
But this proves difficult because the place opens itself up to numerous possibilities. The 
fissures “could be” almost anything: “footpaths, ancient homes/ random erosions.” The poem 
then abruptly turns the reader’s attention, indicating that this inescapable human condition—the 
necessity of interpreting a given reality external to the self—is analogous to belief: “To believe is 
to believe you have been torn / from the abyss, yet stand waveringly on its rim.” The line 
division here is key. The pause created between being “torn” and being “torn / from” invites a 
double meaning of the word that undermines univocity since both work. In the first sense, the 
individual knows that belief renders one incomplete and, thus, torn. The connotations here are 
negative. (This idea comes up more explicitly in the poem “Every Riven Thing,” which I will 
turn to more fully in a moment.) Yet to be “torn / from the abyss” is positive; it is to be pulled 
back—not rent—and potentially saved from the abyss of meaninglessness and oblivion, the very 
things that haunts one in the immanent frame. The whole poem turns on these two lines and they 
provide a link to Wiman’s understanding of why God matters in terms of the interpretive work 
required to be open to the possibility of a re-enchanted reality. 
For Wiman, the world, like a poem, is not dependent upon the interpreter for its 
construction and, thus, its meaning. The poet (and all participants in the material world) must 
occupy a position not of pride or certainty, but a wavering and tentative stance between knowing 
and not knowing, doubt, belief, and knowledge. The abyss, for Wiman, is meaningless—a world 
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devoid of any purpose and intentionality. However, as Wiman argues in My Bright Abyss, it is 
only through this abyss that God can be known.  
As Lori Branch notes, this is the distinctly postsecular challenge to post-Enlightenment 
thought that pits knowledge against belief, certainty against uncertainty, and rather sees the two 
as a dynamic, interlocked pair. For Wiman, though, God is the “bright abyss” and, as such, the 
source of meaning and the beginning and end of all the world’s movement. This injects a certain 
purpose into the world, but also shapes the stance of the one who looks upon it. The world—as 
something expressed of God—can never be something we simply stands over as if we were 
solely in control, but it must be stood under, or less awkwardly, under-stood.  
And as the poet “come[s] back to the world” in the hopes of finding the plain words for 
this canyon, he is struck again by the “slickrock whorls” that are reality. The paradoxical 
“slickrock” world is something both seemingly fixed, yet slippery and evasive. It is static and in 
motion. It is visible in part and largely hidden from sight.  
As was noted in “Dust Devil,” through this particular encounter with the natural world, 
the poet is brought into a moment of epiphany and confrontation with a world enchanted by 
uncontainable, untouchable forces. In the last image, the poet sees a “dozen buzzards swirled and 
buoyed / above some terrible intangible fire / that must scald the very heart / of matter to cast up 
such avid ash.” Like the rock of the canyon, the buzzards swirl in a cyclical pattern evoking, 
once again, the earth’s ceaseless motion and flux and the invisible wind/spirit that moves, 
unseen, where it will. This world the poet sees in part is one animated by that “terrible intangible 
fire” of vitality at the very heart of all matter. But just what this “fire” might be finds more 
complete expression in the second part of this pairing, “2047 Grace Street.” 
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II. 2047 Grace Street 
 
But the world is more often refuge 
than evidence, comfort and covert 
for the flinching will, rather than the sharp 
particulate instants through which God’s being burns 
into ours. I say God and mean more  
than the bright abyss that opens in that word. 
I say world and mean less 
than the abstract oblivion of atoms 
out of which every intact thing emerges, 
into which every intact thing finally goes. 
I do not know how to come closer to God 
except by standing where a world is ending 
for one man. It is still dark, 
and for an hour I have listened  
to the breathing of the woman I love beyond  
my ability to love. Praise to the pain 
scalding us toward each other, the grief 
beyond which, please God, when will live 
and thrive. And praise to the light that is not 
yet, the dawn in which one bird believes, 
crying not as if there had been no night 
but as if there were no night in which it had not been.216 
 
The poem, titled with the address of Wiman’s first home with his wife, is about the restless 
struggle to accept a material world in which pain and suffering are the seemingly meaningless 
facts with which all humans are confronted. This poem begins to make more definite Wiman’s 
distinctly postsecular rendering of Christianity and its attendant myth of re-enchantment. 
In the final pages of My Bright Abyss, Wiman provides an important clue for interpreting 
this poem, writing: 
Grace. It is—not at all coincidentally, I now think—the name of the street where my wife 
and I first lived together. It is the middle name of our firstborn child, who with her twin 
sister has taught us so much about how to accept God’s immanent presence. And it is, I 
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am absolutely sure, the fearful and hopeful state in which my wife and I lay the first night 
I was home from the hospital after the transplant, feeling like a holy fever that bright 
defiance of, not death exactly, and not suffering, but meaningless death and suffering – 
which surely warrants, if anything does, the name of faith.217 
Grace, in Wiman’s register, fuses together the “immanent presence” of God in his bodily 
suffering. This is a clear indication of Wiman’s project of re-enchantment and opens up a way of 
reading the poem “2047 Grace Street” along these lines. 
The opening conjunction of the poem suggests that it is a continuation of thought with 
“Canyon de Chelly, Arizona.” This conjunction—“But”—makes these poems into two 
interdependent pieces of one whole. So while the first poem ends rather enigmatically in the 
poet’s confrontation with the “terrible intangible fire” that animates and destroys all matter, 
“2047 Grace Street” makes a connection between this mysterious force and the God whose 
“being burns into ours.” The poet goes on to express how inadequate the words for God and the 
world are in this scenario: “I say God and mean more / than the bright abyss that opens in that 
word. / I say world and mean less / than the abstract oblivion of atoms / out of which every intact 
thing emerges, / into which every intact thing finally goes.” Wiman is acknowledging here, 
again, the tensions between words and our intended meaning.  
The simple sound of God has become Wiman’s “bright abyss”—echoing the abyss from 
“Canyon de Chelly, Arizona.” As the passage from My Bright Abyss indicates, God is not the 
negation of the abyss but is a “bright” abyss, one in which suffering and death still occur, but 
they are both natural processes that mean something. “Death is here to teach us something, or to 
make us fit for something,” Wiman writes, which is an idea he admits “would sound 
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preposterous to modern scientific sensibilities.”218 That death can give form to life, though, is 
precisely how (noted above) it is silences that give the form to words. 
Faith has “little to do with belief, and so much to do with acceptance. Acceptance of all 
the gifts that God, even in the midst of death, grants us.”219 Wiman’s insight here is echoed by 
philosopher Norman Wirzba, who maintains that “creaturely life [in contradistinction from 
autonomous subjectivity] is marked by the humble, grateful reception of life as a gracious gift 
from God. […] Deathly ‘life,’ is the existence that disrespects and violates limits, is marked by 
the obligation to life from out of oneself […]. But this is an impossible, frustrating obligation, 
and a fundamental self-deception, because no creature is the source of its own life.” 220 For 
Wiman, confronting this bare “fact” is peculiarly difficult in a late modern, secular age that 
“sought to eliminate death in the frenzy of the instant, to deflect it with irony and hard-edged 
surfaces in which because nothing was valued more than anything else, nothing was subject to 
ultimate confirmation or denial.”221 What is needed, Wiman urges, is “to begin finding a way to 
once more imagine ourselves into and out of death.”222  Wiman’s stare down with death is, 
ultimately, an acceptance of the givenness of life even in the raging against the uncertainty that 
shrouds its ineluctable end.  
If death is here to give shape to life, as Wiman claims, that shape is one of radical 
humility. This is the fundamental starting point, we will see in the fourth chapter, for Wendell 
Berry’s agrarian vision. As the Genesis narrative indicates, humans were made from soil, from 
humus, and to humus they will return. And in “2047 Grace Street,” Wiman indicates this new 
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posture: “… praise to the light that is not / yet, the dawn in which one bird believes, / crying not 
as if there had been no night / but as if there were no night in which it had not been.” This is not 
to ignore or suppress the dark night of death which couches human life, but rather to be 
chastened and formed by it.  
An openness to such belief is not to negate the limits of our vision in the dark—a subtle 
allusion here to Paul in 1 Corinthians 13: “For now we see in a mirror dimly”—but it is to come 
again to the fact of being. The fact that through no machinations or willing of humans: humans 
are. In a world where all things have been given in integrative way—life, death, joy, pain, 
sorrow, longing, suffering, bodies, families, friends—the fundamental posture is one of gratitude, 
praise, and, finally, wonder. The ideas of seeing dimly “through a glass” finds the best 
articulation in “From a Window” which is another of Wiman’s poems in Every Riven Thing that 
grapples with death, suffering, and the limits of human vision.223 
 
“From a Window” 
 
Incurable and unbelieving 
In any truth but the truth of grieving, 
 
I saw a tree inside a tree 
Rise kaleidoscopically 
 
As if the leaves had livelier ghosts. 
I pressed my face as close 
 
To the pane as I could get 
To watch that fitful, fluent spirit 
 
That seemed a single being undefined 
Or countless beings of one mind 
 
Haul its strange cohesion 
 
 223 I owe much of my reading of this poem to a conference paper titled “Forms of Contingent Faith: The 
Necessity of Doubt in Christian Wiman’s Poetry,” delivered by Dr. Chad Wriglesworth for the Christianity and 
Literature Study Group as part of the ACCUTE conference held at the University of Ottawa in the Spring of 2015.  
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Beyond the limits of my vision 
 
Over the house heavenwards. 
Of course I knew those leaves were birds 
 
Of course that old tree stood 
Exactly as it had and would 
 
(but why should it seem fuller now?) 
And though a man’s mind might endow 
 
Even a tree with some excess  
Of life to which a man seems witness, 
 
That life is not the life of men. 
And that is where the joy came in. 
  
This entire poem revolves around the paradox that joy can infuse a material world of suffering 
and pain. Once again Wiman sets up the speaker of the poem as one surveying a scene, but this 
time the external world is mediated through a pane of glass. The homophonic wordplay with 
pane suggests that the speaker’s vision is also mediated through the pain and suffering of an 
incurable disease. It is this state of being—a state of being towards death—that controls the 
poem from the outset.  
We begin in the mind of the speaker.  Wriglesworth notes that “[w]e enter the poem 
without reference to a person or another created form, but only an all-consuming state of 
subjectivity.”224 Yet the opening couplet is not final, it is not closed off by a period but left open 
with a comma. The poet then sees through the window a murmuration of birds take flight from a 
tree: “I saw a tree inside a tree / rise kaleidoscopically.” Wriglesworth points out that “[t]he ‘tree 
inside a tree’ opens up a new creation of vitality—life nested within life—so that the poet bent 
on wordplay, who once “saw” only a materialist way of being, has encountered a vivacious 
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reality that is now beginning to saw the previous way of knowing “mere matter” to the ground.225 
(Of course, “mere matter” is noted tongue-in-cheek, for to reductively label something infinitely 
meaningful as “mere” is an absurdity.) “Pause for a moment,” Rowan Williams writes, “ to 
reflect on how odd it is that our language can discover anything by simply playing games with 
itself.”226 Wiman is here recognizing that poetry—with its multiplicity of meanings and its 
ambiguities— is not merely some aberration of human speech but it is precisely the type of thing 
we might expect if the material world is itself the “fluent” speech of a creative God. Poetry then 
is an intimate participation in both the world and God and has the possibility to draw one into a 
nearer union with both.  
Echoing the ideas in “Dust Devil” and “Canyon de Chelly, Arizona,” Wiman is once 
again fascinated by a world that is enchanted by some spiritual presence that animates the world. 
In the case of this poem it is found in the “livelier ghosts” that set the birds into flight. He leans 
close to the pane “to watch that fitful, fluent spirit / that seemed a single being undefined / or 
countless beings of one mind / haul its strange cohesion / beyond the limits of my vision / over 
the house heavenwards.” Contrary to the disenchanted stance of control, Wiman again observes 
the limitations of human perception and how this leaves open the possibility of some 
transcendent reality that animates the immanent world. 
 The poet, though, is certain about none of this. The metaphorical language—“as if” and 
“seemed”—allow the poet to undercut these speculations with a rather dismissive: “Of course I 
knew those leaves were birds. / Of course that old tree stood / exactly as it had and would.” The 
line, though, is abruptly stopped and left open ended with no punctuation mark. The diseased 
speaker understands that the cause of the birds’ movement remains unknown and the life of the 
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tree will go on as it had “and would” long after the poet is dead. But before the poet entertains 
this thought, he goes back to ruminations on this tree: “(but why should it seem fuller now?).” 
And the real struggle with words and knowledge is how to make sense of a world that always 
seems to be something else, a world that is always in a process of ceaseless exchange and 
movement, much like the language we use for it. 
 As the poem concludes, there is a movement from pure subjectivity towards a meditation 
on the world outside the self. Although this world of non-human things is apprehended by the 
poet only partially, it is in the very fact of its otherness that brings joy to the poet: “and though a 
man’s mind might endow / even a tree with some excess / of life to which a man seems witness, / 
that life is not the life of men. / And that is where the joy came in.” The movement from despair 
to joy occurs when the poet does not yield everything to pure subjectivity and construction, nor 
does he find an inherent meaninglessness in the powers of his imagination to make the world 
sensible. Rather, the “joy” comes in upon the realization that his limited vision bears witness to a 
meaningful world of which he is a meaningful participant. This joy is again fundamental to 
Wiman’s conversion to a new myth of reality. “The inclusion and entrance of joy,” Wriglesworth 
notes, “suggests the arrival of a wholly other expression of life—perhaps indicative of the Greek 
word zoe—life from beyond life that creates: Word within word, world within world, tree within 
tree—that source of all things that dwells among the bios of creaturely forms as a divine gift.”227  
 Wiman’s poetry and prose suggest that there are strains of postsecular Christian theology 
that figure the world as sacred because it is first a gift from a creator God and exists in relation to 
this source of Being before it exists in relation to human knowledge or control. 
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Obviously, that’s a contestable claim in the secular age. Yet this is precisely the Christian 
form of re-enchantment on offer in Wiman’s poetry. We find this particularly Christian form of 
re-enchantment poignantly expressed in the title poem of Every Riven Thing. In many ways, the 
poem is the culmination of Wiman’s reflection on the interrelationship between human joy, 
suffering, and language, and the God in whom all things might be joined together. The poem is 
an extended meditation, and intensification, of several of the ideas already touched upon in other 
poems and essays. 
“Every Riven Thing” is composed of four stanzas of five lines and then a final stanza of 
the one, repeated line that opens each stanza: “God goes belonging to every riven thing he’s 
made.” The poem’s power lies in how Wiman places a certain pressure on these words, not only 
through their repetition, but in situating them within different contexts and grammatical 
structures so that the meaning of each word slides and shifts through each new rendering in each 
verse. The words oddly become familiar through multiple readings but are always strange in 
their new delivery and altered context. This is not, as I will show, to play a poststructural game 
in which all these terms are rendered meaningless; rather, the verses work together to form a 
coherent, gathered meaning and contingent resolution.  
The poem opens:  
God goes, belonging to every riven thing he’s made 
Sing his being simply by being 
The thing it is:  
Stone and tree and sky, 
Man who sees and sings and wonders why 
 
God goes. [l. 1 – 6]228 
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The first stanza is marked by the presence of a God who is actively moving within the “riven 
things” to which he belongs. God is not simply the supreme and detached being outside some 
encapsulated world. In a way, Wiman’s focus upon a God who “goes” and who “belongs” to the 
created world is a reformulation of the late Medieval and early modern theological renderings of 
God and the world–the relationship between transcendence and immanence—that created the 
very conditions in which the myth of disenchantment became possible. If Lynn White Jr. 
challenged his audience to rethink the old religion (by which he meant Christianity), this is 
precisely what Wiman’s poem is doing. God is not, Wiman is showing, a noun, but something 
closer to a verb. God is movement and act, not a static object. As Wiman notes in My Bright 
Abyss: “Any notion of God that is static is—since it asserts singular knowledge of God and seeks 
to limit his being to that knowledge—blasphemous.”229 The poem uses language that goes out 
from the poet and, thus, continues belonging to him or her, even as the poem has freedom as it 
moves in the world.  
This is, again, to counteract certain strains of objectivist theology borne in modernity 
wherein God was figured as a transcendent Being untethered from an autonomous natural order. 
It is in this mode that modern theology asserted concepts about God’s character that were logical 
corollaries of a supreme being, yet also so abstract that God’s omnipotent, omniscient character 
seemed remote from embodied, creaturely life. Such abstractions helped give rise to a 
disenchanted form of excarnational Christianity, as Charles Taylor’s work shows. Once God is 
imagined in some logically ideal fashion, his ongoing participation in the phenomenal world is 
much easier to imagine away. Countering this theology, Wiman urges Christians particularly—
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and secular readers more broadly—to accept the possibility of a Christ who is not the product of 
rationalism, but contingent in the moment-to-moment reality of creaturely life:  
Omnipotent, eternal, omniscient—what in the world do these rotten words really mean? 
Are we able to imagine such attributes, much less perceive them? I don’t think so. Christ 
is the only way toward knowledge of God, and Christ is contingency. […] Better to say 
that contingency is the only way toward knowledge of God, and contingency, for 
Christians, is the essence of incarnation. And incarnation, as well as the possibilities for 
salvation within it, precedes Christ’s presence in history, and exceeds all that is known by 
the term Christianity.230  
These lines echo earlier thoughts found in “Notes on Poetry and Religion,” wherein Wiman 
makes the point that an “abstract” God who is merely an idea free from the change and decay of 
this world is impossible to respond with hope or joy or love. According to Wiman, God must 
belong to this world, he must enchant it, he must be part of the immanent frame since “You 
cannot devote your life to an abstraction. Indeed, life shatters all abstractions in one way or 
another, including words such as faith or belief. If God is not in the very fabric of existence for 
you, if you do not find Him (or miss Him!) in the details of your daily life, then religion is just 
one more way to commit spiritual suicide.”231  
If, according to Wiman, God as the source of Being is not detached from the world but 
intimately involved in it, continuing to uphold and sustain it, then one has a workable frame for 
the contingency and dependence of all creaturely, material life. Indeed, this is why all things are, 
for Wiman, “riven.” Riven is an uncommon word, but it is the past participle of “to rive” which 
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means to crack or tear apart. If all things subsist because of the ongoing sustaining attention of 
the source of Being, then should this attention depart, all reality would cease to be.232  This is not 
just a theological point, but it is fundamentally an ecological point. If all things are riven, then all 
things depend on other things for their completion and fulfillment. The whole web of material 
reality is an interlocking weave. All things exist in complex relationships, not only to the unseen 
source of Being but to one another. Wiman makes no explicit ecological claims, but this is, 
again, foundational for what Robinson and Berry will explore in their more pronounced 
ecological projects. 
In the very way Wiman uses language he indicates that this ecological truth permeates 
our language. No word or phoneme is autonomous in its meaning; rather, the meaning is always 
a function of its relationship to its location with other words and phonemes. A past participle like 
riven, wherein a verb becomes an adjective or noun, depends upon the same contingency of 
meaning that the entire poem performs. A “thing” (a noun) might only be a thing in one context, 
but within another context it becomes an “action” (a verb) or a qualifier (an adjective). Context 
makes all the difference, and thus meaning in this poem—in a contingent world—is something 
always on the move. This is not to negate the presence of meaning, but it is, perhaps, to 
understand meaning as something (to borrow lines from T.S. Eliot) “still and still moving.”233 
 Furthermore, if everything is riven, everything is at once fundamentally broken and 
fundamentally incomplete in itself. The double meaning here holds. Nothing is autonomous and 
nothing in a state of perfection in a fallen world. All things in the material world are split and 
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cracked; that is, they are contingent and ultimately dependent upon other things outside and 
beyond themselves in order to continue being and existing and perpetuating. For Wiman, this 
movement is underwritten and orchestrated by the attention of a God whose disposition towards 
all of this is one of enduring love. It is for this reason, the poet suggests, that “God goes” and all 
things “sing his [God’s] being simply by being.” The “stone” and “tree” and “sky” simply are the 
things they are and while man’s contingent vision leads him to “wonder why” such things are, 
the givenness of their being depends on nothing from human perception and, ultimately, remains 
a mystery. 
 The three objects are also indicative of different realms of being. The stone appears to be 
inert matter, there is no discernible vitality in it to perpetuate itself through procreation. It simply 
is. A tree, however, lives and dies, and is participant in the change and decay of material 
existence. It also bears seeds and new trees are created and carry forward in time. The sky, 
however, is not so clearly a definable “thing” but a seemingly invisible substance that is present 
in the perception of man. It is the substance made of subsensible material through which all other 
matter moves and is experienced.  
In a landmark work of eco-phenomenology, The Spell of the Sensuous, David Abram 
provides an insightful account of experiencing the sky that helps unpack some of the riches in 
Wiman’s poem. Abram notes the significance of the sky which houses the invisible air: 
[T]he air can never be opened for our eyes, never made manifest. Itself invisible, it is the 
medium through which we see all else in the present terrain. And this unseen enigma is 
the very mystery that enables life to live. It unites our breathing bodies not only with the 
under-the-ground (with the rich microbial life of the soil, with fossil and mineral deposits 
deep in the bedrock), and not only with the beyond-the-horizon (with distant forests and 
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oceans), but also with the interior life of all that we perceive in the open field of the 
living present. […] What the plants are quietly breathing out, we animals are breathing 
in; what we breath out, the plants are breathing in. The air, we might say, is the soul of 
the visible landscape, the secret realm from when all beings drawn their nourishment.234 
From rock to tree to sky, Wiman’s poetry, like Abram’s phenomenology, attempts to show the 
interconnected, ecological relationships of all life that depend upon and participate with one 
another.  
In the second stanza, the shifting punctuation turns attention from God towards humanity. 
God goes. Belonging, to every riven thing he’s made,  
means a storm of peace.  
Think of the atoms inside the stone. 
Think of the man who sits alone 
trying to will himself into a stillness where  
 
God goes belonging. 
 
Just who the verbal “Belonging” belongs to, however, is ambiguous. It makes sense in the 
context of the previous stanza, that the implied subject is “man.” As such, it is man who belongs 
to the riven things of his making. This leads to the paradoxical “storm of peace.” Wiman may 
very well be talking here of the making of poetry, which involves both control and the 
relinquishing of control, the attempt to speak intentionally, but also a “bodying forth” of 
meanings that will ultimately escape authorial intention. There is both chaos and form in the 
creation of culture, and man as maker participates in this tension through the material act of 
creatio ex creatis.  
 However, the remainder of the second stanza also indicates that the verbal is also quite 
possibly in relation to God. And the paradoxical “storm of peace” is a fitting analogy to the 
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motion and stasis that characterize the material objects that subsist by the Creator’s ongoing 
attention. Returning to the “stone” in the first stanza, Wiman commands with an imperative 
sentence: “Think of the atoms inside the stone.” The reader must imagine the subsensible reality 
of perpetual movement voice and movement that underwrites everything, even an object as 
seeming static as a stone. Limited human perception renders it a fixed object, a whole. Yet 
beneath the appearances is an ongoing, frenetic activity of atomic structures. Wiman then says, 
again with the imperative: “Think of the man who sits alone / trying to will himself into a 
stillness where / God goes belonging.” And again, the paradox Wiman brings to mind is the 
unique position humans occupy in the realm of material objects. They share and participate in the 
atomic frenzy at work in stones, trees, and even the sky, yet they also possess the will to find the 
silence and stillness in which they might apprehend God.  
In the third and fourth and final partial stanza, Wiman brings to a climax his reflection on 
the interconnectedness of words, the world, and God. 
God goes belonging. To every riven thing he’s made 
there is given one shade 
shaped exactly to the thing itself:  
under the tree a darker tree;  
under the man the only man to see 
 
God goes belonging to every riven thing. He’s made 
the things that bring near, 
made the mind that makes him go. 
A part of what man knows, 
apart from what man knows, 
 
God goes belonging to every riven thing he’s made. 
 
The intriguing aspect of the third stanza is that while the attention now focuses upon the tree and 
the man and their shadows, light is never mentioned. It’s the unspoken source from which all 
sight is made possible, even the sight of the “negative” form of shade that follows all things. In a 
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collection that repeatedly calls into question the powers of human vision, Wiman’s point seems 
to be that even the powers of human vision wherein we distinguish objects from each other is all 
contingent on the ever moving rays of light that move through the invisible sky, reflect off of 
objects and meet the perceiving eye.  
 In the penultimate stanza, Wiman shifts the focus to the idea that the world is made. The 
world is a given creation, made by a God who moves through it continuously. When God uttered 
“Let there be…” in Genesis, that may not be a one-time declaration that has ended, as Christians 
often assume with what is a default, functional deism. Rather, as David Abram suggests after 
looking at the Jewish mystical tradition: “It is by virtue of [God’s] continual breath that nature is 
always new; the world around is a continual, ongoing utterance.”235 Again, this is an important 
feature of a postsecular Christian theology that speaks to the Anthropocene, one that recovers 
fresh ways of understanding the world from within a tradition that it has forgotten or ignored. If 
God’s ongoing utterance of the world is true, then these “things” are not the res extensa of 
matter, untethered from a deistic God. Instead, they are the very things by which he makes 
Himself known to a human’s limited, material mind.  
The mind—the seat of human experience, consciousness, and language—is, as I will 
explore fully in the following chapter, framed by Marilynne Robinson as the soul. She is 
attempting to recover older language of nous or psyche, in which mind and soul were 
coterminous.  Now Wiman does not make this same linguistic move; however, his reflections on 
the soul in My Bright Abyss, I argue, help to understand this section of “Every Riven Thing.” 
Wiman writes: 
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…the soul is not simply the agent that does the seeing (the entity to which metaphorical 
glimmerings are given), it is in some way the things that are seen (the world that 
glimmers); or perhaps more accurately, the soul is the verb that makes an exchange 
between the self and reality—or the self and other selves—possible.  It is the soul that 
turns perception into communication, and communication—even if it’s just between one 
man and the storm of atoms around him—into communion.236  
If this is what Wiman means by “mind”—and the echoes in this passage and the poem “Every 
Riven Thing” suggest it very well may be—then the mysterious powers of the human mind is 
how we make sense of our communication, the root of which is communio. It is the words as 
expressions of our mind made from impressions of the world that join us with it and with other 
language animals.  
This is how we participate in material reality yet also participate in the God from which 
all material reality is given and sustained. Wiman, again, is quick to acknowledge that we cannot 
know this in the same way we know things through science and empirical observation, but we 
can know it through a belief open to doubt and humbled by the provisional quality of its claims. 
And it is such belief, or faith, that is a form of knowledge that is of an entirely different order 
than that of the empiricism and rationalism privileged in a disenchanted age.  
The notion that our language is a response to the natural world may also suggest a certain 
mechanistic framing: as if our words were some mere reaction to a communicative reality that 
precedes (and proceeds) us. Rather, what I want to stress, along the lines laid out by Taylor and 
Williams, is that language—particularly poetic language—reveals to us something about what 
the world is and the way we belong to the world as language animals. Language is the 
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lebenswelt, or the form of life, by which humans inhabit the earth. The theological insights of 
Wiman not only provide a viable, if only always tentative, framework for the linguistic 
dimension of re-enchantment, but also provide a much more satisfactory motivation for seeing 
material reality as sacred, meaning as given, and our posture towards the earth as one capable of 
humble wonder instead of detached control. 
 But to understand expansive experience and understanding of the world wrought through 
belief, we must look more closely at the soul and, thus, turn to Marilynne Robinson who, 
interestingly enough, is one of “the three living novelists whose work means the most”237 to 
Christian Wiman. In fact, he is particularly intrigued by Robinson because she has done much to 
recover the language of belief in a secular, disenchanted age. Wiman writes: 
Does the decay of belief among educated people in the West precede the decay of 
language used to define and explore belief, or do we find the fire of belief fading in us 
only because the words are sodden with overuse and imprecision, and will not burn? We 
need a poetics of belief, a language capacious enough to include a mystery that, 
ultimately, defeats it, and sufficiently intimate and inclusive to serve not only as 
individual expression, but as communal need.238  
Of course, Wiman’s work is a prime example of the “poetics of belief” in the secular age, but his 
indication that the work of Robinson may be just the visionary light American—and by 
extension, Western—culture needs, bears further attention. Particularly because Robinson, by 
attending closely to the human soul and offering a particularly Christian myth of re-enchantment, 
helps us move closer towards a conception of a truly ecological self, one that is not buffered 
from the world, but porous and open to becoming re-embedded to it. And the way she arrives 
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there is, like Wiman, by recovering a lost (or forgotten) language of belief that occupies a 









































CHAPTER THREE: MARILYNNE ROBINSON 
A Soul of and for the World 
____________________ 
 
In the context of the highly polarized US Presidential election of 2016, Baylor University 
professor Alan Jacobs wrote a piece in Harper’s titled “The Watchmen” in which Jacobs asks 
where all the Christian public intellectuals went.239 “Half a century ago,” he maintains, “such 
figures existed in America: serious Christian intellectuals who occupied a prominent place on the 
national stage. They are gone now.”240 In his conclusion, Jacobs laments this situation and then 
argues that this problem, as he thinks it to be, is not simply due to a dearth of Christian voices, 
but also a “secular”241 intellectual audience that is no longer in tune with Christianity: “[F]rom 
the Fifties to the Seventies, American intellectuals as a group lost the ability to hear the music of 
religious thought and practice,” Jacobs argues, “And surely that happened at least in part because 
we Christian intellectuals ceased to play it for them.”242 
 While culturally provocative, Jacobs’ argument does not account for the fact that one of 
the most recognized and awarded public intellectuals in American culture is Marilynne 
Robinson, someone who explicitly confesses to be a Christian. Jacobs addresses the case of 
Robinson, but only to dismiss her particular version of Christianity as being compromised by 
secularism and, thus, inadequate for his conception of what it means to be a truly Christian 
public intellectual. He argues that while Robinson might be the friend of Barack Obama—a clear 
indicator of her public influence—she never “calls upon her readers to act differently, socially or 
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politically or morally, than they would normally be inclined to act.”243 Jacobs clarifies that by 
“her readers” he means Robinson’s “largely secular audience.”244 Robinson, it would seem to 
Jacobs, is too secular to be understood as a Christian public intellectual. 
 Jacobs’ take on Robinson’s popularity and Christianity is, of course, contestable. I draw 
attention to it only because it shows a certain reading of Robinson that might surprise secular 
materialists who are just as nonplussed by Robinson’s popularity given her overt attempts to 
recover Christian thought –particularly Calvinist and Puritan strains of it—in contemporary 
American intellectual and cultural life. This confusion of how to engage Robinson’s thought—
which is also the case with Wiman and, as we will see in the next chapter, Wendell Berry—is a 
feature of reading postsecular American writing by confessional Christians who are not simply in 
opposition to, but also informed by secularism. Robinson’s writing is self-consciously Christian, 
yet she remains amenable to various aspects of secularism even as she is uncomfortable with 
certain expressions of contemporary American Christianity. And, as Jacobs’ argument indicates, 
various American Christians continue to be uncomfortable with her today. 
 The discomfort, I argue, is due in large part to different understandings of secularism, a 
topic explored in the previous chapters. Part of the challenge is that when Jacobs pits the 
categories of “secular” against “Christian,” there is an underlying assumption that secularism 
constitutes what Charles Taylor calls a “subtraction narrative”245 in which secularization 
necessitates a loss or negation of religious belief. From this frame of reference, Jacobs expects 
that American Christian intellectuals should continue to be the apologists of the early to mid-
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twentieth century. Indeed, Jacobs offers C.S. Lewis and Reinhold Niebuhr as two possible 
exemplars of what Christian intellectuals should aspire towards.  
Yet to make such an argument fails to understand how Robinson’s postsecular 
theological vision operates. I argue that Robinson is best understood as a postsecular writer who 
complicates the binary categories of Christian and non-Christian, sacred and secular, belief and 
doubt, and even religious and scientific. What often unsettles readers prone to accepting such 
conflict narratives is Robinson’s “posture of openness and reception.”246 This posture is not to 
suggest Robinson is relativistic or, along the lines of other postsecular writers, such as many of 
the authors John McClure looks at in Partial Faiths—writers like N. Scott Momaday, Toni 
Morrison, Don DeLillo, and Thomas Pynchon, to name a few. Such writers often form 
hybridized “new” religions out of the fragments of old religions. These new forms of religious 
expression are created in reaction to (and often against) the most rigid strains of anti-religious, 
disenchanted secularism.  
Yet McClure also argues that the “weakening” of fundamentalisms—whether that’s the 
secular fundamentalism of scientism or dogmatic religious fundamentalism—is a central feature 
of postsecular narratives that also “affirm the urgent need for a turn toward the religious even as 
they reject the familiar dream of a full return to an authoritative faith. The paths they chart do not 
lead back into the domain of conventional religious dwelling […]. Instead they lead into zones 
where characters must learn to reconcile important secular and religious intuitions.”247 For 
Robinson, I will show, the shared ground of these intuitions is phenomenological. Indeed, her 
postsecular Christian project is fundamentally about recovering the importance of human 
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experience as a way to make sense of reality and, more to the point of this project, to understand 
how religious belief inform experience of reality. In this liminal space, one that refuses 
“simplistic narratives that religion must be either secularized or recovered,”248 Robinson remains 
confessionally Christian, working, as Amy Hungerford notes about other confessionally religious 
writers in contemporary American literature, “within a religious paradigm [she] does not aspire 
to escape and whose terms [she] does not wish to cast aside.”249 Understanding Robinson’s 
project as postsecular and Christian sheds important light on her fascination of the relationship 
between human experience, religious belief, and the human relationship to the material world.  
In this chapter, I will look more closely at how Robinson occupies the liminal space of 
the postsecular, by exploring the soul as the site of human experience. Yet while Robinson’s 
critique of disenchantment is phenomenological, I will also show in this chapter how it remains 
confessionally Christian and, finally, deeply concerned about our ecological relationship to the 
material world. The vision of re-enchantment Robinson offers, I maintain, must be understood in 
the context of how the individual might experience the world not as some inert and dead material 
they can quantify and control. Robinson’s writing offers no strong apologetic or even argument 
about why such stories are wrong. Rather, she consistently counters such narratives by bringing 
us intimately into the experience of reality through other stories. That is, through the experience 
of other souls. In Gilead, Robinson fleshes out a counter narrative of re-enchantment by 
providing an intimate glimpse into the reality of a person who lives “as if” the material world 
were sustained and made anew each moment by God, a creative source of energy that is also 
personal and characterized, above all, by love. For John Ames, the material world is no 
disenchanted place, but, drawing on John Calvin’s theology, is the theatre of God. This 
 
 248 Sung, 2. 
 249 Hungerford, 111 – 112. 
 111 
perception changes his entire posture to himself, to others, and to the material world. Robinson is 
not strongly dogmatic about this. Rather, her fiction invites readers into a new way of 
experiencing reality through a new story, one informed by, among other things, Christian belief. 
In this chapter I will draw on numerous essays from Robinson; however, her collection of 
essays in Absence of Mind: The Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern Myth of the Self 
(2010) provide her most sustained treatment of the soul from a postsecular Christian perspective. 
Therefore, I will be looking most closely at this collection, because, I argue, it situates 
Robinson’s project as one particularly concerned with a re-enchanted vision that reimagines the 
relationship of humans with the material world. Robinson, as some recent scholars are beginning 
to address, is indeed a writer with an important, albeit understated, ecological vision.250 My 
intent, in this chapter, is to show that this ecological vision is underwritten by a postsecular 
project. And just as Wiman’s prose form shed light upon his poetic project, in a similar fashion 
Robinson’s essays provide some hermeneutical tools for understanding her fiction.  
After looking at her recovery of the soul and the challenges she poses to otherworldly 
renditions of Christianity and deterministic materialisms, I will look more closely at Robinson’s 
2004 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel Gilead, which among other things is Robinson’s exploration 
of a soul who, over the course of a life, learns how to perceive the sacred beauty of the natural 
world which is not merely the arena for the absurdity that is human existence, but rather, in 
Robinson’s rendering, God’s theater. I will focus particularly on the journey the young pastor 
Ames and his father make to the site of their deceased forebear, which is both a site of their 
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familial, ontological source and also a site that demarcates the end of material life. The meaning 
of this experience, for Ames, unfolds over the course of life, drawing him into deeper and more 
profound mysteries about who he is and where he is in the world. During this journey, the young 
Ames experiences a moment of epiphany in which he sees the light of the sun reflected by the 
light of the moon. This moment (which mirrors the epiphany Robinson experienced in reading 
the Congregationalist pastor Jonathan Edwards) provides a climactic moment in Ames’s 
narrative in which, I maintain, Robinson presents a re-enchanted vision the world as God’s stage. 
This has significant ecological implications. Indeed, as Belden Lane notes, “The image of the 
theatre […] suggests how such a theology could (and should) be lived out in a practice of piety 
that embraces the whole of creation.”251  
 
A Postsecular Christian Vision 
It is worth noting that Robinson actually responded to Jacobs’ article “The Watchmen” 
with her own short letter to the editor of Harper’s, writing: “There are a great many things those 
of us who call ourselves Christians need to talk over. One very important one is secularism.”252 
She goes on to debunk the well-worn narrative that “this phenomenon [of secularism]” only 
entails hostility and persecution for Christians and other religious practitioners. She suggests that 
secularism in the American Academy, for instance, has also been a significant accomplishment, 
making possible a public space in which “a culture of mutual courtesy and service that is no less 
compatible with Christianity because it accommodates the same values in other faiths and ethical 
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systems.”253 This understanding of secularism echoes Charles Taylor’s, particularly the secular3 
as a space in which various renderings of reality remain open to one another, allowing a certain 
“cross-pressure”—to use Taylor’s term--from competing narratives to shape one another. 
In the best conditions of secularism, scientific and religious discourses confront, 
challenge, and mutually inform one another. These spaces become dangerous and hostile,  Taylor 
would maintain (and Robinson would agree), if and when the narratives—the myths—become 
“closed spins” rather than “open takes.”254 Such hardened ideology also fails to allow the 
importance of lived experience, casting it aside for more rigid propositions about what reality is 
(or should be). For Robinson, experience of reality is always more complex and excessive than 
the forms of meaning which humans make of it. Yet affording such propositional statements—
whether they are creeds or scientific dogmas—the belief that a person is fully able to define and 
speak for reality is when fundamentalisms emerge, and polarized tribalism ensues. A different 
path forward in American thought and culture, Robinson repeatedly illustrates in her work, is 
through the cultivation of a posture of openness—a posture that Robinson maintains should be 
both religious and scientific, since both forms of knowledge demand that we confront and 
challenge “our comfortable certainties.”255  
This is not to suggest that any and all claims are valid. Robinson is not advocating for an 
unlimited openness or unchecked relativism. Rather, Robinson’s openness begins with valuing 
subjective experiences in ways that undermine the so-called objectivist stances of closed 
religious dogmatisms and closed scientistic fundamentalism. Both of these, as I argued in the 
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opening chapter, are post-Enlightenment projects that postsecularism challenges. Tae Sung 
helpfully notes that Robinson’s “hermeneutical posture of openness” leads her towards a project 
that makes no defense for her beliefs, but rather demands an awareness of the conditions in 
which belief and unbelief even take place. The echoes of Taylor’s central interest in A Secular 
Age are clear. These conditions, Sung goes on, “open or close moral sources” in the secular 
age.256 In other words, Robinson’s fiction and prose create imaginative visions in which her 
particularly Christian narrative of re-enchantment might seem plausible (if not even desirable). 
 Robinson’s writing has proven very difficult for literary critics to contend with, for her 
thought is not easy to contain or categorize. Alex Engebretson sums up this difficulty succinctly: 
[S]he is a woman critical of feminist scholarship; a political progressive and cultural 
traditionalist; a liberal Protestant who admires John Calvin; an environmentalist who was 
sued by Greenpeace; a celebrated novelist who has published more essays than fiction; a 
domestic novelist and novelist of ideas; a critic of modernism and a champion of the 
American nineteenth century.257 
Each set of descriptors illustrates Robinson’s liminal position in, out of, and between various 
intellectual and religious communities. But Engebretson is incorrect when he suggests that this 
position is due to Robinson’s contrarian nature and idiosyncratic form of thought. Rather, I argue 
the real difficulty in categorizing Robinson is primarily due to her self-consciously cultivated 
posture towards forms of thought that undermine the primacy of personal experience. The two 
particular groups are reductive materialists beholden to a myth of disenchantment and religious 
fundamentalists with heavily dogmatic, otherworldly tendencies. Robinson’s writing challenges 
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both groups in ways that at once attracts and repels them. In her life and in her work,  Robinson 
has cultivated a posture that is deeply critical of the intellectual and cultural pressures to 
conform. She is, therefore, a writer radically open to the claims of divergent forms of thought—
religious, scientific, or otherwise—particularly if they are not enclosed to the claims of human 
experience.  
Robinson’s biography—her own life experience—is a helpful entryway into 
understanding the apparent ease with which she inhabits various intellectual communities while 
also unsettling established lines of intellectual and cultural affiliation.258 Robinson notes that she 
“did not have an especially strong religious upbringing” and actually “came to theology on [her] 
own.”259 Now despite this apparent lack of theology, Robinson remarks that the “atmosphere [of 
her childhood] was in fact Calvinist”260 and it seems, from a story Robinson tells often in essays 
and interviews, that her appreciation for Calvinist Christian thought only deepened while she 
attended Pembroke College. It was while reading the great American theologian Jonathan 
Edwards that Robinson had an epiphany that profoundly influenced her vision of reality, the way 
she understood God, the world, and herself: 
When I was a sophomore in college, taking a course in American philosophy I went to 
the library and read an assigned text, Jonathan Edwards’s Doctrine of Original Sin 
Defended. There is a long footnote in this daunting treatise that discusses the light of the 
moon, and how the apparent continuity of the moon’s light is a consequence of it 
reflecting light that is in fact continuously renewed. This was Edwards’s analogy for the 
continuous renewal of the world by the will of God, which creates, to our eyes, seeming 
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lawfulness and identity, but which is in fact a continuous free act of God.  Edwards’s 
footnote was my first, best introduction to epistemology and ontology, and my escape—
and what a rescue it was—from the contending, tedious determinisms that seemed to be 
all that was on offer to me then.261 
This moment, I maintain, is crucial for understanding Robinson’s particularly Christian narrative, 
or myth, of re-enchantment. I will return to it when it reappears in a poignant episode of Gilead 
and its connection to the Calvinist notion of the world as God’s theatre. At this point, however, it 
is simply worth noting that for Robinson, Edwards’s meditations on the material world are what 
initially prompted her “religious belief in intellectual openness.”262 Edwards, a Congregationalist  
preacher from the 18th century, satisfied her intellectual hunger for a more satisfactory story 
about the world than the various reductionisms of modern thought—Darwinism, Freudianism, 
and Behaviourism—that were on offer at Pembroke.  
Articulating religiously inflected alternatives to various materialistic determinisms and 
dogmatic forms of Christianity became a focal point for Robinson’s intellectual curiosity and 
critique that, I argue, mark her as a distinctly postsecular writer. Robinson’s postsecular 
Christianity is characterized by her refusal to see secularism and Christianity as fundamentally at 
odds, or even in necessary conflict, with one another.  
In an essay titled “Memory,” Robinson confounds the categories of Christian and secular 
by declaring: “I am a Christian, [but] other loyalties are important to me, secularism, for 
example.”263 This conflation gets explored in greater detail in her essay  “Son of Adam, Son of 
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Man,” in which Robinson looks at various “extravagant notions of the world” prompted by 
physics and concludes: “There is no need to credit any of these theories in order to reject the 
claims of the old commonsensical science to have discredited the Christian mythos, which is 
actually rather restrained by comparison.”264 She goes on to claim that for this reason she does 
not reject the myth, or narrative, of Christianity in favor of science, but  
returns to the original language of [her] faith, crediting its Word as meaningful [… and] 
accept[ing] it as one among the great givens to be encountered in experience, that is, as a 
thing that presents itself, reveals itself, always partially and circumstantially, accessible 
only to tentative apprehension, which means that it is always newly meaningful. In this it 
is like everything else, but much more so.265  
As she does in numerous essays, Robinson collapses the supposedly mutually exclusive 
categories of Christianity and secularism through an epistemology that is at once comfortable 
with uncertainty and focused upon the fundamental mysteries of ontology that are experienced 
through experience itself.   
In another interview, Robinson explains a bit more clearly how Christian dogma and 
creeds are not unnecessary but must always be secondary to this mysterious encounter with 
being. In other words, creeds and statements place limits—sometimes helpful, sometimes 
constricting—on one’s experience of reality: “Creeds themselves exist,” Robinson tells her 
interviewer, “to stabilize the intense speculations that religion, which is always about the 
ultimate nature of things, will inspire.”266 Echoing Wiman, Robinson notes that “Any writer who 
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has wearied of words knows the feeling of being limited by the things that enable.”267 In other 
words, one’s language and creedal confession are meant to help shape and give meaning to the 
experience of reality, but they are never meant to be exhaustive. Reality always exceeds our 
words and our meanings for it, particularly as these words and meanings take new shape and 
increased depth over time. 
Hungerford helpfully notes that for Robinson there is an important connection between 
the Divine and the human attempts to make meaning of it since both “exceed the ‘stabilizing’ 
resources, the formal discursive structures through which human beings attempt to challenge 
lived experience of the divine and of the world.”268 Both religious life and even literature, 
according to Hungerford, are the formal containers of the experience of the mysterious heart of 
reality. To be clear, for Robinson the re-enchanted world is mysterious “not because it is a puzzle 
yet unsolved, but [because it] is the individual’s experience of a reality that constantly reveals 
itself in unexpected ways.”269 Mystery, as we saw with Wiman, is not a term meant to defer 
precision, but rather to name the abundance of reality that our language and even our conscious 
minds are not able to fully contain. In Robinson’s Calvinist Christian rendering, the reason for 
the “excess” of both reality and the human meanings we give it is because “the created order, 
which always remains mysteriously incomprehensible, communicates the greatness and power of 
the Creator, which extends far beyond anything perceivable in his creation.”270 This is the heart 
of Robinson’s particularly Christian myth of re-enchantment. According to Robinson, experience 
can be shaped by this story which gives form and meaning to reality as if it were the theatre of 
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God’s glory.271 This theological move separates Robinson from other twentieth century thinkers 
whose existentialism and phenomenology was often a bold move to value inward experience in a 
world where God was presumed dead. It is also to separate her from the functional Deism that 
saw God’s creative act as a one-time event from which God remained detached.  
Of course, not all scholars of Robinson are convinced she is a postsecular writer, 
particularly as laid out by John McClure in Partial Faiths. In an interview, Robinson was asked 
if she understood herself to be “postsecular” despite having a “‘strong’ form religiosity,”272 as 
opposed to the non-dogmatic “weak religion” characteristic of postsecular writers. Robinson’s 
somewhat biting response is telling of her skepticism against her interviewers’ assumptions 
about “strong” forms of religion. In her rejoinder, Robinson makes it clear that she understands 
her own work as similar to her American literary peers who might not share her commitment to 
recovering a distinct form of Christian thought, yet are still open to seeking an appropriate 
language for their encounter with all the mysteries of being: 
The idea that one system of belief must categorically exclude others seems to me to have 
arisen when people stopped reading and teaching theology. Our idea of what a “strong 
theology” would look like or mean is really the result of speculation colored by more 
than a little condescension. The great theologians themselves, from Paul onward, were 
much more interested in the inarticulable every religion tries to find words for. […] I find 
my “strong theology” extraordinarily beautiful, and I love all the thought and 
learnedness, and the great seriousness, I find in it. That said, the choices these other 
writers make are interesting and very fruitful. A movement back toward the sense of 
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sacredness is more likely than sectarianisms to refresh our sense of the meaning of 
religion and theology as well.273 
In many ways, Robinson’s insight here reiterates Taylor’s understanding of our secular age as 
the site where multiple claims, narratives, and myths are on offer about the nature of reality from 
both religious and nonreligious people. But what is most telling—and will have the largest 
ecological implications—is that many of these postsecular movements (whether confessionally 
Christian or otherwise) are countering the post-Enlightenment narratives about reality and 
attempting to recover the sense of the sacred in reality. 
This sense pervades both science and religion. In her essay “Theology,” for example, 
Robinson argues that the haunting intuitions about reality that prompt scientific exploration are 
the same intuitions that haunt religious communities: “Religions are expressions of the sound 
human intuition that there is something beyond being as we experience it in this life. What is 
often described as a sense of the transcendent might in some cases be the intuition of the 
actual.”274 Exploring these intuitions of reality communally is what gives Robinson hope that her 
particular version of re-enchantment, a shared story of ontology that she finds “extraordinarily 
beautiful,” might be entertained. It is also, as I noted earlier, a way for both religion and science 
to find shared ground in their mutual attention to a world where meaning deepens and unfolds in 
shared human experiences over time. 
With this broader understanding of Robinson’s postsecular negotiation between 
secularism and Christianity, I want to turn now to her particular desire to recover a narrative, or a 
myth, that avoids the destructive, materialist reductions of humanity by championing human 
exceptionalism. To do this, we need to look more closely at a project that permeates much of 
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Robinson’s writing: the recovery of the soul. By recovering the soul—the site of human 
experience in Robinson’s rendering—Robinson shows how we might also recover the possibility 
of a new posture to the world, a posture that has real ecological implications.  
 
Absence of Mind: Recovering the Soul and New Myths of Reality 
Robinson’s this-worldly theological vision is almost entirely contingent on her attempts 
to not simply recover the concept of the human soul, but to transmute it in the process. For 
Robinson, the soul is not, first of all, some other-wordly animating spirit that inhabits the 
physical human body and eludes our senses. Rather, for Robinson, the “soul” is part of the given 
facticity of material life that all humans encounter. “I find the soul a valuable concept, a 
statement of the dignity of a human life and of the unutterable gravity of human action and 
experience,” Robinson writes in “Humanism,” and she goes on: “I would add that I find my own 
soul interesting company, if this did not seem to cast doubt on my impeccable objectivity.”275  
The soul is primarily the site of inwardness, consciousness, and subjective experience of the 
material world. As such, it is what makes us the most remarkable and complex creatures in the 
known cosmos. Humans, as possessors of this inward experience, are an integral part of this 
material world yet they are free to act, imagine, create and destroy in ways that no deterministic 
rendering can explain satisfactorily. 
According to Robinson, the recovery of the significance of human experience of the soul 
at work is precisely what is needed in an age held captive by the myth of disenchantment. One of 
the most dangerous consequences of the desacralizing of the material world is that in 
objectifying the material world, human perception and subjectivity is marginalized and 
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discredited. In Absence of Mind, Robinson argues against “an assertive popular literature that 
describes the mind as if from the posture of science [in order to] discredit the old romantic myth 
of the self still encouraged by religion.”276  
Robinson’s desire to recover what she calls human exceptionalism is not to lock her into 
a destructive anthropocentrism. Rather, it is her attempt to explore how the soul is uniquely 
capable of participating in the Being of reality, and, by extension, the God who is the sustaining 
source of that Being every moment. Robinson’s ecological vision, although rarely covered by 
ecocritics,277 thus treats the destruction of the world as “an atrocious crime of the most cosmic 
proportions”278 because, as writers such as Jonathan Edwards revealed to her, it is to make 
meaningless the ordered (and ordering) address of God from which all reality springs. Robinson 
conflates mind and soul throughout these (and other) essays, but her point remains: the narrative 
of disenchantment ultimately disregards and denigrates “the self, the solitary, perceiving, and 
interpreting locus of anything that can be called experience.”279 The soul is what allows humans 
to encounter the mystery (defined above) of the world, it is “that part of us that encounters what 
is hidden and yet present all around us.”280 
Robinson’s critique of these reductive anthropologies does not pit Christianity or religion 
against the secular. Throughout Absence of Mind she also argues that a new form of Christian 
theology is necessary today because “to some extent even theology has embraced 
impoverishment, often under the name of secularism, in order to blend more thoroughly into a 
disheartened cultural landscape. To the great degree that theology has accommodated what she 
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calls “the parascientific”281 worldview, it too has tended to forget the beauty and strangeness of 
the individual soul, that is, of the world as perceived in the course of a human life, of the mind as 
it exists in time.”282 What Robinson means by this is something I have already noted in Wiman 
(and will note much more explicitly in Berry), which is that modern forms of Christianity are not 
in themselves sources of re-enchantment; in fact, many are often beholden to a myth of 
disenchantment.  
In a later essay, “The Sacred, The Human,” Robinson expands on some of these ideas to 
more clearly articulate just why a Christian humanism is necessary and what she means by 
arguing for a human exceptionalism. In that essay, Robinson shares her anecdote regarding 
Edwards and moonlight to reiterate her belief that “The Creation is constantly renewed as an act 
of God, who therefore remains free relative to his creation. […] He is also therefore pervasively 
present and engrossed in it.”283 Such freedom and dynamism are realities in which humans, as 
image bearers of this creator, participate. Yet this distinctly Christian framing, Robinson asserts, 
“has been marginalized as unnecessary and implausible”284 by a modern scientific discourse that 
has “forebade metaphysics as a language and as a mode of thought, which amounted to radically 
narrowing the questions it would or could address while jettisoning a great part of Western 
tradition.”285 Recovering this tradition, for Robinson, is a major source of her project in helping 
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her readers understand their place in Western tradition and, more particularly, recovering the 
liberation of thought that attends recovering the metaphysical vocabulary shorn by modern 
scientism. 
The exceptionalism of the human person that Robinson is attempting to recover tries to 
escape the determinisms that attend various post-Enlightenment myths about the human person. 
Such narratives of the human person render them determined by their own biology and, thus, not 
free. Yet for Robinson this is precisely the space in which the exceptionalism of humanity—
which is potentially creative and destructive—needs to be understood. The human, for Robinson, 
is not determined by a predisposition merely to survive, but rather to act freely and 
indeterminately. Only through such freedom is love for the world possible. Robinson makes an 
intriguing move, though, by asserting that such freedom does not necessarily have to wait for 
religious recovery; in fact, science is already revealing this: “If our Being participates in 
something as mysterious and irreducible as quantum physics—and how could it not?—the 
presumption ought to be on the side of extraordinary human complexity.”286 Robinson will tether 
this participation to a participation in the God who underwrites all Being, but Robinson’s interest 
in real science (as opposed to parascientific discourse  suggests that it is also capable of 
inducting us “to a revival of the final awe at the wonder of creation so characteristic of 
theology.”287 Humans, as physical bodies, are as mysterious and complex as the material world 
in which they interact and of which they are made. For Robinson, this is a ground upon which 
both scientist and theologian can occupy without hostility or conflict. Both can operate from a 
story of re-enchantment that provides meaning for how we perceive and experience reality. 
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But more than this, as souls—as experiencing beings capable of cognition and 
metacognition—Robinson argues that our true exceptionality is our ability to “define goodness” 
and our obligation to act on it.288 Materialist determinisms provide no satisfying answer, at least 
for Robinson, to the conundrum of altruism or even how one ought to behave towards others or 
the non-human environment. It is the retrograde Congregationalists and Puritans, particularly 
Jonathan Edwards, Robinson argues, who provide a more expansive vision of the human person 
and of reality that is not fixated on some otherworldly plane of heaven, but rather “makes any 
other person potentially or, in any moment, actually a revelation of the nature of God, as the 
brilliance of creation is also.”289   
When I talk about Robinson’s vision of a re-enchanted myth of the human person in the 
world, it is precisely along these lines. In this rendering, which Robinson admits owes much to 
the neglected (and oft-maligned) legacy of Reformed theological thought in American culture, 
humanity is not only capable of, but responsible for, their highest human capacities of generosity 
and love, intelligence and beauty.290 According to Robinson, the soul is the means by which 
humans “participate in the revelation that saturates experience, since Being itself is an emanation 
from God.”291 There is no easy sundering of God and world, of embeddedness in the material 
and embeddedness in the metaphysical in Robinson’s rendering. The vision of human 
exceptionalism that motivates her project is one that challenges determinism by suggesting that 
our greatest hope in the Anthropocene is tethered to our greatest vulnerability: we are free to do 
good and, thus, also free to do evil. Annette Aronowicz notes the stakes of this debate with bleak 
clarity: “To be engaged in the battle for the soul is to be watchful for signs of that 
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dehumanization for, increasingly, the objectifying gaze is not just a matter of contemplation but 
also of projected manipulation through biotechnical means.”292  
Robinson’s focus on the significance of human experience over institutional ideological 
positions is integral to understanding both her ecological and theological vision. Robinson’s 
1989 collection of essays, Mother Country, remains one of the works for which she is most 
proud.293 These essays criticized “England’s dumping of nuclear waste into the sea at the 
Sellafield Nuclear Plant.”294  Robinson claims that such acts of ecological destruction are 
products of “moral aphasia” and that “our education produces an acculturated blindness which 
precludes our taking in available, unambiguous information if it is contrary to our 
assumptions.”295 For Robinson, such recklessness that is obviously self-destructive is a profound 
moral failure. But more than this—and perhaps the reason “Robinson’s form of 
environmentalism has not sat well with environmentalists”296—is that ecological destruction 
occurs when people allow the purveyors of modern mythologies to gain such a hold on the 
collective imagination that people no longer trust their own experiences of a place. Rather, they 
rely too heavily on the “right rhetoric or institutions [that] will do the work of judgment for 
them.”297  
Robinson does not trust such organizationally-backed narratives because they often 
become hardened ideologies—or closed takes--that lean heavily on the authority of a supposedly 
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objective science that seeks control and power over a place while minimizing  the lived 
experience of people who inhabit such places.298 While Robinson’s battle with Greenpeace, an 
institution she argued was complicit in the Sellafield disaster, has received much attention and 
notoriety when it comes to her ecological writing,299 what intrigues me is Robinson’s insistence 
that any ecological vision must be tethered to the individual and communal experience of a 
landscape. Ecology, for Robinson then, is a matter of the soul. In an interview with literary critic 
George Handley, Robinson claims that any human investment in landscape is an “investment of 
soul […]. The best defense, the best sort of on-the-ground defense for any landscape is to have 
people love it, and any landscape deserves that.”300 One’s love of the land is rooted to one’s 
shared experience of the land. And our experience of the land is mediated by the stories we tell, 
the myths we live by. 
Ideology—religious or secular—is inadequate for properly regarding and valuing human 
experience. Therefore, for Robinson, we need to lean less on ideology and more on story, on 
narratives, that form and give meaning to human experience.  In Absence of Mind, Robinson 
makes a clever rhetorical maneuver, ceding ground to a disenchanted scientism, by temporarily 
looking at life as if it were “stripped of myth, unhallowed and unhaunted.”301 In this guise, she 
muses that even if there were no spiritual or metaphysical world with which we had to grapple, 
this still could not “impoverish experience.”302 Just as Robinson adopts a persona in the opening 
of her essays who lives as if the world were disenchanted, any re-enchantment requires a form of 
human experience that will live as if it were enchanted. Robinson’s phenomenological shift does 
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not sit well with secularists who maintain such “as if” claims are merely delusions nor with 
Christians who claim that God is an objective, universal truth whether He is acknowledged or 
not. Robinson’s shift to experience does not sit well with both sides.  
This tension exists because it has everything to do with Robinson’s context and the 
liminal position she occupies between secular and Christian communities.  Hungerford argues 
that Robinson’s focus on the “experience” of religion as opposed to doctrinal, propositional 
truths is a move necessitated by the secular age in which she writes.303  If we recover the value of 
the human mind defined as the seat of human experience of the world, Robinson argues, the 
human propensity for religious belief, and even belief in God, becomes much more palatable. 
Recovering the significance of human experience allows the postsecular conditions for the 
reception of belief—for a new myth—to change. 
To make this move, many of Robinson’s essays dismantle the current model of reality 
based on disenchantment. This is possible because all models of reality are ultimately myths, or 
stories. In her 2005 essay “Facing Reality” Robinson notes this, although using the term “fiction” 
rather than myth; she remarks:  
Our present model of the world is a fiction, based on notions of objectivity and of the 
character and implications of science, which are a hundred years out of date. […]. As a 
fiction writer, I feel smothered by this collective fiction, this Reality. I do not admire it or 
enjoy it, this work of grim and minor imagination which somehow or other got itself 
acknowledged as The Great Truth and The Voice of Our Time because of rather than 
despite its obvious thinness and fraudulence.304  
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Robinson’s use of “fiction” here is similar to Midgley’s use of “myth” in that she is articulating 
that our experience of reality is always contingent on the shared narratives that give meaning.305 
How one perceives reality is indeed a process of communal figuration and negotiation, and is 
therefore up for grabs in the contested space of the secular age.  
And Robinson believes our ability to understand “these collective fictions matter 
[because] they have the profoundest influence on what we know and see and understand.”306 Yet 
because our mythologies, or fictions, orient us, they are also quite capable of misleading. For 
instance, “When they make fear the key to interpretation of history and experience, as they do so 
often, as ours does now,” Robinson warns, “nothing contains a greater potential for releasing all 
the varieties of destruction.”307 The stories one tells, these collective fictions from which one 
operates, are not benign.  
 
Gilead: Experiencing the World as God’s Theatre 
Robinson maintains that a “better story”—a better lived mythology—could be found in 
theology. However, this must be a Christian theology that is at once informed by modern science 
and one that rejects the disenchanted forms of thought that disregard the exceptionalism of the 
human soul. Such a theology, Robinson argues, is particularly needed for the present moment. In 
this section, I will turn to a reading of Robinson’s novel, Gilead, but it is important for my 
particular project to highlight, at the outset of this reading, that Gilead is deeply shaped by 
Robinson’s particular theological vision articulated within the context of the secular age.  
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 In “Theology for this Moment,” a talk given in 2016, Robinson lays out a vision for how 
theology—Christian theology in particular—might become capable of better addressing the 
various reductions inherent to modern life. Whereas Bacon believed religious belief was an “idol 
of the theater” that inhibited enlightened thought, Robinson recovers the notion of the world as 
an icon of God’s theatre. Indeed, Robinson argues that theology could be poised to address the 
contemporary secular, Anthropocene age by encouraging people to imagine the cosmos as if it 
were God’s theater.308 I use the phrase “as if” because Robinson seems reticent to assert with any 
absolute certitude that material reality is, in fact, such a thing. In postsecular fashion, Robinson 
hesitates to say that such a vision—which draws on the Reformed theologian John Calvin who, 
in turn, draws on Scripture—is anything more than another contestable “account” on offer in the 
secular age:  
We cannot say that the stars were arrayed to instruct us in the glory of God, to dispose 
our minds to wonder, to make us feel our finitude within an order of Being for which 
millennia are more transient than a breath. This, for all we know, is the accidental 
consequence of the accidental emergence of the constellations […] We must step back 
and acknowledge that any accounts of the initial moments that make the event seem 
straightforward and comprehensible are deeply wrong.309 
Such reticence, I maintain, is part of Robinson’s postsecular disposition that makes her 
uncomfortable with any truth claims that are not understood to be provisional and open to 
change. But what is notable in Robinson’s account is her desire to return to the “initial moments” 
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of Being—of the existence of material reality—and see this encounter as a necessary first step 
for all forms of thought. 
Robinson argues that the theology needed for the present moment must begin by first 
encountering the mysterious nature of existence, of Being. Such an encounter of the unfolding 
givenness of material reality is, for Robinson, the starting point and the shared ground of the best 
theology and science. Robinson does not use the term disenchantment in the essay, but her 
rationale for advocating such a starting point is that “we have estranged ourselves from 
Being.”310 In the Anthropocene, such estrangement, I have been arguing, is precisely the 
consequence of the lived myth of disenchantment. Robinson then goes on to suggest that 
theology, informed by science, must revive the “irreducible thrill of the universe”311 which 
requires a new narrative that is not prone to reductions. In the context of this project, it requires a 
new way to experience the world, one infused with the awe and wonder at a material world.  
 This theological vision Robinson lays out in this 2016 lecture is already, in many ways, 
enacted much earlier through the novel Gilead. In what follows, I will explore how Robinson’s 
vision of a re-enchanted world emerges, first, through the postsecular tensions of belief and 
unbelief. These tensions are manifested primarily through the conflicted, generational 
relationship of John Ames (the narrator of Gilead), his Atheist brother Edward, and their father. 
This fraught familial relationship is fractured along lines of belief and unbelief, Christianity and 
Atheism. However, while fathers and sons seem to be severed from one another, the mutual 
respect between the brothers (one Atheist, one Christian) reveals another possibility for a 
postsecular way to experience the world. More, the trajectory of John Ames indicates a way 
forward for Christian theology in the secular age. John Ames emerges from this relationship as a 
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Christian pastor whose theology is deeply informed and shaped by the secular materialist thought 
of his Feuerbach-reading brother Edward. I will then explore more fully just how Ames’ 
theological vision is informed by secular thought in ways that make it much more attentive to the 
excessive, unfolding quality of the material world.  
After understanding how Robinson frames Ames as a postsecular, theological voice, I 
want to then focus in on an early episode in the novel, the journey John Ames and his father take 
to the unmarked grave of their deceased forebear. Just as Robinson noted above that a theology 
“for this moment” must attend to the mysterious origins of Being, the journey of Ames and his 
father to the grave enacts this journey in significant ways. In this journey to a site of familial 
death, I argue, Robinson allows John Ames to have a profound encounter with Being that causes 
him to experience material reality as the mysteriously unfolding theater of God’s glory. This 
journey and its significance are reflected upon repeatedly throughout the narrative and become a 
key site for Robinson’s exploration of a re-enchanted world. Through this journey, Ames (and 
Robinson’s audience) encounter a new myth by which to live in the world, one that catalyzes a 
potentially healthier way of understanding, attending, and even loving all that is not the self. 
The novel Gilead discloses the life story of John Ames, a dying pastor of a small-town 
Congregationalist church in the 1950s. Gilead is told from John Ames’ perspective but written as 
a second-person address to both Ames’s young son Robbie and, I argue, to Robinson’s 
contemporary audience. That is, Gilead addresses the secular age and Anthropocene era in subtle 
yet profound ways. 
The secular age tensions are manifest primarily in the relationship between John Ames 
and his brother Edward. I largely agree with Hungerford, who claims that “John Ames is a 
character fully imagined to be living within Charles Taylor’s secular age: he emerges in Gilead 
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as a believer profoundly aware of the possibility—even the plausibility—of unbelief.”312 What 
Hungerford does not explore, however, is how this tension leads Ames to significant 
generational and ecological insights. Nevertheless, it is within this conflicted space of belief and 
unbelief, certainty and doubt that Ames’s experience of the world becomes ecologically 
instructive.  
The tensions of the secular age are most poignantly felt in the novel by the relationship 
Ames has with his older brother Edward. The two brothers represent two paths one might take in 
the secular age in which the conditions of belief have changed. Edward goes off to Europe to 
prepare for the ministry—a family tradition of sorts—but comes back a Feuerbach-and-Marx-
reading atheist.313 Edward becomes symbolic of the American insecurity of looking to the elites 
of Europe to set the intellectual and cultural trends and, as such, he denigrates his home town and 
desires to take “a bit of the Middle West out of [Ames].”314 The parochialism and backwardness 
of the American Midwest is, for Edward, a laughable source of derision. Edward and his father, a 
Christian pastor, eventually reach an intractable conflict when Edward refuses to bless the meal 
out of an appeal to his conscience.315 This is ironic because it is precisely in the act of blessing in 
the material world that Edward’s believing brother, John, finds Feuerbach so instructive. 
Nevertheless, as an atheist, Edward becomes a troubling enigma to his believing parents and the 
narrative he chooses to live by becomes a way for him to detach from his familial line, the very 
source of his existence. This detachment very much makes Edward the prototypical modern man, 
detached from his source. 
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However, John Ames refuses to paint a caricatured version of his brother Edward as 
some wayward, lost atheist. In fact, Ames provides a rather affectionate, empathetic treatment of 
Edward whose atheism is contested, but never a source of unbridgeable conflict. Ames (like 
Robinson) operates from a posture of openness and allows his belief to be shaped by the secular 
thought of his brother who intentionally leaves behind his copy of Feuerbach as a gift (in much 
the same way that Ames, by novel’s end, leaves the same book behind for his son, Robbie). 
Ames’s this-wordly theological vision that emerges in his life is not a reaction against the 
disenchanted materialism of his brother per se but inflected by its insights. Ames’ love and joy 
for this world finds common ground with Feuerbach who is, Ames says, “as good on the joyful 
aspects of religion as anybody, and he loves the world.”316 While Feuerbach’s “one error” is that 
he wants “religion to just stand out of the way,”317 Ames’s appreciation and eventual use of 
Feuerbach in his theology encourages, I argue, a postsecular reading of Ames. 
Ironically, while Edward’s severance from the family comes through his refusal to bless 
the food by saying “Grace,” Ames finds Feuerbach to be more instructive on the nature of 
blessing in the material world than many theologians. Quoting Feuerbach, Ames notes that 
“[Water] is the image of the spotless nature of the Divine Spirit. [Water] has a significance in 
itself, as water; it is on account of its natural quality that it is consecrated and selected as the 
vehicle of the Holy Spirit.”318 And throughout the novel water and baptism and blessing become 
significant touchstones in Ames’ ministry.  
 Robinson situates Ames’s theological vision of this world and its sacred character first 
within a framework inspired and guided by Feuerbach, a materialist thinker understood by many 
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American Christians to be detrimental to the truth of Christian theology. But Robinson does not 
frame Feuerbach in terms of his propositional truth statements. Rather, through Ames, she 
wonders just what Feuerbach “means” for the Christian faith. Robinson’s choice here, 
Hungerford argues, is an important postsecular move. When Ames, later in the narrative, is 
reflecting on an article entitled “ God and the American People,” published in 1948 in Ladies’ 
Home Journal, Ames reflects on “the oddness of the phrase ‘believe in God.’”319 He is struck by 
the oddness of the phrase as recalls “that first chapter of Feuerbach, which is really about the 
awkwardness of language and not about religion at all.”320 The cross-pressure Ames feels, 
however, is that belief in God is not something that can so easily be quantified in a poll. 
Precisely what this means is complex, particularly in the secular age of contested narratives. 
One’s beliefs of God are contingent on one’s experience of reality and the story that gives shape 
to it. 
Ames then rejects the rationalist, polemical stance of certain twentieth century Christian 
apologists who would fan the flames of conflict between believers and unbelievers. Rather, 
Ames’s belief is couched in his humble uncertainty that remains appreciative of the insights 
Feuerbach brings to religious discourse, even while he disagrees with them. The problem with 
Feuerbach, according to Ames, are not his “attacks” on religion, but that the narrative about 
reality he assumes might be too limited. This leads Ames to confront Being and work out what 
myth might be adequate to account for it. 
Ames notes that Feuerbach’s thought has limited meaning because he “doesn’t imagine 
the possibility of an existence beyond this one.”321That such a materialistic understanding of 
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matter excludes this possibility is, in Taylor’s vocabulary, to accept a closed spin rather than to 
remain open to various takes. Ames, unlike his brother, attempts to encounter Being by 
remaining open to the possibility that God might be “a reality embracing this one but exceeding 
it, the way for example, the world embraces and exceeds Soapy’s understanding of it.”322  Soapy 
is their cat. Reality for Soapy, Ames goes on, is quite unlike the reality humans experience, and 
“the degrees of unlikeness within the reality we know are very extreme, and what I wish to 
suggest,” Ames writes,  “is a much more absolute unlikeness, with which we exist, though our 
human circumstance creates in us a radically limited and peculiar notion of what existence is.”323 
While Ames appreciates Feuerbach’s loving attention to this world, he also believes that such 
attention does not necessarily exclude the possibility of perceiving this world as participating in a 
reality that exceeds our linguistic and conceptual grasps. Such a perspective requires an ability to 
believe a different narrative about humans and the world. But such belief is, according to Ames, 
a rather mysterious gift that some accept, and others—like Edward—reject. 
 Hungerford’s work on Robinson’s form of Christian belief clarifies how these (and 
other) passages mark a strategic shift in writing about belief in contemporary American 
literature. I argue that this shift is inflected by the conditions and what Taylor calls the “cross 
pressures” of the secular age. Ames addresses the “conflict” narratives that afflict the church in 
the mid-twentieth century, but he warns his son that “many of the attacks on belief that have had 
such prestige for the last century or two are in fact meaningless. I must tell you this, because 
everything else I have told you, and them, loses almost all its meaning and its right to attention if 
this is not established.”324 Hungerford points out that “the choice of the word ‘meaningless’ is 
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crucial: he does not say that the arguments are wrong, or mistaken, but that they do not 
participate in the religious practice of making experience open upon meaning.”325 For Robinson, 
belief creates a “religiously understood reality,”326 or, in the language of this project, it creates 
the myth by which one lives in the world and gives meaning to reality. 
John Ames provides a way to perceive the world “as if” it was not simply an arena for 
human survival, but as the theatre of God’s glory. This is the fundamental Christian myth of re-
enchantment through which Ames experiences reality and it is drawn from the theology of John 
Calvin. Perceiving the earth as God’s theater, Belden Lane argues, was theologian John Calvin’s 
“favorite metaphor in speaking of the natural world” and by it, Calvin believed “all created 
reality, extending each moment from the hand of God, is shot through with longing.”327 For 
Calvin, perceiving the world in such a way leads one to perform “deliberate practices of 
delight.”328 In his Institutes, Calvin reacted against the tendencies within Christian thought 
towards Deism, writing that “to make God a momentary Creator, who once for all finished his 
works, would be cold and barren.”329 For Calvin, and for John Ames who lives within the 
narrative framework of Calvin’s theology, “creation is a continuing event, ever unfolding from 
the hand of God, ever responding in praise.”330  
In “Theology for this Moment,” Robinson also concludes her address by making the 
provocative proposal that the most necessary theology for the contemporary malaise of the 
modern world would involve a recovery of precisely this metaphor for the world: 
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[A] theology for our time should help us know that Being is indeed the theater of God's 
glory, and that, within it, we have a terrible privilege, a capacity for profound error and 
grave harm. We might venture an answer to God's question, Where were you when I 
created - ? We were there, potential and implicit and by the grace of God inevitable, more 
unstoppable than the sea, impervious as Leviathan, in that deep womb of time, almost 
hearing the sons of God when they shouted for joy. And we are here, your still-forming 
child, still opening our eyes on a reality whose astonishments can never exhaust.331 
Robinson’s concluding remarks here provide a contained summation of the theological vision 
that undergirds Gilead and, particularly, undergird its distinctly Christian myth of re-
enchantment. As performers within this great theatre of Being, Robinson notes that we are 
capable of profound acts of destruction and desecration. Yet by attending closely to our source, 
the Being which modern men are detached from, Robinson urges theology to inculcate a posture 
to the world that is fille with wonder at the excessive, unfolding givenness of reality. Returning 
to our source of Being, is, for Robinson, a return to a re-enchanted participation with the material 
world and its source. 
Understanding the world as God’s theatre properly qualifies Robinson’s attention to the 
soul as site of human experience and, thus, exceptionalism. Because while her focus on human 
exceptionalism might suggest an unhealthy, or even dangerous, anthropocentrism, understanding 
the world as God’s theatre—and not human’s—radically decenters the human and puts important 
limits to the exceptional aspects of the soul. By framing reality along these lines, the 
experiencing self exists first in relation to the source of its Being before it is in relation to any 
other person or place or object. Experience of reality is always, for Robinson, experience in 
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relation to a given world of which the experiencing self is a recipient. The world is not, as the 
myth of disenchantment suggests, something that humans take or even construct, but rather it is a 
gift that is received. This is a humbling reality. The posture to the world it should invoke is 
gratitude first. 
The reception and perception of gifts are indicative of the ways in which belief forms 
experience and perception and provide a glimpse into how Robinson’s myth of re-enchantment 
operates in Gilead. Gifts include things like belief, but are also physical, natural objects. One of 
the more potent instances of such gifts is told as a memory that Ames returns to several times in 
his narrative. He recalls a time when his father takes from a burned church an ash covered biscuit 
and hands it to his son. In his memory of that experience, Ames notes:  
That biscuit ashy from my father’s charred hand. It all means more than I can tell you. So 
you must not judge what I know by what I find words for. If I could only give you what 
my father gave me. No, what the Lord has given me and must also give you. But I hope 
you will put yourself in the way of the gift.332 
In a sense, the giving of an ashy biscuit is a simple, mundane act of a father providing for his 
child. Yet Ames notes that his language is inadequate for the excessiveness of meaning he can 
take from this seemingly simple experience. Tae Sung comments that throughout Gilead such 
gifts “emerge somewhere between history and memory, between fact and interpretations, 
between the ashy biscuit given for a meal and received as communion.”333 Ames’s religious 
belief opens his experience up into new depths of meaning. It is important to hear how Ames 
understands his belief as a gift that his father did not give him, but the Lord (his Creator) gave 
him.  
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 In the secular age, to receive the gift of belief—the gift that opens one up the possibility 
of a re-enchanted world along Christian lines—requires a leap of faith made difficult within the 
immanent frame.334 Secularity closes one from the possibility of receiving this gift of belief in 
another counter-narrative about reality. Indeed, while Edward is one example from someone who 
is buffered from receiving such a gift of belief, at the end of the novel, Jack Boughton is also 
someone we remain uncertain of in terms of his reception of belief or not. But as Ames meditates 
on gifts and his desire to give the gift of belief to his son, he realizes that such a gifting is largely 
out of his control. For this reason, Ames tells Robbie to simply put himself “in the way of the 
gift.”335 Tae Sung remarks that “to be in the way of the gift is to have an interpretive framework 
that is open to moral sources. In the religious (Calvinist) framework of the novel, this openness 
requires a narrative of how the gifts function: it cannot be generated by the self.”336 For my 
purposes, I am intrigued to return back to how the Calvinist “interpretive framework” of God’s 
theater that Robinson and Ames operate within provides a new posture to the world and to 
others. 
Ames requires a narrative structure to provide meaning for his experience, but he does 
not believe that the human is the creative source of that meaning. Rather, believing himself to be 
living within the theater of God’s glory, Ames locates the source of meaning and the excessive 
quality of the mundane world to be a product of their shared relationship to the God who speaks 
them into existence and continually sustains them.  
This narrative even helps explain how Pastor Ames came to exist, as it were, in the 
fictional world of Gilead. In various interviews Robinson notes that the voice of Ames “came to 
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her after several days of being alone.”337 Chad Wriglesworth argues that Robinson’s Christian 
narrative framework moves outside the text in ways that help explain her own creative process. 
Such inspiration for a character is, in this rendering, a rather inexplicable gift. Yet Wriglesworth 
suggests that “from a theological perspective, Robinson’s life and craft are shaped within a 
cosmos that was and still is being addressed by God.”338 Wriglesworth is drawing here on 
theologian Rowan Williams who argues in an essay “Changing the Myths We Live By” (inspired 
clearly by the work of Mary Midgley), that  
[t]he Christian believes that creation exists because God speaks in both: Hebrew and 
Christian Scripture the Word of God is the foundation of everything. In Eastern thought 
especially, this theme was developed in some depth, drawing out the implication that 
creation is itself an act of communication, a form of language. Creation is an address, an 
action that expresses an intelligence and asks for intelligent response.339  
This understanding of the creation as tethered to the Creator through a form of communication 
makes sense of the various patterns of call and response one finds in Gilead. In the opening line, 
for instance, Ames writes: “I told you last night that I might be gone sometime, and you said, 
Where, and I said, To be with the Good Lord, and you said, Why, and I said, Because I’m 
old,”340 The lengthy, excessive run-on sentence here is a playful dialogue that sets the novel in 
motion. Ames, the father, is about to be absent and his letter is a way of staying present for his 
son and, even while he is hidden from sight. The move allows for continued ongoing encounters 
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of son with absent father. The meanings of the letters, just like the meanings of Ames 
experiences that he recounts in those letters, will shift through time. 
The world, in such a narrative framework, is a place of unfolding mystery on both grand 
and particularized levels of experience. This is why Ames marvels at soap bubbles rising341 and 
baseballs rotating342 as microsmic instantiations of the same patterns and forms one perceives in 
planets and galaxies forming and collapsing. All are responses to the creative summons of their 
source of Being. The discrepancies between durations of events or the physical size of objects 
find unity in their shared relationship to the God who caused and causes each moment of their 
existence. The experience of such a reality—formed as it is by belief in the notion of God’s 
theater—is an encounter with a reality that overflows the boundaries of language or mental 
concepts.  
Ames notes this when he thinks about how people often use the word “just” to stress 
excess and particularity by saying things like “the sun just shone and the tree just glistened, and 
the water just poured out” as a way to “call attention to a thing existing in excess of itself, so to 
speak, a sort of purity or lavishness, at any rate something ordinary in kind but exceptional in 
degree.”343 (It is interesting, that this exuberant, joy filled response to the brilliance of the 
material world is preceded by a “mention of Feuerbach and joy.”344) 
Ames’s understanding of the world as God’s theater clarifies the role that blessing plays 
in the text as well.  In Ames’s rendering, the material world is filled with excessive meaning 
because it is the site where God continuously reveals and conceals His grandeur. Again, in 
“Theology for this Moment,” Robinson notes that a good Christian theology provides a 
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meaningful narrative about the sacredness of blessing by understanding the connection of Being 
to God: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Christ was in the beginning 
with God and without him nothing was made that was made. The categorical blessing put on all 
that exists […] asserts a very broad, unconditional reality, a givenness that in its fullness reflects 
divine intent.”345  
Ames repeatedly refers to blessing throughout his narrative, but one of the first moments 
is in relation to a trip that he and his father take when he is only twelve years old: “That journey 
was a great blessing to me,”346 Ames recalls. This trip Ames is referring to acts, I argue, as a 
central unifying moment in Robinson’s vision of a re-enchanted world. It is a site of blessing—a 
site of the excessiveness of the world as underwritten by God—because Ames returns to it again 
and again in his memory and the meaning of it deepens and expands. Annette Aronowicz argues 
that “with each context, the content of the blessing shifts and widens, never leaving the original 
association with his father, but nevertheless metamorphosing from a containable and pat 
equivalence between one event and one meaning to something that permeates his entire life in 
visible and invisible ways.”347 As Ames repeatedly returns in his memories to this journey, it 
becomes clear how mysterious all human experience is as it unfolds through time. The journey 
they are referring to is the journey to find the grave of Ames’s father’s father. This “blessed” 
journey, as a microsm of life lived in God’s theater, is fundamentally a search for the source of 
one’s belonging—or longing to belong—in this life, and this world.  
In Absence of Mind, Robinson explains this desire to know our lineage, noting that “each 
of us lives intensely within herself of himself, continuously assimilating past and present 
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experience to a narrative and vision that are unique in every case, yet profoundly 
communicable.”348 The desire to assimilate the past and present in ways that give one a sense of 
belonging in the world is, for Robinson, a manifestation of life in the natural world as God’s 
theatre. These human longings are, in this interpretive framework, performative desires grounded 
in “the grandeur of the created order, which already remains mysteriously incomprehensible, that 
communicates to us the greatness and power of the Creator.”349 Finding one’s familial source is 
rooted in the desire to understand one’s ontological source.  
Robinson explores genealogies in “Son of Adam, Son of Man,” an essay in which she 
looks at genealogies in the Old Testament and articulates an anthropology derived from a 
Christian narrative of re-enchantment. Various secular accounts of human origins, Robinson 
remarks, lean on evolution rendered through a materialist narrative. From such accounts, humans 
are understood to be an evolved form of animal life, emerging from the material world. Such a 
narrative, according to Robinson, fails to account for human exceptionality that separates them 
from other creatures. While these scientific narratives encourage us to “take our place among the 
animals,” she also wonders, if animals might not “feel a bit insulted by our intrusion” since “only 
in myth or nightmare could another such creature be found. What a thing is man.”350  
The Christian narrative, Robinson argues, counters the “reductive”351 anthropologies of 
Darwinism through its insistence that human exceptionalism is derived from being creatures who 
have souls and, thus, are creatures capable of participating in the world and in the God who is the 
source of its being. For Robinson, this is what it means to be made in God’s image. Human 
history, Robinson shows through her reading of New Testament genealogies, is “the great 
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unfinished portrait of Adam,”352 who is not simply the fabled first human, but declared a child of 
God. This theocentric narrative completely reorients how humans might understand themselves 
in relation to others and the world. Yet it is contingent on a particularly Christian rendering of 
reality. If God is not simply a human construct, Robinson argues, but a “given”353 for how we 
experience the world, then “it is possible to claim a dignity for humankind that is assured 
because it is bestowed on us [and ] it is beyond even our formidable powers to besmirch and 
destroy.”354 For Robinson the givenness—the gift—of this reality is only authenticated through 
our experience of ourselves and other people as possessors of a dignitary and value that was not 
constructed for them by others or themselves.   
Understanding the world thought this re-enchanted framework allows Robinson to also 
go beyond simply marveling at the world, but also to restoring its brokenness. Because the God 
at the heart of her theological vision is not a neutral or benign force, but rather one characterized 
by love. The gravesite is not only a journey towards death, but a journey with the hopes of some 
form of reconciliation that require a form of love. The journey is Ames’s father’s way of being 
reconciled to the father, the source of being, from which he’s become detached. 
Ames, reflecting on the causes of his grandfather and father’s rupture, remarks that “the 
old man […] may have been too dazzled by the great light of his experience to realize that an 
impressive sun shines on us all. Perhaps that is the one thing I wish to tell you [Robbie]. 
Sometimes the visionary aspect of any particular day comes to you in the memory of it, or it 
opens to you over time.”355 Robinson layers the meaning of light throughout the novel, making it 
a metaphor for the enchanted natural world renewed each moment by God’s ongoing presence as 
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well as the experiencing self. Ames suggests that all of our individual experiences are grasping 
after the source of light that shines on and exceeds the human experience that participates in this 
illuminated Being. Aronowicz argues that “the beauty of the physical light, […] becomes a 
metaphor for the light at the beginning of creation.”356 But the most important aspect of this 
light, Aronowicz proceeds in a provocative way, is that it is not simply “the neutral being that 
surrounds us but the love and goodness of a personal God.”357 When Ames comes to delight in 
the image bearing nature of his own son, he is delighting as a form of love that participates in the 
love that underwrites the entire theater of God’s glory. In a secular age where God’s absence is 
perhaps more poignantly felt, Ames wonders why God withdraws from his theatre just as the sun 
hides behind the earth at night, but then muses that “the Lord is more constant and far more 
extravagant than it seems to imply. Wherever you turn your eyes the world can shine like a 
transfiguration. You don’t have to bring a thing to it except a little willingness to see. Only who 
would have the courage to see it?”358 
For Robinson, the sacred exceptionality of all humans—proven in both their awesome 
brilliance and their capacity for destruction—is not merely something constructed in the 
imagination but an essential feature of a reality that all exists first in responsive relation to a 
personal God of love. In this framework, the Other—whether human or natural—becomes a site 
of loving responsibility. Ames tells this to his son by telling him that “when you encounter 
another person […] it is as if a question is being put to you.”359  
This framing connects to Robinson’s particular Christian view of re-enchantment. The 
others with whom one interacts are not given value and meaning by human interaction. Rather, 
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Robinson suggests through Ames, our soul is capable of understanding others “as if” they are 
“emissaries sent from the Lord” and thus such encounters with others provide a “chance to show 
that I do in some small degree participate in the grace that saved me, [and] you are free to act 
otherwise than as circumstances would seem to dictate.”360 This, for Robinson, brings all humans 
into the theatre of the enchanted world as performers on God’s stage in which we “are free to act 
by [our] own lights. […] Freed at the same time of the impulse to hate or resent.”361 Ames 
follows this call for loving conduct by reflecting on the Calvinist notion of the theatrum mundi:  
Calvin says somewhere that each of us is an actor on a stage and God is the audience. 
That metaphor has always interested me, because it makes us artists of our behavior, and 
the reaction of God to us might be thought of as aesthetic rather than morally judgmental 
in the ordinarily sense. How well do we understand our role?362  
The freedom of the soul that Ames articulates here understands the entire cosmos as existing first 
in relation to God, the source of all Being, before it exists in relation to even our experience. 
Ames goes on to suggest that such a metaphor of the world reminds us that “the world exists for 
God’s enjoyment, not in any simple sense, of course, but as you enjoy the being of a child even 
when he is in every way a thorn in your heart.”363 Ames circles back to the broken father-son 
dynamic, reframing it now in a cosmic and ontological perspective from which reconciliation is 
possible. He particularizes the idea by again turning to reflect on his brother Edward, estranged 
now in from his father: “Edward did have a mind of his own, a mind worthy of respect. […] 
Who knows where any mind comes from. It’s all mystery.”364 As explored above, Robinson’s 
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use of mind is synonymous with soul and experience. By locating the soul’s mysteriousness here, 
she is not, I argue, simply saying we cannot know the other. Rather, she is saying that what we 
can know of them is their intrinsic value and worth in relation to the shared source of Being in 
which—in Whom—all minds participate. The mystery is that these minds which are unfolding 
through time summon us towards a freely given love for which we are responsible. 
Ames’s journey to his grandfather’s grave is a way for Robinson to explore the tension 
humans experience connected and disconnected from families of origin. The journey brings the 
young Ames and his father to the brink of life. They almost die of starvation and dehydration 
until a stranger—living in a domesticated outpost on the edges of civilization—welcomes them 
into her home for a very humble meal of water and cornmeal mush.365 The grave is hidden in 
“the loneliest place you could imagine,” Ames recalls; “If I were to say it was going back to 
nature, you might get the idea that there was some sort of vitality about the place. But it was 
parched and sun stricken. It was hard to imagine the grass had ever been green.”366 Many of the 
graves are nameless and Ames’s limited understanding of even his own lineage fills this episode 
with a pervasive uncertainty, compounded by the unreliability of Ames’s memory. Ames does 
not know his family line past the third generation and even in regard to his own father he 
remarks that “A man can know his father, or his son, and there might still be nothing between 
them but loyalty and love and mutual incomprehension.”367  
Yet despite Ames’ ignorance, he also acknowledges a belief that whatever he knows or 
does not know, he is “profoundly in his [father’s] debt.”368 Ames remains aware that the strange 
miracle of his particular being is absolutely contingent on this largely unknown man. His 
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existence was a gift, for which he did nothing, but a gift he received and for which he must give 
a response. 
At the grave, Ames and his father begin the uniquely human work of domestication. They 
start to tame the wild: “Then [my father] started cutting the brush back with a hand scythe he had 
brought, and we set up the markers that had fallen over […]. We worked a good while putting 
things to rights.”369 Making order of the wild becomes, for Robinson, not simply a matter of 
good ecological behavior, but an instance of the uniquely human capacity of bringing order from 
disorder, of cultivating life in the face of the apparent meaningless of death. These are quiet, 
mundane acts of creative love. Just as the strange, nameless lady creates a home at the edge of 
the world, so Ames and his father cultivate a tiny plot in some forgotten corner of America. For 
Robinson, such behavior is not futile, but a remarkable testament—or proof—of the capacity and 
vitality of the human soul to make meaningful, loving experiences that embed us into the 
material world. 
And the natural backdrop for this scene contain important resonances with Robinson’s 
other writing that help to make sense of her particularly Christian myth of re-enchantment. 
Because while the scene is depicted as a site of death and scorched earth, Ames also recalls that 
“Everywhere you stepped, little grasshoppers would fly up by the score, making that snap they 
do, like striking a match.”370 And as they work around the grave, Ames remembers the sounds 
and signs of ongoing creaturely life: “There was such a sound of grasshoppers, and of wind 
rattling that dry grass.”371 The phrasing here contains obvious resonances with Robinson’s 
“Preface” to a collected edition of the works of John Calvin, in which she argues that the 
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mysterious energy which gives rise to the expansion and flux of the entire cosmos—all its many 
unfoldings and permutations—is the same energy that animates the human soul. While lengthy, 
it is worth quoting this passage in full; Robinson argues:  
We feel we know certain things about the physical universe. It is inconceivably vast, it is 
expanding, and its rate of expansion is accelerating. How do we compare the energy that 
drives the universe to the energy expended in the striking of a match? […] That the 
striking of a match amounts to virtually nothing in the roar of the universe comparatively 
speaking, does not in any way lessen its reality or change its nature. And in fact, the 
energy the match stores and releases, like the mind that contrived it and the hand that 
holds it, all express that cosmic energy, though how and why we cannot say. We do not 
bother ourselves with these problems of incommensurability or relationship, though we 
routinely assume that such imponderables surround us on every side. It is as if the world 
of daily life existed without reference to those seas of space/time which we know in fact 
contain it altogether. Only the grandest religious thought has even attempted create a 
wholly integrated model of reality, typically employing the language of myth or epic to 
assert human meaning in the context of a dauntingly nonhuman universe. We moderns 
have abandoned the effort, and for us that seems to serve as an equivalent to solving the 
problem. […] The Creator is, by [Calvin’s] reckoning, utterly greater than any conception 
we can form of his creation, and at the same time free, present, just, loving, and 
intimately attentive to fallen humankind, collectively and one by one. It is as if we were 
to find a tender solicitude toward us in our slightest thoughts. It is as if we were to 
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propose that that great energy only exists to make possible our miraculously delicate 
participation in it.372 
By disenchanting the world—by removing the possibility of a Creator God—Robinson suggests 
here, the “dauntingly nonhuman universe” is not easily understood to be a place fit for human 
meaning or dwelling. Indeed, the presence of life flickering among the graveyard presents Ames 
with an unavoidable fact about reality: all the distinct forms of life in this world will ultimately 
return back into the earth from which they emerged.  
Handley notes that the fact of nature’s indifference to these cycles of life and death 
creates profound ethical difficulties since “if true [it] implies that human personhood, morality, 
and imagination as free and undetermined by mechanical laws are obliterated, rendering 
environmental degradation as meaningless as it is to a fundamentalist awaiting the rapture.”373 
(Handley intriguingly notes how such determinisms, borne from a myth of disenchantment, are 
shared by otherworldly forms of Christianity as well.) Embracing such narratives about reality—
even though they align with observable fact—does not provide any ethical basis for human 
agents to care for the earth or even one another. It does not make cosmic reality a place, let alone 
a home. Such views endorse a biocentrism that denies human exceptionality and, thus, becomes 
a form of human nihilism. Robinson’s theocentric vision where the world is God’s theatre retains 
the exceptionalism while simultaneously humbling it. 
In her interview with George Handley, Robinson indicates that the world’s unfolding 
mysteriousness means that any sense of belonging to it, as humans, is never a simple given:  
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There’s nothing stranger than the fact that we exist on a planet. Who does not feel the 
oddness of this? I mean, stop and think about where we actually are in the larger sense. It 
seems to me as if every local landscape is a version of the cosmic mystery, that it is very 
strange that we’re here, and that it is very strange that we are what we are. In a certain 
sense the mystery of the physical reality of the human being is expressed in any 
individual case by the mystery of a present landscape. The landscape is ours in the sense 
that it is the landscape that we query. So we’re created in the fact of ourselves answering 
to a particular sense of amazement.374 
Robinson is not simply articulating that wonder is the appropriate response to the mysterious fact 
that we exist, but rather that each soul experiencing any particular place is the backdrop for the 
theatrum mundi Ames references earlier. All people and all places have intrinsic value through 
the myth by which Ames lives and experiences the world. Each place is a significant locus of the 
ongoing, unfolding mystery of a cosmos that participates in Being. Rather than degrading such 
places and times through a hermeneutic of condescension (like Edward) or a stance of control 
and mastery, Robinson explores the possibility of encountering reality by humbly, gratefully 
receiving it as gift. 
The moment at the grave is capped by a clear allusion to the moment that launched 
Robinson’s own explorations of the theological vision of the American Congregationalists. The 
young Ames, standing beside his praying father and his grandfather’s grave, is confronted (in 
this seeming no-man’s-land) by a moment of dazzling wonder, the meaning of which he answers 
to (or responds to) throughout his life: 
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At first I thought I saw the sun setting in the east; I knew where east was, because the sun 
was just going over the horizon when we got there that morning. Then I realized that 
what I saw was a full moon rising just as the sun was going down. Each of them was 
standing on its edge, with the most wonderful light between them. It seemed as if you 
could touch it, as if there were palpable currents of light passing back and forth, or as if 
there were great taut skeins of light suspended between them. […] They seemed to float 
on the horizon for quite a long time, I suppose because they were both so bright you 
couldn’t get a clear look at them. And that grave, and my father and I, were exactly 
between them, which seemed amazing to me at the time, since I hadn’t given much 
thought to the nature of the horizon.375  
This episode is an obvious echo of the footnote in Jonathan Edward’s work that satisfied 
Robinson’s ontological longings for a more adequate account of reality than were offered 
through deterministic materialisms. This scene, according to Robinson was “Edwards’s analogy 
for the continuous renewal of the world by the will of God, which creates, to our eyes, seeming 
lawfulness and identity, but which is in fact a continuous free act of God.”376 Ames, however, 
does not explain it away for his son, but just remembers it and returns to it, and lets Robbie (and 
the reader) experience it vicariously.  
This moment, though, has important ecological significance. Arrested—even 
enchanted—by the cosmic backdrop, Ames’s father says: “I would never have thought this place 
could be beautiful.”377 In a brief moment, Ames and his father experience the unveiling of a large 
and complex reality that is moving and that contains them and their ability to experience it. It 
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moves them, but not in any deterministic way. This moment gives them a sense, beyond any 
language or proof, that this particular place matters. It is an unseemly place for the divine, but 
even here reality is charged with vitality and meaning. Later in the narrative, Ames recalls this 
moment again, but this time he considers how the human is mysteriously embedded in the 
material world through an ability to experience it: 
You learn […] what an amazing instrument you are, so to speak, what a power you have 
to experience beyond anything you might ever actually need. Who would have thought 
that the moon could dazzle and flame like that? Despite what he said, I could see that my 
father was a little shaken. He had to stop and wipe his eyes.378  
In the Institutes, Calvin writes: “Wherever you turn your eyes, there is no portion of the world, 
however minute, that does not exhibit at least some sparks of beauty, while it is impossible to 
contemplate the vast and beautiful fabric as it extends around, without being overwhelmed by the 
immense weight of glory.”379 When Robinson writes her preface to Calvin’s work, she argues 
that it is the soul through which humans are able to exist in communion—or relation—with the 
material world that is (just like the human family tree) founded and sustained by the Creator: 
“The beauty of what we see is burdened with truth. It signifies the power of God and his constant 
grace toward the human creature. It signifies the address of God to the individual human 
consciousness.”380  
For Robinson, such a theological vision of the soul is not fixed on some afterlife, but 
attentive to this-world; the “task of the soul,” Robinson says in another essay, “is a deep 
perception of the givenness of this world rather than a looking through or beyond it.”381 In this 
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Calvinistic rendering, the sacredness of reality is not hidden beyond this life and this world, but 
is experienced in the soul’s confrontation with it. 
The soul, however, does not simply perceive reality, it must also make it cohere through 
memory and narrative. What would otherwise be disparate fragments, the soul gathers into a 
provisional whole. Gilead, in many ways, is Ames’s attempts to order the disparate, complex, 
mysterious realities of his own life. As he comes to reflect later in the novel, these layers of his 
experience accumulate because the human body is—much like the light from the sun reflecting 
off the moon and reaching the human eye—in a constant state of motion and becoming. The 
profound mystery—or as Ames would say, “miracle”382—of existence is that there is any 
durable, realized self at all. As Ames writes: “Whenever I take a child into my arms to be 
baptized. I am, so to speak, comprehended in the experience more fully, having seen more of 
life, knowing better what it means to affirm the sacredness of the human creature. I believe there 
are visions that come to us only in memory, in retrospect.”383  
In this retrospection, Ames completely flips the disenchanted narrative on its head. The 
world outside of human experience—outside of human subjectivity—is not some inert and 
passive material we know in order to control. Rather, it is a communicative world charged with a 
significance and sacredness that humans do not construct, but rather acknowledge and revere and 
participate in. The source of Being is, ultimately, love and the response it calls for is love, the 
kind of love that can restore people to their places and to one another, but only if they have the 
“courage to see.”384 
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As I noted at the outset, I argue that Robinson wrote Gilead for a contemporary audience 
that dwells in the secular age and in the Anthropocene era. Although subtle, Gilead is a profound 
response to the various forms of dis-ease that characterize life in this contemporary world. And 
by setting the novel in the 1950s, she is giving Americans a glimpse into their own family history 
and all its fraught tensions between belief and unbelief. Gilead complicates the narrative on both 
sides of the polarized American public. Ames offers an Anthropocene, ill at ease with the 
destruction of the world and the stance of control wrought through the myth of disenchantment, 
another way of perceiving humanity and experiencing the world through a myth of re-
enchantment. It is telling that in Ames’s final lines, he says “I’ll pray, and then I’ll sleep.”385 In 
his final notes, as he embarks on the journey into complete uncertainty that lies beyond all 
human experience, he encourages Robbie to consider a relationship with the unseen source of 
Being (through prayer) and the relinquishing of control (through sleep.)  
The novel’s critical success and popularity may seem odd. Yet that the somewhat 
antiquated, sermonic voice of pastor Ames and his lengthy meditations on baseball, light, water, 
and the finer points of Calvinist doctrine continues to resonate with many readers in the twenty-
first century is a fact of contemporary American culture. This has confounded many. Literary 
critics such as Randy Boyagoda claim that Robinson’s fiction, particularly Gilead, remains out 
of touch with present concerns. According to Boyagoda, Gilead has found success because it 
panders to a contemporary, secular audience fascinated by the antiquated religiosity of an 
American past that never compels them to live differently. In a recent interview, Boyagoda 
argues: 
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Robinson makes it too easy for readers to engage with religious experience through her 
fiction, because the experience is closed off from us—and in a subtle way, exotic. In 
many ways, Robinson is the most quietly exotic writer alive today, in that the world of 
Gilead is as exotic to a First World Anglophone reader as a world informed and inspired 
by an Eastern religion would be. […] In those contexts, religious experience is exotic and 
has no purchase on you personally. The 1950s small-town and rural Christian experiences 
of Robinson’s fiction have no purchase on us.386 
Boyagoda’s critique of Robinson echoes that of Alan Jacobs’ claims from “The Watchmen”: 
Robinson’s writing makes no demands on the present, particularly a secular present. Yet 
Boyagoda’s critique misses how Gilead is a thoroughly postsecular project targeted to and 
informed by the polarized, secularized American audience of the twenty-first century.  
Gilead is indeed set in the twilight of living American memory—the 1950s of 
handwritten letters and radio broadcast baseball—but the novel’s temporal setting allows 
Robinson both to speak into and speak against the present context of an American secular culture 
ill-at-ease with religion and a contemporary American evangelicalism prone to dogmatism and 
virulent forms of rationalist, tribal apologetic. That Boyagoda and Jacobs both seem to want a 
clearer apologetic (even combative) stance from Robinson is to ask her to become a part of the 
very problem—the very posture—her writing is addressing.  
For Alan Jacobs the polarization of 2016 concerned the looming election, but for 
Robinson the polarization she addresses comes over a decade earlier and was due largely to the 
post 9/11 backlash against all forms of religious extremism and fundamentalism. Alex 
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Engebretson is right to claim that Gilead is “best considered within the frame of U.S. cultural 
and political history after 9/11 [because it] can be read as a response to anxieties surrounding the 
nation’s religious-secular divide.”387 Post-9/11 America saw virulent public rhetoric of anti-
religious secular thought and, conversely, vehement anti-secular Christian apologetics. By 
inviting readers into the temporal landscape of their relatively recent forebears, Robinson 
unsettles any naive Christian nostalgia for the supposed virtuosity of pre-sexual revolution 
America and also challenges the secular shorthand by which the 1950s are reductively 
understood (and usually condemned) as the site of oppressive religious fundamentalisms.388  
In a way, Robinson’s choice of setting Gilead in 1950s rural America puts Robinson (and 
her contemporary audience) on the same significant journey to Kansas that pastor Ames takes 
with his father when they go out to find the gravesite of Ames’ grandfather and, thus, gain a 
sense of their place in the world and that is unfolding in time. By exploring rural America in the 
1950s, Robinson is making the case that Americans might gain access to knowledge about where 
and when they are in the present. The 1950s as a temporal setting is not, as Boyagoda wrongfully 
claims, a pandering escape at all. There is no 9/11 (or 2016 election for that matter) without this 
pivotal decade just as there is no child without a parent or grandparent.  
All the fracture lines between the religious and secular, faith and doubt that characterize 
the early twenty-first century context in which Robinson writes exist in 1950s Gilead. The 
experiencing self like the American nation is, thus, not a free-floating autonomous entity, but 
something embedded in the unfolding nature of time, something in which it ineluctably 
participates. For Robinson this American tradition of which she is keenly interested also gives 
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way to a more general Western and human tradition. Her fiction explores not simply 1950s 
America or the living memory of Pastor Ames which reaches back to those who experienced the 
Civil War, but it goes all the way back (as Wiman appreciated) to the fall of Troy.  
Throughout Gilead, Robinson invites readers into the inner life of John Ames’s 
experience and leaves them where that experience ends. Robinson also invites readers to have a 
willingness to see the world in a new, strange light in the secular age and to consider an 
experience of reality “as if” God is and “as if” the world might be the theatre of his self-
revelation. Yet while Robinson’s turn inward is perhaps helpful in making the case for a myth of 
re-enchantment, it is no grounds for knowing how to live on the land. That is why brilliant 
interior reflections on the earth abound in Gilead, but actual ecological practice is muted. Indeed, 
even Ames’s final lines counter the historical call for Christians to “Pray and Work” by inviting 
readers to “Pray and Sleep.”   
The this-worldly theological vision in Gilead reveals a new, humbler, posture to the 
world. However, this is not enough to show how one might act and work and better honour or 
care for the material world. Particularly in an Anthropocene age in which techno-industrial 
advances and the introduction of the machine age have created an entirely new form of relating 
to the land. The American landscape of the 1950s includes many small-town places like Gilead, 
but the next decades will see their erosion and erasure as new machines and corporate agriculture 
overtake the landscapes and imaginations of Americans. To better understand how a distinctly 
postsecular, Christian re-enchanted vision of the cosmos can redirect human action and work in 
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Christian Wiman framed My Bright Abyss as a meditation for “modern” believers and Marilynne 
Robinson intended Absence of Mind to challenge the “modern” myth of self that had castigated 
human experience. Wiman’s meditation was a clear example of Charles Taylor’s notion that the 
experience of faith in a secular age is cross pressured by doubt and uncertainty in ways it was not 
several centuries earlier. Taylor’s focus on the experience of faith helps him articulate why the 
secular does not mean religious beliefs are simply disappearing (as some secularization theorists 
would have it), but that the nature of religious belief is being shaped by their reaction to the 
secular. The argument of this project is that one of the primary ways in which religious belief—
particularly Christianity—is being shaped by secularism is in the response and reaction against a 
key narrative of secularism: the myth of disenchantment.  
In Wiman’s poetry and prose we noticed a theological vision that attends closely to this 
life and this world, particularly in all the pain and suffering such embodiment brings. Wiman’s 
theological vision does not seek to escape from such pain as otherworldly forms of Christianity 
might, nor does he grant the conclusions of materialists operating strictly within the immanent 
frame who see such pain and suffering as evidence of the nihil (or abyss) below the surface of 
the appearances. Rather, Wiman articulates a particular postsecular vision of a re-enchanted 
world that embraces human contingency in a world suffused with the mysterious, ongoing 
presence of a God who sustains and gives meaning to the creaturely world moment by moment. 
In a similar vein, Robinson reacts against the modern, disenchanted world by attempting 
to recover the idea of the human soul—which, for her, is synonymous with inward experience or 
 161 
consciousness—as the faculty that not only makes humans exceptional in the material world, but 
also firmly embeds them in the natural world, the theatre of God’s glory. While Robinson moves 
towards a postsecular vision of reality and a new posture of attention and affection for particular, 
often neglected, landscapes—and in so doing, goes beyond even Wiman’s ecological vision—
her essays and fiction do not fully address just what this new perception of reality might entail 
for how we behave in the world, particularly when it comes to matters of land use and labor. For 
that, the writing of Wendell Berry is a helpful addition to this small group of contemporary 
American writers seeking a myth of re-enchantment. 
Like Wiman and Robinson, Wendell Berry also writes against the modern, secular world 
and the myth of disenchantment that pervades it. Indeed, one of the key texts of Wendell Berry’s 
corpus under focus in this chapter is Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition. 
But before this essay, Berry’s critiques of the modern world are many and well known and they 
most often deal with how the modern world has not only imagined the earth, but how its 
narrative about the world and humanity’s relationship to it has led to disastrous abuses most 
acutely experienced by Berry in his home state of Kentucky. If any of the three writers in this 
project speak most directly to the malaise of the Anthropocene in terms of human abuses of the 
land, it is the Kentucky farmer, poet, essayist, and novelist, Wendell Berry.   
In The Unsettling of America, an early collection of essays that placed Berry on the map 
as one of the most important agrarian voices in twentieth century America, Berry writes: 
The Modern World would respect the Creation only insofar as it could be used by 
humans. Henceforth, by definition, by principle, we would be unable to leave anything as 
it was. The usable would be used; the useless would be sacrificed in the use of something 
else. By means of the machine metaphor we have eliminated any fear or awe or reverence 
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or humility or delight or joy that might have restrained us in our use of the world. We 
have indeed learned to act as if our sovereignty were unlimited and as if our intelligence 
were equal to the universe. Our “success” is a catastrophic demonstration of our failure. 
The industrial Paradise is a fantasy in the minds of the privileged and the powerful; the 
reality is a shambles.389 
Although he does not use the term “disenchantment” here, Berry’s reference to the “machine 
metaphor” is a metonymy for the mechanistic depiction of the cosmos that not only underwrites 
the myth of disenchantment, but also characterizes an Anthropocene in which this mechanistic 
narrative unleashed human control and power over-and-against the organic world. For the past 
half century Berry has repeatedly made the case that the present and ongoing destruction of the 
natural world is a consequence of such a reductionistic account of nature. Because of his 
reactions against this dominant narrative that undergirds secularism, I am framing Berry as a 
postsecular writer alongside Wiman and Robinson. However, for Berry this label poses a certain 
challenge. 
Drawing on Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, John McClure notes that much of 
“postsecular” literature is marked by a “weakening confidence in secular-rational promises of 
peace and progress and the philosophical weakening of secular reason’s claims to exclusive 
authority on matters of the real.”390 In the brief passage above one can already sense Berry’s 
anger at how contemporary language and modern technologies and the attendant posture that 
desires objective knowledge wed to control, all collaborate to shape a destructive relationship to 
the natural world. These remove the awe and fear and reverence appropriate for the natural world 
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and replace them with a stance of disengaged control. We sense Berry’s frustration in how the 
value of the earth is no longer understood to be intrinsic to it, but has, in the “Modern world,” 
become contingent on human use and usefulness.  
In making this remarkable shift, Berry argues, modern people have become almost god-
like—or perceived themselves to be god-like—in their sovereign power over and against the 
world by means of utilitarian reason and the application of that reason to potent technologies and 
economic systems. Yet the industrialized paradises—the post-Enlightenment promised lands of 
“peace and progress”—created from this stance have often proven (particularly in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries) to be closer to something like hellscapes. Fantasies have become 
nightmares. Some of Berry’s harshest critiques aimed at the heart of the ecological destruction 
all around him are levelled at those beholden by the myth of disenchantment, those who treat the 
earth “as a dead inert chemical mass.”391  
Berry’s frustration at this reductionist understanding of the world creates what I argue is a 
particularly “postsecular” fascination with re-enchantment that underpins almost all of his 
ecological writing. In other words, I maintain that we do not get Berry’s ecological vision 
outside of his broader postsecular theological vision. To be clear, Wiman is the only author in 
this study who seems to have seriously moved from a position of secular unbelief to Christianity 
that is quite distinct from the inherited, doctrinal, otherworldly Baptist theology of his youth. In 
this sense, Wiman’s work is the most conscientiously postsecular. However, in the last chapter, I 
also noted that Robinson regards her own form of Christianity as a “weak form,” and, thus, 
understands there to be a certain kinship in here work with other postsecular contemporaries like 
Toni Morrison or Don DeLillo. While Robinson’s vision of reality that challenged secular norms 
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came from reading the Calvinist thought of Jonathan Edwards (among others), this recovery is 
still in reaction to and inflected by secularism. Wiman and Robinson do not, like other 
postsecular authors, offer new, hybridized forms of religion. However, their advocacy for a 
recovery of Christianity that focuses the importance of contingency for epistemology, the awe 
and reverence of humanity’s shared ontology with all of reality, and a dynamic, mysterious 
world that is intrinsically significant and unfolding through time because of its ongoing relational 
status to a Creator, all make their distinctly Christian myths of re-enchantment postsecular 
reactions against the disenchanted, modern world. These reactions have challenged members 
both within and without modern manifestations of Christianity. 
In an early collection of essays, A Continuous Harmony, Berry succinctly addresses the 
role that the secular plays in contemporary American nature poetry that is instructive for how 
one can read Berry’s project as a postsecular offering. Talking about his non-Christian 
contemporaries, Berry speaks admiringly about their attention to the natural world from “a state 
of mind that could very accurately be described as religious.”392 Berry cautions that his use of 
this word might be seen derogatorily in a secular age, and he understands that it will be seen as 
primitive by many. But he means by this “religious” state of mind is an openness to the “sense of 
the presence of mystery or divinity in the world, or eve to the attitudes of wonder or awe or 
humility before the works of creation.”393  
This term mystery comes up in both Wiman and Robinson, but it is important to recall 
again that this is not simply a term that means an ambiguous unknown. While there is an element 
of uncertainty to it, all three authors in this project understand mystery as a fundamental aspect 
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of a world re-enchanted along Christian lines. Understood as such, the world is not simply 
charged with God’s ongoing presence, but is to be understood sacramentally.  
Theologian Hans Boersma’s work on the sacramental imagination in the Christian 
tradition is helpful in unpacking just how mystery is tied to sacrament in Berry’s writing. 
Boersma argues that “we would not go wrong by simply equating mystery and sacrament”394 and 
that “reality truly is mysterious [in that] it carries a dimension that we are unable to fully 
express.”395 This is an idea explored in both Wiman and Robinson and, to be clear, Wiman was 
also not satisfied with any slippery use of mystery that simply relegates it to the unknown. For 
Wiman, the world’s mystery was tied to its participation with its ontological source: God, the 
bright abyss behind all the appearances. For Wiman, our inability to fully speak for such a 
mysterious world was tied to our inability to grasp God through language. 
 In a similar vein, Boersma claims that it is the “sacramental character of reality that is 
the reason it so often appears mysterious and beyond human comprehension.”396 Of course, this 
does nothing to clarify the point yet. Boersma only acknowledges here that the belief that all of 
reality participates in the ongoingness of a living, dynamic God—who is eternal and beyond 
finite human comprehension—helps explain why our words and concepts and grasp on reality so 
often fall short of completion and certainty. The sacramental character of reality, according to 
Boersma, is the way in which material reality we sense and experience is not simply a sign 
pointing to some otherworld (akin to Platonic forms); rather, material reality “participates in the 
mysterious reality to which it points.”397 It is because of this participation that the Christian 
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visions of re-enchantment are not escapes from the world to some detached, idealized heaven, 
but nor are they prone to the reductive, nihilistic tendencies of pure materialism. It is through 
such a narrative that such renderings of Christianity challenge disenchantment but stay attentive 
to and affectionate for this material world. 
Indeed, in the same essay from A Continuous Harmony I noted above, Berry goes on to 
articulate the religious state of mind he sees in contemporary American nature writing by quoting 
from John Steward Collis’s The Triumph of the Tree, in which Berry offers a very clear picture 
of a postsecular reaction to disenchantment: 
Having become aware of objects and begun to name them, this Earliest Man became 
aware of something else. It is a remarkable fact that no sooner had he looked closely at 
the phenomena of nature than he began to concern himself with, not the visible object in 
front of him which he could clearly see, but the with an invisible object which he could 
not see at all. He looked at the trees, the rocks, the rivers, the animals, and having looked 
at them he at once began to talk about something in them which he had never seen and 
never heard of. This thing inside the objective appearance was called a god. […] his first 
thoughts seem to have turned towards a Thing behind the thing, a Force behind or within 
the appearance.398 
It is important to note that this “religious state of mind” Berry sees in contemporary American 
nature writing is a recovery of “primitive” thought beholden to the myth of enchantment. 
However, Berry notes that in his own thinking, this “peculiar aspiration of contemporary nature 
poetry might be fairly accurately suggested by calling it a secular pilgrimage.”399 In a very telling 
passage about Berry’s own affinity for these “secular” writers, he argues: 
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It is secular because it takes place outside of, or without reference to, the institutions of 
religion, and it does not seek any institutional shrine or holy place; it is in search of the 
world. But it is a pilgrimage nevertheless because it is a religious quest. It does not seek 
the world of inert materiality that is postulated by both the heaven-oriented churches and 
by the exploitive industries; it seeks the world of the creation, the created world in which 
the Creator, the formative and quickening spirit, is still immanent and at work.”400 
This small excerpt sums up Berry’s vision of re-enchantment succinctly while also 
indicating the precarious position he (like Wiman and Robinson) occupies as a Christian writer 
concerned about nature in the secular age. Indeed, Berry identifies as a Christian and has quite 
publicly (as we will see) tried to make a sustained argument about the relationship between the 
Christian religion and how one should care for and belong to the created order. In The Unsettling 
of America, Berry notes:  
What relation do we see, if any, between body and mind, or body and soul? What 
connections or responsibilities do we maintain between our bodies and the earth? These 
are religious questions, obviously, for our bodies are part of the Creation, and they 
involve us in all the issues of mystery.401  
Berry’s call here to think about the ecological crisis as a religious problem bears closer attention 
in the secular age where, Charles Taylor argues, belief is always contested and contestable, even 
within a believing community.  
In fact, Berry often reveals himself to be a very uneasy member of Christian 
communities. In his essays particularly, one often finds a voice deeply critical of certain groups 
 
 400 Ibid, 4 – 5.  
 401 Wendell Berry, “The Body and the Earth,” The Unsettling of America: Culture and Agriculture (San 
Francisco: Sierra Club, 1977), 97. 
 168 
of Christians and their naïve (or willed) complicity with an industrialized mindset that would see 
forests razed and mountaintops removed all in the name of the “cultural mandate” ordering 
followers of God to have “dominion” over the creation.402 Many Christians, according to Berry, 
have often conveniently, inexcusably wed Christian theology to a whole host of post-
Enlightenment dualisms in a manner that has justified the exploitation and desecration of the 
complex ecology on which all life depends. In Charles Taylor’s language, such Christians shaped 
by the conditions of the secular age, lean upon theologies of “excarnation”403 that privilege 
abstract, disembodied, and immaterial truths rather than practical wisdom for material, 
embodied, creaturely life.  
In some Christian writing, the “postsecular” reaction to the myth of disenchantment has 
been to articulate what I have been calling “this-worldly” theologies of re-enchantment. 
Theologian Ellen Davis, whose agrarian reading of the Bible was inspired by Berry’s body of 
work, calls this a “modest materialism.”404 She calls the materialism of agrarians Like Berry 
“modest” because while he is  “concern[ed] with the materiality of existence, [he] does not claim 
that what we humans can (or theoretically ever could) see or touch or make is exhaustive of what 
is, nor even that it constitutes the larger or more important part of what is.”405 To further clarify 
her point, Davis contrasts this modest materialism with “materialistic scientism” which is under 
the illusion and “magical thinking” that “science can solve all problems.”406 This form of 
materialism is a consequence of the disenchantment that Weber and Taylor note and is, Davis 
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continues, “strangely oblivious to what may be the most readily observable and nonnegotiable 
characteristic of our material world, namely finitude.”407 Berry’s writing consistently tries to 
recover the this-worldly focus, the “modest materialism” aware of both human ignorance and 
material limits, within Christianity and, by doing so, articulate a “postsecular” Christian option 
that re-embeds408 humans as integral participants of the world through attentive, careful, loving 
work.  
In the following chapter, I will explore how Berry’s writing and work are the culmination 
of a particular Christian form of postsecular re-enchantment in contemporary American letters. 
While there is overlap with both Robinson and Wiman’s understanding of the world as sustained 
each moment by God’s continued, creative presence, Berry also articulates from this a much 
more explicit ecological vision about how we practically live into this Christian myth of re-
enchantment. Berry’s writing has recycled numerous themes throughout the years so that what 
Owen Barfield once said of his friend C.S. Lewis, could equally be said of Berry: “What he 
thought about everything was secretly present in what he said about anything.”409 Within Berry’s 
body of work is a remarkably consistent unity and coherence of thought. From his earliest 
writing, one finds the seeds that would germinate into more mature manifestations of his central 
ideas found in his other essay collections, his novels, and his poetry.  
While Berry is well known as a champion of ecological conservation and local food, 
agrarianism and sustainability, all of these matters cannot be separated from the particular myth 
of re-enchantment that undergirds, and gives coherences to, almost everything he writes. Berry 
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is, indeed, an ecological writer, but his particularly Christian vision is honed as a postsecular 
response to a disenchanted age. By understanding Berry’s postsecular position a bit more clearly, 
we can turn to a closer reading of his novel Jayber Crow, in which, I maintain, Berry gives one 
of the most explicit expressions about how Christianity provides a way in which humans can 
understand themselves as ecological creatures. 
 
Contra the Christians: Culture and Scripture 
  As I noted earlier in the first chapter, secularization has often entailed a “conflict” 
between religion and science, and thus engendered skepticism and distrust between both sides. 
Even though Taylor’s account of the secular age articulates a desire for a more open secularism 
(one championed by Robinson as well), the conflicts endure. As was also noted, ecocritical 
thought has not been immune to this and has also often had a rather skeptical attitude towards 
religion, and Christianity in particular, when it comes to the treatment of the natural world.  
  Recall Lynn White Jr., in his seminal 1967 essay, “The Historical Roots of our 
Ecological Crisis,” arguing that the Christian heritage bears a large “burden of guilt” for 
fostering attitudes that encourage ecological degradation.410 Yet despite this, White never really 
endorsed a full-scale rejection of Christianity. Rather, and here lies the challenge, White 
proposed a “rethinking of Christian axioms.”411 “What people do about their ecology,” White 
wrote, “depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human 
ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny – that is, by religion.”412 
White did not advocate the rejection of Christianity per se, a point that can be often forgotten, 
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but a possible revaluation of it. He concluded that essay with these words: “Since the roots of our 
trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it 
that or not.”413 White’s disillusionment with various manifestations of Christianity yet his 
perduring optimism that it also might contain the resources to get us beyond such problematic 
theologies parallels, in many ways, Berry’s own troubled relationship to the dualistic Christianity 
of his Protestant Kentucky upbringing, one that advocated primarily for a life beyond this life 
and, in so doing, denigrated the material world. 
In “Christianity and the Survival of Creation” Berry makes a bold assertion: recovering 
the Christian tradition is fundamental to the preservation of creation. “Our native religion,” by 
which Berry means here Christianity,414 “should survive and renew itself so that it may become 
as largely and truly instructive as we need it to be. On such a survival and renewal of the 
Christian religion may depend the survival of the Creation that is its subject.”415 I will address 
the problems Berry has with his “native religion” of Christianity in just a moment, but it is 
important to understand why and how Berry seeks such a recovery project in the first place. For 
Berry it has to do with belonging to a place that includes not just the flora and fauna, but also the 
people and their traditions, beliefs, and practices. In Life is a Miracle, Berry argues that we must 
remember our tradition as a way of living into Ezra Pound’s modernist dictum to “make it new!” 
This was not to abolish the past, but to make it live in the present: “The new must come from the 
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old, for where else would you get it?”416 In an essay titled “Poetry and Marriage,” Berry qualifies 
this further, noting that any remembering of the past will not simply be blind acceptance or rosy-
eyed nostalgia; rather, remembering one’s traditions will necessarily involve “judg[ing] and 
correct[ing]” it.417 This is an active form of remembering. Ellen Davis argues that it is for this 
reason that Berry’s writing functions like that of the Old Testament Prophets who were originally 
referred to as “seers.”418 Davis notes that their ability to see requires a memory that “recall[s] the 
beloved community to itself” by “looking backward, noting both failures and successes, so as to 
imagine new possibilities better than those offered by the dominant culture of the age.”419  
 Berry’s interest in his “native tradition” of Christianity is not to exclude the value he 
finds in other religious traditions. In his decades long correspondence with fellow poet and friend 
Gary Snyder, Berry’s interest and disagreements with Buddhism and Indigenous religions are 
quite apparent.420 However, Berry’s desire to recover Christianity is connected to his deep 
concern for handing over a tradition to a new generation who should not only be members of the 
land of their birth, but also members of the community and tradition that precede them. For 
Berry, this means that to live in Kentucky in the twentieth century (and presumably 21st) is not 
simply to understand the agrarian legacy of the Kentucky farm community, but also to 
understand the literature, philosophy, and religion of the West. In contemplating his Sabbath 
Poems—poems Berry wrote on Sundays often in lieu of attending formal, religious services—
Berry wrote to Snyder:  
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These poems are the result, partly, of a whole pattern of dissatisfactions: with my time 
and history, with my work, with my grasp of problems, with such solutions as I have 
found, with the traditions both of poetry and religion that the poems attempt to use and 
serve. That last dissatisfaction is the cause of all the immediate difficulties. There the 
traditions are, inextricably braided together, very beautiful in certain manifestations, but 
broken off, cheapened, weakened, encrusted with hateful growths — yet so rich, so full 
of the suggestion of usefulness and beauty, that I finally can’t resist the impulse to try to 
lay hold of them.421  
Christianity, for Berry, is interwoven in the traditions of historical, philosophical, and literary 
knowledge that transform space into a place, but even more than this, transform a place into the 
home to which one might belong. This is why Berry’s writing explores close readings of The 
Odyssey and Virgil’s Georgics as well as ruminations on King Lear and, of course, close 
exegesis of the Christian Scriptures.422 Kimberly Smith argues that it is Berry’s “goal to revive 
and renew the intellectual tradition that he has inherited.”423 Dominic Manganiello even goes so 
far as to suggest that Berry’s particular reliance on intertextuality in his writing is a way in which 
he shows how interdependent humans are as creatures; no one is self-sufficient and we all, to 
some degree, rely on our memories passed on by the great community of the dead.424 When a 
community remembers, according to Berry, it is part of the way in which they become 
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meaningful participants and members of their homeland. It is a counter-cultural way of becoming 
re-embedded in society, particularly in a secular age that eschews such traditions and champions 
an autonomous, detached self, one shorn of myths and metanarratives. Throughout his writing 
Berry continually engages the challenge to “rethink” Christianity along these lines, as a religion 
that possesses profound truths about the proper relationship between humankind as integral 
participants in a material world that precedes and proceeds humans.   
Berry also seeks the insights of Christianity because he maintains, in a decidedly 
postsecular way, that Christianity has the resources to challenge current, secular renderings of 
the “real” that are inadequate and unhealthy: 
 Right at the heart of the religious impulse there seems to be a certain solicitude for 
reality: the fear of foreclosing it or of reducing it to some merely human estimate. […] As 
inhabitants of the modern world, we are religious now perhaps to the extent of our desire 
to crack open the coffin of materialism, and to give to reality a larger, freer definition 
than is allowed by the militant materialists of the corporate economy and their political 
servants or by the mechanical paradigm of reductive science.425 
Such reductive materialisms, wherein “we think of ourselves as merely biological creatures, 
whose story is determined by genetics or environment”426 are a consequence of the myth of 
disenchantment and provide no framework for a true responsibility or impetus to caring 
affection. Conversely, though, a Christianity that is beholden to a theology of excarnation, in 
which “we think of ourselves as lofty souls trapped temporarily in lowly bodies”427 is equally 
problematic. 
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To better understand Berry’s recovery project, it helps to know just what Berry believes 
American Christianity needs to be recovered from, which I have already hinted at in the 
preceding paragraphs. This not only helps to contextualize Berry’s postsecular unease within 
certain forms of popular Christianity, but how the myth of disenchantment cuts across both 
religious and non-religious communities. This is not simply a matter of faith versus reason, or 
religion versus science, but a matter of recovering a healthy love for this world that utilizes both 
while challenging both. In his writing, Berry has often lamented how “organized Christianity 
seems to have made peace with ‘the economy’” and that “the church has lately shown little 
inclination to honor the earth.”428 Berry asserts that “the culpability of Christianity in the 
destruction of the natural world and the uselessness of Christianity in any effort to correct that 
destruction are now established clichés of the conservation movement”429 and that “most 
Christian organizations are as happily indifferent to the ecological, cultural, and religious 
implications of industrial economics as are most industrial organizations.  The certified Christian 
seems just as likely as anyone else to join the military-industrial conspiracy to murder 
Creation.”430 American forms of Christianity, in Berry’s analysis, have not been passively 
complicit, but in some cases have actively promoted the abuse of the Creation through their false 
teachings about the world and man’s relationship to it.  
In regard to the American theological and literary tradition in particular, Jeffrey Bilbro 
helpfully explores what he calls “the problematic roots of Puritan dualism.”431 Bilbro is, of 
course, drawing on the well-worn narrative developed, most notably, by Perry Miller in Errand 
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into the Wilderness, in which nature for the early settlers was rendered a place hostile to human 
activity and a haunt for the devil.432  One can hear Berry addressing these problematic roots in 
“A Native Hill,” where he notes his wariness about the Christian religion in America that has 
“promoted and fed upon a destructive schism between body and soul, Heaven and earth.  [One 
that has] encouraged people to believe that the world is of no importance, and that their only 
obligation is to submit to certain churchly formulas in order to get to Heaven.”433 Berry goes on 
to frame this as a particularly Christian form of disenchantment, found in post-Enlightenment 
Deistic rationalism: “Once the creator was removed from the creation, divinity became only a 
remote abstraction, a social weapon in the hands of the religious institutions. […] While pursuing 
Heaven with the sublime appetite he thought of as his soul, [humanity] could turn his heart 
against his neighbors and his hands against the world.”434  
However, Bilbro (and Miller’s) account of the Puritans is much too simplistic, 
particularly given the work that Marilynne Robinson has done to unsettle such common 
assumptions. The dualism that Berry challenges is a hallmark of Western thought since at least 
the Greeks and is manifest in a variety of idealistic philosophies and theologies. 435 
 Charles Taylor is helpful in tracing a more complex reading of the Puritans that places 
their thought in a longer historical, theological trajectory. For my particular interests, the Puritan 
moment that shaped so much American ecological and theological thought occurs 
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simultaneously with what Charles Taylor calls the rise of “Providential Deism” that brought 
about a great “anthropocentric shift.”436 This is a more compelling take on the Puritans than 
Bilbro and Miller’s, and one that better explains the gnostic tendencies in contemporary forms of 
American evangelical Christianity. As God was removed from the inner working of nature, 
“religion in this era became more focused on humans.”437 Taylor remarks that the 
anthropocentric shift this entailed—the very one Lynn White Jr. notes in his essay—is a 
reordering of religious priorities away from glorifying God and participating in Him and His 
created world and towards more immanentized, “secular” forms of happiness.438 The Puritan 
settlers looked on the new world as a new wilderness in which they might make a heaven of hell. 
The problem here is that this is only to enchant one side of the equation: the human. The human, 
in this light, is the imago dei, capable of creating culture from a nature that was spoken into 
existence but no longer attended to or sustained by God. Such a world is not a sacrament of the 
greater reality (a participant in it), but only a mere set of symbols that point to the reality beyond 
it.  
What Bilbro and Miller miss in their reading is precisely why this anthropocentric shift is 
much more complex than simple dualisms. Indeed, the Deistic theology of post-seventeenth 
century thought catalyzed a capitalistic mindset that perceived the American wilderness as 
nothing more than a standing reserve of commodities. Transforming the world into commodities 
was not only good economics, but sound theology. Berry’s thought offers no simple rejection of 
this, but an important nuance: the re-enchantment of non-human nature. Not only are humans 
exceptional (as Robinson showed us), but they are so as participants in the mysterious Reality 
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shared by all creatures. Indeed, Berry’s writing is not against using the world or even working it 
and cultivating it. Rather, it is a call to a peculiar kind of work that does not forget that the root 
word of economics and ecology is oikos, the household. All human action and work must attend 
to keeping this earth a healthy home for humans, now and in future generations.  
Bilbro notes that this dualism led to a rather “schizophrenic” treatment of nature all 
throughout American history to the present day.439 Again, I would say the schizophrenia is 
because in certain strains of Puritanism it only saw one side of the human-nature relationship as 
enchanted. When we turn to a closer look at Berry’s ecological and theological vision, however, 
we find one way in which the tension between the gnostic dualisms he is still critiquing in the 
late twentieth century might be overcome, and this is precisely in the form a distinctly Christian, 
postsecular re-enchantment.440 
While Berry might seem to distance himself from the church in his writing, his desire is 
to create a holistic vision of the symbiotic relationship between humanity and the earth that takes 
the church’s historical teachings seriously. For Berry, this vision can be found within, not 
without, the Scripture Christians believe to be authoritative. In fact, the problems that Lynn 
White Jr. exposed in certain understandings of Scripture do not reveal a problem with Scripture 
as much as they reveal a problem with an ability to interpret Scripture properly. In his Foreword 
to Scripture, Culture and Agriculture: An Agrarian Reading of the Bible, Berry remarks that 
there is a “falsehood in the idea that our ecological destructiveness is permitted, even instructed, 
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in the Bible. Berry argues that this is a misunderstanding and misuse of the Bible. The fault, 
clearly, is in the way the Bible has been applied.”441   
  One of Lynn White Jr.’s main contentions with the Christian heritage is that its adherents 
believed they were to conquer, subdue and have dominion over the world. These contentions are 
largely based upon a certain interpretation of the cultural mandate found in Genesis 1:28. 
However, in “God and Country” Berry suggests that “many are guilty of an extremely 
unintelligent misreading”442 of this very passage. The fact that both Christian and non-Christian 
thinkers have pointed to the cultural mandate as one culprit behind humanity’s unrestrained 
abuse of the natural world gives credence to Berry’s claim that the Bible can be “used 
fragmentarily to justify several kinds of meanness.”443 “The evangelist,” Berry warns, “has 
walked beside the conqueror and the merchant, too often blandly assuming that their causes were 
the same.”444 
Berry offers two pieces of advice for those who misuse Scripture in such a way and, thus, 
miss what a religious rendering of the world might offer a secular age beholden to the myth of 
disenchantment. For the irreligious who cherry-pick passages of Scripture to criticize, Berry 
suggests that they “have not mastered the first rule of the criticism of books: you have to read 
them before you criticize them.”445  However, for the Christian, Berry says, there must be a “long 
work of true criticism” where we “learn to read and understand the Bible in the light of the 
present fact of Creation.”446 Again, note that Berry’s postsecular voice cuts both ways, both 
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against the irreligious who are suspicious of Christianity and the religious who naively accept a 
distorted version of Christianity.  
In the “Foreword” to Ellen Davis’ agrarian reading of the Bible, Berry lays out a 
conceptual framework that one will need if they are to turn seriously to the Bible and Christian 
tradition as a source which has something to say about humanity’s relationship to the earth; he 
writes: “[T]he Bible is not a book only about ‘spirituality’ or getting to Heaven, but is also a 
practical book about the good use of land and creatures as a religious practice, and about the 
abuse of land and creatures as a kind of blasphemy.”447 Note Berry’s “this-worldly” theology—
or “modest materialism”—in which theology is never divorced from real world application, 
abstract thought never severed from practice. Here again Berry avoids anthropocentric 
inclinations by denying that humanity is the sole focus of Scripture while the created world is 
only of marginal importance.  Berry also does not simply flip the dichotomy by making 
humankind peripheral to the creation; rather, he suggests that humanity and creation are 
inextricably linked to each other in a complex ecological and symbiotic relationship.  What 
Scripture gives us when we look at it holistically, Berry continues, is “a story and a discourse 
about the connection of a people to a place.  This connection is at once urgently religious and 
urgently practical.”448 As we will notice in Berry’s fictional world of Jayber Crow, Christianity 
provides one way to reenchant the world in a secular age and one framework for articulating how 
humans might understand themselves to be embedded participants in the world’s mysterious, 
given life rather than those whose stance to the world is marked by control and mastery. 
Yet the Bible’s call to mastery over the world bears further attention. Berry argues that a 
proper understanding of the call to be stewards who exercise dominion and mastery over the 
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creation implies, at base, that the created world is something inherently good and given. As a 
steward, humanity is not the source of the world’s goodness, but only charged with caring for it 
in a way that is responsible. As we saw with Wiman, such language is loaded. We respond not 
only to the communicative reality of non-human things, but also, Berry suggests, to the source 
who first communicated them into existence.  
Berry acknowledges that the earth’s goodness needs to be the starting point for any good 
Christian ecological thinking, but this goodness again is not an anthropocentric construction. The 
earth is not good, Berry notes, because humans deem it to be. Rather, in the Christian framework 
from which Berry operates, the earth’s goodness is part of its relationship to its Creator: 
The ecological teaching of the Bible is simply inescapable: God made the world because 
He wanted it made. He thinks the world is good, and He loves it. It is His world; He has 
never relinquished title to it. And He has never revoked the conditions, bearing on His 
gift to us of the use of it that oblige us to take excellent care of it. If God loves the world, 
then how might any person of faith be excused for not loving it or justified in destroying 
it?449 
Because the concept of God and his declaration that the earth is “good” transcends any human 
construction of goodness, human responsibility to the world in this framing is a participation in a 
relationship between God and the world that precedes and includes humans. Ellen Davis 
provides unique insight into a “this-worldly” theology that makes sense of the cultural mandate 
in a secular age of contested belief in her chapter “Seeing with God: Israel’s Poem of Creation.”  
Davis translates the mandate from the original Hebrew as follows: “Be fruitful and multiply; fill 
the earth and conquer it and exercise mastery among the fish of the sea and among the birds of 
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the sky and among every animal that creeps on the earth.”450 Davis points out that the translation 
of “mastery” rather than “dominion” is more accurate since the Hebrew verb is “not ‘to rule’; the 
word actually denotes the travelling around of the shepherd with his flock. Thus, the language of 
Genesis 1 acknowledges the unique power of Homo sapiens, yet without separating us from the 
other creatures.”451 The ecological crisis, Davis argues as preface to her study, is ultimately a 
moral problem facing humans before it is anything else. Yet it only becomes moral if we 
understand ourselves to be apart from and a part of the natural world: humans are indeed 
composed of the same stuff as the soil, but they are also unlike any other thing in having a 
freedom and capacity to act creatively or destructively.452  
  In addition, this cultural mandate does not give primacy to humankind as the focal point 
of the Creator-Creature-Creation dynamic. Drawing upon a Medieval understanding of the 
cosmos as something harmoniously ordered, Davis points out that “[t]he earth and God are both 
centers, and the axis connecting them is the Chain of Being.”453 Humanity, therefore, must 
observe their calling “to master” the world in a way that conforms to the patterns of the ordered 
creation of which we are a part. In Berry’s fiction, as we will see, this ordered cosmos of the 
Medieval (premodern) imagination continues to animate his vision of re-enchantment 
 
Contra the Materialists: Science and Wonder 
Berry’s most articulate critique of the myth of disenchantment comes in his collection 
Life is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition (2000). Written as an extended review 
(and critique) of E.O. Wilson’s Consilience, Berry’s essays extend themes he had already begun 
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to explore in The Unsettling of America several decades earlier. The importance of this 
collection, for my purposes, is first that it precedes the publication of Jayber Crow (2001) by 
only one year and thus proves helpful in illuminating what ideas and themes Berry was wrestling 
with while also working through them in fiction. Second, this collection provides Berry’s most 
explicit treatment of what a post-Enlightenment disenchantment has meant for how we imagine 
the world and, consequently, our place in it. Berry provides a Christian postsecular option for re-
enchantment. And it helps to see how Berry does so in opposition to a dominant form of post-
Enlightenment thought that continues to pit religion against science, faith against reason. By 
trusting so completely in the powers of human reason, Berry warns, we not only elevate 
humanity in dangerous ways, but denigrate the material world by forgetting that the world’s 
complexity will always elude our understanding and its life (in which we participate) is of the 
utmost mysteries that should humble us. 
From the title of the collection, Berry indicates that the Modern world in all its supposed 
enlightenment is still subject to superstition. Like Adorno, Horkheimer, Midgley, and Taylor,454 
Berry refuses to see the Enlightened as living in some mythless, or irreligious realm. While 
religion and mythology are not synonymous, as overarching narratives that help us make sense 
of who we are and our place in the world there is important overlap. Therefore Berry’s fear is apt 
when he notes: “Whatever proposes to invalidate or abolish religion (and this is what consilience 
pretty openly proposes) is in fact attempting to put itself in religion’s place.”455 The peculiarly 
modern superstition of E.O. Wilson is this faith in the omnicompetence of the scientific method 
and the optimism that this knowledge, applied to new technologies will save us from the 
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drudgery of creaturely limits. Yet Berry, in a passage that sounds reminiscent of Weber’s 
discussion of disenchantment, warns that “Science can function as religion only by making two 
unscientific claims: that it will eventually know everything, and that it will eventually solve all 
human problems.”456 
As he often does, Berry relies on the historical tradition of Western literature and thought 
to counter Wilson. He begins his essay by unpacking several lines from Shakespeare’s King 
Lear. What fascinates Berry is the character of Gloucester, the old earl “who, like Lear, is guilty 
of hubris or presumption, of treating life as knowable, predictable, and within his control.”457 In 
Berry’s rather strategic reading, Gloucester becomes a stand-in for the disenchanted man. 
Gloucester is, fittingly, blinded and unknowingly led by his exiled son, Edgar, to a cliff top 
where he renounces his life and seeks to bring about its end. Unable to see that the drop his son 
led him to is only a few feet, Gloucester survives his attempted suicide, recovers, and finds 
Edgar his son at hand. Edgar, revealing himself to his father, says “Thy life’s a miracle. Speak 
yet again.”458 Berry uses this text as a jumping off point to explore how humans “can give up on 
life by presuming to ‘understand’ it—that is by reducing it to the terms of our understanding and 
treating it as predictable or mechanical.”459 Gloucester as embodiment of the disenchanted man, 
Berry argues, reveals to us a destructive death drive under our pretenses of control and 
domination and absolute knowledge.  In “The Way of Ignorance,” an essay written several years 
later, Berry develops this theme further, reacting against Richard Dawkins’s assertion that “our 
brains are big enough to see into the future and plot long-term consequences.” Berry argues that 
this post-Enlightenment attitude is “a superstition of the most primitive sort. We recognize it also 
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as our old friend hubris, ungodly ignorance disguised as godly arrogance.”460 In a sly way, Berry 
has turned the tables on Francis Bacon, one of E.O. Wilson’s Enlightenment heroes. The idols of 
the theater that inhibited serious thinking turn out, according to Berry, merely to be another form 
of idols. There is superstition all the way down. But rather than try to claim access to some 
objective, universal truth as other Christian reactionaries do.461 Berry goes another direction, one 
that we have seen Wiman traverse: the way of ignorance.  
While Berry promotes a certain “way of ignorance,” he is clear to note that the 
particularly “modern” forms of ignorance—ones that have proven so destructive in the 
Anthropocene—are deeply indebted to the post-Enlightenment myth of disenchantment:  
There are several kinds of ignorance that are not inherent in our nature but come instead 
from weakness of character. Paramount among these is the willful ignorance that refuses 
to honor as knowledge anything not subject to empirical proof. We could just as well call 
it materialist ignorance. This ignorance rejects useful knowledge such as traditions of 
imagination and religion, and so it comes across as narrow-mindedness. We have the 
materialist culture that afflicts us now because a world exclusively material is the kind of 
world most readily used and abused by the kind of mind the materialists think they have. 
To this kind of mind, there is no longer a legitimate wonder. Wonder has been replaced 
by a research agenda, which is still a world away from demonstrating the impropriety of 
wonder.462 
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The “arrogant ignorance” Berry refers to here aligns with the various aspects of the “myth of 
disenchantment” unpacked in the first chapter. Such arrogant boasts about our power to “know” 
are limited to what can be known to human senses and reason and the parts of the world that are 
quantifiable. In such a narrative, religion and imagination are relegated to the margins. 
 “To treat life as mechanical or predictable or understandable,” Berry argues, “is to reduce 
it.”463 On the surface, this sounds rather absurd: a lot of good has indeed come from treating life 
in this way. Understanding genetics to diets to animals as “systems” that are both understandable 
(within limits, of course) and largely predictable is a rather important accomplishment and 
treating the earth this way has not merely reduced it, but amplified it.464 The rhetoric here reveals 
a problem, noted by critics, in how often Berry’s thinking creates two (rather reductive) extremes 
that usually rely on unhelpful caricature. For example, in multiple places Berry (drawing on the 
thought of his teacher Wallace Stegner) classifies all Americans as either “Boomers” or 
“Stickers.”465 Alan Jacobs criticizes Berry’s  “binary code,” arguing “it’s useless—it’s worse 
than useless—it’s simplistic and uncharitable.”466 In a similar fashion, Berry’s “binary code” of 
the arrogance of modern “superstitious” science versus the religious “way of ignorance” might 
also seem reductive, useless, simplistic, and even uncharitable. Jeffrey Bilbro explains this rather 
frustrating aspect in Berry’s writing, arguing that his “binaries are a rhetorical form that can 
prophetically pry open the too narrow codes in which we buffer ourselves from complex 
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reality.”467 In other words, by making such stark contrasts, Berry is not ignoring the particulars—
in fact, Berry’s call for loving care in the world is precisely to be attentive to particulars—but 
rather Berry is helping us to see clearly what is at stake with the assumptions that undergird a 
disenchanted mythology.   
If we take Bilbro’s reading of Berry’s binaries seriously, the arguably caricatured 
materialist scientist remains instructive as a “type” that might take on various manifestations in 
the modern world, yet no matter the particular nuances of their character, they remain beholden 
to the myth of disenchantment, which for Berry will eventually lead to a destructive stance 
against the world. In his early career, even Berry has admitted that he was not immune from the 
pull of these cultural forces. In many ways, he was the “boomer” chasing career opportunities in 
New York and abroad. While he was achieving success by modern standards, Berry also realized 
he was becoming placeless, the type of buffered, modern man that is home everywhere and 
nowhere.468 
 For Berry, achieving a home in the world starts at the level of perception and moves to 
the very things we create. “We treat people, places, and things,” Berry warns, “in accordance 
with the way we perceive them.”469 And Berry’s biggest fear is that the modern world’s 
perceptions are often filtered by the myth disenchantment: 
The reclassification of the world from creature to machine must involve at least a 
perilous reduction of moral complexity. So must the shift in our attitude toward the 
creation from reverence to understanding. So much the shift in our perceived relationship 
 
 467 Jeffrey Bilbro, “Humility,” Virtues of Renewal: Wendell Berry’s Sustainable Forms (Louisville: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2019), 75.  
 468 Berry tells this story in multiple essays but see both “The Long-Legged House” and “A Native Hill” in 
The Long-Legged House: Essays (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 20102). 
 469 Life is a Miracle, 88. 
 188 
to nature from that of steward to that of absolute owner, manager, and engineer. So even 
must our permutation of “holy” to “holistic.”470 
The ecological dimensions to this are apparent: “The widespread belief that creatures are 
machines obviously makes it difficult to form an advocacy for creatures against machines.”471  
For Berry, the ecological moral failure of the Anthropocene is embedded in a whole way 
of life—a “myth we live by”—that shapes perceptions, informs language, and ultimately 
circumscribes practices and cultural artefacts. In postwar, industrialized America, Berry realizes 
how deeply embedded the “modern superstition” has become in the American way of life. Berry 
calls this “not ‘science’ but ‘science-technology-and-industry’.”472 It is the full manifestation of 
the Anthropocene. For Berry, these three have combined in Western culture in a potent 
concoction that often alienates humans from nature and one another: “Science-technology-and-
industry has enabled us to be precise (apparently) in describing objects that are extremely small 
and near or extremely large and far away. It has failed utterly to provide us with even adequate 
descriptions of the places and communities we live in—probably because it cannot do so.”473 
And it cannot do so, he suggests, because the very nature of science is its reliance upon 
“abstraction,” the “tendency to allow the particular to be absorbed or obscured by the general. 
[…] Having been classified, dissected, and explained, the creature has disappeared into its class, 
anatomy, and explanation.”474 This is not a fault of science per se, but the danger comes when 
scientific truths becomes “the hard cash of the modern economy”475 and we forget that the very 
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mysterious miracle of life that supersedes scientific knowledge is the heart of the oikos, the 
household around which all economic and ecological thought depends. 
On the surface, Life is a Miracle seems to make Berry just another proponent of the 
conflict between religion and science. But in Berry’s essay he is clear that he is “not of course 
proposing an end to science and other intellectual disciplines but rather a change of standards 
and goals.”476 Berry argues that the standards for human behaviour (particularly in terms of how 
we use the natural world) must come “not from the capability of technology, but from the nature 
of places and communities. We must shift the priority from production to local adaptation, from 
innovation to familiairity, from power to elegance, from costliness to thrift.”477  This actually 
addresses his notion of work that contrasted that of the early American settlers. To see nature as 
a standing reserve of commodities reduces the world and degrades work and opens it up to the 
desecration of nature, turning it into a place hostile to human dwelling.  But if people work in 
ways that desire to see the world become a home, such a change might, Berry concludes, “make 
our work an answer to despair.”478 
 Berry’s call to caring, local work does not simply focus on human exceptionalism 
without addressing the nature of the material world of which they are apart. To do this is to allow 
a theological vision that champions work but destroys the very life of this world. Therefore, 
Berry’s distinct call to work is intimately associated with his postsecular, Christian vision of a 
material world that is “mysterious” along the sacramental lines noted above. Re-enchanting 
reality in such a way is what, for Berry, properly frames human work in the world. It does not 
negate it but gives it the context in which it becomes home-making work.  In Life is a Miracle, 
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Berry starts to tease out some of the ways in which the world might be reimagined in ways that 
challenge post-Enlightenment reductions. In a passage reminiscent of writing by both Wiman 
and Robinson, Berry claims that reality is never something that our science will fully understand; 
rather, reality is always characterized by a more-ness and plenitude. It always eludes a human’s 
intellectual understanding, control, and language:  
When I try to make my language more particular, I see that the life of the place is always 
emerging beyond expectation or prediction or typicality, that it is unique, given to the 
world minute by minute, only once, never to be repeated. And then is when I see that this 
life is a miracle, absolutely worth having, absolutely worth saving.479 
Berry is not denying the power or significance of science; rather, he is attempting to reframe it 
within the boundaries of a religious discourse that, he believes, more satisfactorily accounts for 
mystery and ignorance and, thus, might lend itself to a posture of humility and restraint. 
“Religious faith,” Berry argues, “is a way of knowing things that cannot otherwise be known.”480 
The way beyond the conflict, Berry argues, is when “Religion [does] not attempt to dispute what 
science has actually proved; and science [does] not claim to know what it does not know.”481  
To be sure, Berry is under no illusion that, in the secular age, his vision of the world will 
be accepted or remain uncontested, particularly his desire to see more openness to religion and 
imagination. Nevertheless, he offers a version of re-enchantment deeply indebted to a “biblical 
religion that is explicitly against reductionism.”482 What Berry means here by reductionism is a 
world shorn of mystery, a world in which God is either non-existent (a secular materialist claim) 
or detached (Deistic, gnostic claim). Berry’s vision keeps the possibility that all flesh lives by the 
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spirit and breath of God (Job 34:14-15). We ‘live, and move, and have our being’ in God (Acts 
17:28).”483  
According to Berry science can never prove, unequivocally, this mysterious dimension to 
reality. It must be believed and held on to as a narrative—or myth—that can helps us work in the 
world and, thus, make it a home. In “Health is Membership,” Berry clarifies that it is through 
such a narrative that our home-making work receives its ultimate model. In this myth of re-
enchantment, God is not some Deistic form of energy, but rather he attends to the world with a 
deeply felt affection and love and, thus, all human work is an invitation to participate in this 
ongoing work: 
I believe that the world was created and approved by love, that it subsists, coheres, and 
endures by love, and that, insofar as it is redeemable, it can be redeemed only by love. I 
believe that divine love, incarnate and indwelling in the world, summons the world 
always toward wholeness, which ultimately is reconciliation and atonement with God.484 
Berry’s fictional narrator, Jayber Crow, will have a vision of the world that echoes this 
sentiment, and it precedes his entrance into an ecological way of life and work. Indeed, Berry’s 
repeated call to do good, healing work in the earth is almost always connected to his bigger 
vision of a reenchanted cosmos that is created and sustained by a loving God. For Berry, one can 
obviously have one (good work) without the other (perception of the world as God’s good 
creation). Indeed, Berry has even noted that “whether we consider it from a religious point of 
view or from the point of view of our merely practical wish to continue to live, we cannot 
exempt use from care.”485 And to recover a way of living that is defined by care, Berry argues, 
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would be to “reclaim and revalidate the ground of our moral and religious tradition” since “what 
we have traditionally called ‘sins’ are wrong not because they are forbidden but because they 
divide us from our neighbours, from the world, and ultimately from God.”486 Berry’s hope is that 
by recovering a this-worldly theological vision of re-enchantment, he both works within his 
native religious tradition and offers a compelling vision of a healthy relationship to the world 
that might intrigue or challenge or haunt atheistic materialists as well as gnostic Christians. And 
it is precisely in this precarious “middle” position between belief and unbelief that marks 
postsecular protagonists like Jayber Crow.  
 
Jayber Crow: Making a Home in the World 
 Jayber Crow is a story told as a first-person perspective through Jayber’s eyes. He is an 
old man at the time of the telling and the novel is written as a series of memories about his past. 
Wendell Berry employs such narrative voices often in his fiction and it allows him to show how 
significant remembering is for membership, which is the key to both Berry’s ecological and 
theological vision. Understanding that we are not detached or alienated— “disembedded” to use 
Taylor’s term—from the world helps one perceive the world as a home (oikos) and, in turn, 
undertake the good work of making it a home. However, as good as this home might be, Berry 
also wants us to understand that the home is broken, marred by the moral evil of individuals and 
structures that will turn the garden into a wasteland. For this reason, even the person fortunate 
enough to find a membership in this world will always only be a pilgrim, passing through.  
Berry’s own life is a testament to this desire for, what he calls, “convocation,” which is 
both the fact and the process of becoming a member, held together by bonds of affection that are 
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at once “religious, ecological, and communal.”487 In “The Long-Legged House, one of Berry’s 
earliest essays,”488 he traces his own “home coming” to Port Royal Kentucky after a successful 
university career launched him into a mobile life that brought him and his wife Tanya to New 
York City and Europe for teaching and writing work. In many ways, Berry had “made it” but 
only at the cost of severing him from the various dependencies he had to his native land, people, 
and religion. By returning to his native land, Berry not only answered a call he felt in his life, but 
became the type of regional writer who is an active participant rather than a detached observer. 
In a similar fashion, the form that Jayber Crow’s life takes is ultimately that of a 
pilgrim’s homecoming. Jayber begins his journey wandering, homeless and placeless, but in the 
course of his life he learns how to dwell ecologically, becoming an integral part of a membership 
tied to land and community and loving, careful work. 
 Jayber’s original name is Jonah, an allusion to the Biblical prophet who, as the story 
goes, refuses to obey God’s order to bring a warning to Nineveh. Rather than go, Jonah runs 
away from home and from God. In the novel, Jonah Crow loses both of his parents and is taken 
in by a neighbour couple who also eventually die while Jonah is young. After being sent to “The 
Good Shepherd,” an orphanage marked by the severing of the most basic natural familial bonds, 
the superintendent remarks: “Mr. Crow, since I believe you have not yet found your way to 
Nineveh, I will call you J.”489 “We were thus not quite nameless,” Jayber remembers, “but also 
not quite named” and “the effect was curious [...] we became in some way faceless to ourselves 
and to one another.”490 The erasure of his name is connected to his displacement and lack of 
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membership; as a child, Jayber remembers, he would “walk around saying [his] name to 
[himself]—'Jonah Crow, Jonah Crow’—until it seemed that it could never have belonged to me 
or to anybody else.”491 As Jayber reflects on this time in his life, he notes how this displacement 
and disconnection brought about a diseased form of life: “I was scared and out of place and (as I 
now see) odd. Not just lonely, but solitary, living as much as I could in secret, looking about, 
seeing much, revealing little.”492 But even as a child, Jayber remembers the longing he felt by 
being able to empathize with another nameless orphan, E. Lawler, who arrives at The Good 
Shepherd when she is about seven years old. Jayber recalls that she kept herself apart, like he 
did, from the group because “she was waiting” but he did not understand for what until “one day 
as her classmates were joining hands to play some sort of game, one of the girls broke the circle. 
She held out her hand to the newcomer to beckon her in.”493 What E. Lawler receives, and what 
Jayber longs for, is the welcome into fellowship with a community in which one belongs. And 
Jayber realizes that one of his own deepest longings is to find this place: 
I never quite felt that I was somewhere I wanted to be. Where I wanted to be, always, day 
in and day out, year in and year out, was Squires Landing and all that fall of country 
between Port William up on the ridge and the river between Sand Ripple and Willow 
Run. When I heard or read the word home, that patch of country was what I thought of. 
Home was one of the words I wrote in my tablet.494  
 For Jayber, though, such membership does not come easily and before he learns to dwell 
ecologically, his journey takes him into both a Christian and non-Christian community that both 
suffer from the adverse effect of a disembodied, excarnational form of life. From The Good 
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Shepherd, Jayber leaves to go to seminary in Pigeonville College after feeling the call to be a 
preacher. Jayber already notes his uneasiness with The Good Shepherd and its attempt to be a 
“world unto itself.”495 Although Jayber admits he cannot imagine a better way to run an 
orphanage, like Berry himself, he becomes suspicious of the people who choose to inhabit 
institutions and organizations, particularly Christian organizations, that are severed from the 
larger community of those who do not share their beliefs. Jayber transfers this wariness to the 
seminary of Pigeonville which has a “pious atmosphere” that makes him unsettled and “long for 
the open countryside and flowing streams.”496 This atmosphere, Jayber recalls, was “soapy and 
paperish and shut-in and a little stale. It didn’t smell of anything bodily or earthly. […] It made 
me feel excluded from it, even while I was in it.”497 As I mentioned earlier, this is precisely the 
“excarnational” otherworldly theology of gnostic Christianity that Berry finds so troubling and, 
as I showed in Chapter 1, is a particularly post-Enlightenment theology beholden to the myth of 
disenchantment. The “rift” this creates between body and soul, earth and heaven, matter and 
spirit is, for Jayber, the source of unease. He can’t abide his seminary training because 
“everything bad was laid on the body, and everything good was credited to the soul”; Jayber sees 
it “the other way around.”498 
 But more than this, Jayber gets to a moment of what Charles Taylor calls secular “cross 
pressure,” when he starts to doubt the faith in which he’s raised. Much of the Christian teaching 
and reading of Scriptures troubles him. As he studies to become a preacher, he is haunted by 
doubts, particularly around questions of love and embodiment:  
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I couldn’t open a Bible without setting of a great jangling and wrangling of questions that 
almost deafened me. If we are to understand the Bible as literally true, why are we 
permitted to hate our enemies? […] And what about our bodies that always seemed to 
come off so badly in every contest with our soul? Did Jesus put on our flesh so that we 
might despise it?499 
Jayber’s questioning and doubting here is precisely how Taylor speaks about the cross-pressured 
nature of the secular age. It does not negate his faith, but changes it. Jayber, who at this point is 
still Jonah, even contemplates if his namesake in Scripture might be a helpful touchstone for 
making sense of the doubts that plague his “calling” to be a pastor and irrevocably shape his this-
worldly focus. He wonders if “there [are] some things He [God] wants us to learn that we can’t 
learn except by falling into the abyss?”500 The language here is reminiscent of Wiman, too, 
whose journey to the edge of the “bright abyss” brings him into a renewed appreciation and love 
for a material world charged with God’s presence. Of course, Jayber is not there in his journey 
yet; in fact, he compares himself to Dante at the start of his life-altering descent into the abyss of 
the inferno, land notes: “I could feel myself being changed—into what, I had no idea. […] I was 
a lost traveler wandering in the woods, needing to be on my way somewhere but not knowing 
where.”501  
The final straw for Jayber in his seminary degree occurs when he talks to his professor, 
Dr. Ardmire,502 about prayer and wonders how we ever know the efficacy of a prayer if there is 
never any “proof.” Whether or not a prayer to an unseen God achieves anything is largely 
outside the bounds of empirical proof. The young, cross-pressured Jayber meets a point of 
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fragilization, in which his childhood faith does not hold up to the scrutiny of reason. Jayber feels 
like his whole world has collapsed, and the “call” he had felt to become a preacher was an 
illusion. However, his professor comforts him by suggesting to Jayber that “you have been given 
questions to which you cannot be given answers. You will have to live them out—perhaps a little 
at a time.”503 As becomes clear, Jayber’s professor is noting that the most important form that 
theological understanding takes is a human life. The truth Jayber is after will not be found in 
abstract, theological propositions, but in a life well lived. 
 Yet it takes him some time to find that life. After leaving seminary, Jayber winds up 
wandering through Lexington and taking literature classes as he’s able while working as a Barber 
on the side to create a small “nest egg”504 of savings. The university becomes a place that 
introduces Jayber to the greater tradition of which he is a part; however, the university is also a 
place marked by the same detachment and displacement that so marred seminary for Jayber. 
While the theologies of excarnation marred theology for Jayber, the university with its “aloof”505 
professors equally marred learning. Jayber and the teachers who introduce him to the tradition 
have no communal relationship. There is no fellowship of belonging. And while the professors 
do ignite Jayber’s wonder and respect, there is something also coldly transactional and utilitarian 
about the exchange. The university, representative for Jayber of the world of the future (which 
would be the late twentieth century) was “preparing people from the world of the past for the 
world of the future, but what was missing was the world of the present, where evert body was 
living its small, short, surprising, miserable, wonderful, blessed, damage, only life.”506 In this 
state of directionless wandering and disembededness from life, Jayber realizes how much of the 
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forces of modern, secular life—manifest in the church and in the school—champion a life that is 
ultimately marked by dis-ease. Before Jayber begins his homeward journey, he has an epiphany 
about the modern man he has become: 
I seemed to have come from nowhere. Without a loved life to live, I was becoming more 
and more a theoretical person, as if I might have been a figment of institutional self-
justification: a theoretical ignorant person from the sticks, who one day would go to a 
theoretical somewhere and make a theoretical something of himself—the implication 
being that until he became that something he would be nothing.507 
Swimming against the cultural currents Jayber feels a “motion of the heart toward [his] 
origins”508 and begins his journey back to Port William. Jayber’s desire to “move” is one of 
desire, one of love. This becomes significant not simply for his need to become a member of the 
Port William community (which he does) but also an ecological member of the earth. Such a 
membership, as Berry noted in his Jefferson lecture, “all turns on affection.”509 
Jayber’s homecoming is prefaced by a flood that becomes symbolic of a watery new birth 
both for the landscape and for Jayber. As Jayber floats along the river he sees the entire 
countryside being unmade, houses are toppling, and debris is scattered all across the water as it 
surges. In the midst of this, Jayber’s memory recalls the opening lines of Genesis and the 
creation account and through his experience Jayber finally comes to a new form of knowledge, 
or a new understanding of his childhood faith, concerning how the material world is enchanted 
by the creative spirit of God; Jayber recalls his epiphany: 
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And this is what it was like—the words were just right there in my mind, and I knew they 
were true: “the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the 
deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.” I’m not sure that I can 
tell you what was happening to me then, or what I know even now. At the time I surely 
wasn’t trying to tell myself. But after all my years of reading in the a book and hearing it 
read and believing and disbelieving it, I seemed to have wandered my way back to the 
beginning—not just of the book, but of the world—and all the rest was yet to come. I felt 
knowledge crawl over my skin.510  
Berry renders Jayber’s homeward journey in terms that concern his understanding of the Bible 
and his understanding of the material world. As a particularly postsecular protagonist, Jayber’s 
story is one marked by believing and disbelieving and, as readers, we are also left to puzzle out 
whether or not Jayber’s experience is true or simply the fevered imaginings of a man steeped in 
Biblical traditions. Once Jayber is rescued from the chaos of the flood—the Genesis “waste and 
void”511 of a pre-ordered creation—he is welcomed as a refugee into Port William where it 
becomes clear that he and the others with him are not “just a helpless, aimless mob of strays, but 
people were there who were in charge.”512 This realization becomes a profoundly important 
insight for Jayber as he sees the ordering love of humans at work bringing healing in the midst of 
destruction, direction in the midst of aimlessness, welcome in the midst of alienation. And as 
Jayber begins to sense that his own longings as a detached, wandering, “aloof” young man are 
starting to be met here, he again has a poignant reflection on why this good work of the Port 
William community is connected to a world enchanted along Christian lines. By being unsettled 
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by his alienation and disconnection from his home, Jayber becomes a version of what Taylor 
calls the “porous” self, open to the possibility of a material reality that is enchanted by God’s 
ongoing presence: 
I knew that the Spirit that had gone forth to shape the world and make it live was still 
alive in it. I just had no doubt. I could see that I lived in the created world, and it was still 
being created. I would be part of it forever. There was no escape. The Spirit that made it 
was in it, shaping it and reshaping it, sometimes lying at rest, sometimes standing up and 
shaking itself, like a muddy horse, and letting the pieces fly. [emphasis added] 513  
Jayber’s entrance into the membership of Port William is a case study in how one belongs to the 
earth and to a community in healthy and healing ways.  
Berry’s postsecular vision of a re-enchanted world still tasks humans with the 
responsibilities of good, stewardly work, but also relieves them of the burden—one poignantly 
felt in the Anthropocene—that the entire material world depends solely on them. This is not to 
say that bad human work will not destroy the world, perhaps even in irrevocable ways. Berry 
makes it very clear that our work has this destructive, desecrating potency throughout his essays 
and in Jayber Crow. He is no naïve optimist. Rather, it is to say that his vision of a world 
enchanted by God’s Spirit who brings and sustains coherence and order in the material world are 
so beyond human comprehension and control that there remains a hope that good human work is 
always the response to an invitation from the ordered world and the God who created it to 
participate. Humans can actively share in this work that precedes and proceeds us and work with 
the grain and within the limits of the created order. If they do not, and choose diseased work, 
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they can struggle against it by their “arrogant ignorance” and seek mastery and control over that 
which ultimately cannot be fully mastered or controlled. 
 In “The Way of Ignorance,” Berry argues that it is indeed the “arrogant ignorance” of the 
modern world that presumes it knows enough to accomplish its narrow ends and foresee and 
control all outcomes.514 Berry’s “way” of ignorance (which connects to his “way of love”) is for 
a humbled ignorance that realizes our actions in the world have consequences for indeterminate 
generations to come: “Adam was the first, but not the last,, to choose for the whole human 
race.”515 Yet humble ignorance does not lead to escapism from responsibility. There is no real 
choice between using or not using the land; the question is between good and bad use: “we 
cannot exempt ourselves from use, we must deal with the issues raised by use.”516 What is 
needed is an artful approach to the sacred earth, “practices that sustain life by connecting us 
conservingly to our places and our world, the art of keeping tied all the strands in the living 
network that sustains us.”517 Work becomes the practical embodiment of a theological vision of a 
good yet broken world that requires faithful, careful, attentive labour to bring about health not 
only of humans, but of all living creatures that have been “given” to humans to care for. 
 “For Berry,” Kimberly Smith argues, “labor is morally significant not because it creates 
wealth but because labor is our primary means of relating to the physical and social world: it 
mediates our relationship to nature (by working the land) and to our community (to the extent we 
work together or for each other).518 Berry argues that this work of stewardship over the earth 
creates a “predicament” because we are forced into using gifts that we do not fully understand. 
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Jeffrey Bilbro notes that what undergirds Berry’s vision, and helps us make sense of this 
predicament, is that human affection and desire, human love, is something that makes good, 
responsible work possible: “Love for the life and health of a holy world naturally leads us to 
imagine how we can participate in healing broken places and preserving abundant life.”519 
Bilbro’s words are particularly helpful in making sense of the uneasiness that faces the 
Anthropocene. Because beneath the malaise that characterizes our late modern world is a desire 
to see the world not as it currently is, but in a healthier form that we imagine. Whether or not we 
believe fully realizing this image is ever possible is beside the point here. Berry’s argument is 
that when we love a place and, in time, belong to it as it belongs to us, we can start to respond to 
the land’s needs by love. In “People, Land, and Community” Berry lays out this theme (which is 
found in so many of his essays and novels and poems) quite explicitly:  
When one buys a farm and moves there to live, something different begins. Thoughts 
begin to be translated into acts. One’s work may be defined in part by one’s visions, but it 
is defined in part too by problems, which the work leads to and reveals. And daily life, 
work, and problems alter the visions. It invariably turns out, I think, that one’s first vision 
of one’s place was to some extent an imposition on it. But if one’s sight is clear and if 
one stays on and works well, one’s love gradually responds to the place as it really is, and 
one’s vision gradually image possibilities that are really in it. Vision, possibility, work, 
and life—all have changed by mutual correction. One works to better purpose then and 
makes fewer mistakes, because at last one sees where one is.520 
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Jayber’s story is, ultimately, about learning to see where he is and learning how to work and live 
and love as a responsible member of the broken Port William community.  
 Jayber takes up his role as a barber in the community and, with the help of Burley 
Coulter, gets set up as a rather precarious member of the community who is always on the 
margins with one foot in and one foot out. This choice of narrator, at least for this story of the 
Port William community, allows Berry to survey a range of different members and criticize and 
evaluate their work. While there are numerous members one could pay attention to, the two most 
instructive examples of work done well and work done poorly are Athey Keith and his son-in-
law, Troy Chatham. Through these characters Jayber begins to understand what it looks like to 
dwell humbly and healthily as an ecological being and, conversely, what it looks like to live into 
the modern mythologies of placeless, autonomous, limitless, economic and technological man. 
 Athey Keith, named after the Greek notion of wisdom, is Berry’s image of the ideal 
farmer who over the course of his life learns precisely how to work with and for the material 
world. As Jayber recalls the farm of Athey, he notes a few things that reveal the type of artful 
good work Berry considers necessary for the ongoing survival of the world: 
Athey Keith was one of the best farmers in the Port William neighborhood in his 
time.  […] Everything on his place, including the crops and animals, was well kept and 
looked good. For Athey would have it no other way. 
Athey used his land conservatively. In any year, by far the greatest part of his land 
would be under grass – for, as he would say, “The land slopes even in the bottoms, and the 
water runs.”  He was always studying his fields, thinking of ways to protect them. He was 
doing what a lot of farmers say they want to do: he was improving his land; he was going 
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to leave it better than he had found it.  […] “Wherever I look,” he said, “I want to see more 
than I need, and have more than I use.”  
Athey logged the woodlands on the main tract only for firewood and the posts and 
lumber he needed on the place. The woods beyond the branch he never used at all. This 
was maybe the finest stand of trees in our part of the country, and Athey was proud of it. 
He protected it from timber buyers by asking considerably more for it than its market 
value. As long as he could make a living farming, that patch of timber would always be 
worth more to him than to them. 
Athey was not exactly, or not only, what is called a “landowner.” He was the 
farm’s farmer, but also its creature and belonging. He lived its life, and it lived his; he 
knew that, of the two lives, his was meant to be the smaller and the shorter.521 
For Athey, the household of the earth becomes his dwelling. He understands his life as one that 
is completely interdependent upon it and humbly acknowledges that his life is small in relation to 
the world that will outlast him. Athey uses the land, but within healthy limits that allow it to 
remain healthy and productive as a resource he and future generations can come to again and 
again. He is also a protector and a keeper of the land, leaving some of it wild and refusing to sell 
it to the highest bidder because he knows that such an economic gain would, ultimately, be a loss 
for the household or oikois, an economic loss. By his careful, attentive work, Athey’s wise use of 
the land allows him both delight and sustenance as he carefully cultivates his place to be a source 
of abundance. 
 In sharp contrast, Berry depicts Athey’s son-in-law Troy, named aptly after a city that 
falls due to infidelity (a corrupted form of love). Jayber notes that they “were different, almost 
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opposite, kinds of men,”522 which the story bears out as Troy begins to farm and becomes the 
embodiment of a man seemingly captivated by the myth of disenchantment and who orders his 
life along its basic premises of what the world is and how he ought to relate to it. Jayber takes an 
almost immediate dislike to Troy, even when Troy is a cocky young boy who is arrogant and 
selfish.523 Troy eventually marries Mattie Chatham (Daughter of Athey Keith) and they move to 
one of Athey’s farms as tenants (stewards, of a sort). Like a Miltonic Satan, Troy works without 
any regards for his creaturely limits or the limits imposed on him by the gift of the land he is to 
work: “ ‘Wherever I look, I want to see more than I need,’ Troy said in effect, ‘Whatever I see, I 
want.”524 It is hardly surprising that Troy, later, is caught by Jayber Crow having an affair 
outside of his marriage. Troy’s character is marked by a desire, an appetite, that is curbed by no 
healthy boundaries. This impulse translates to his use of the land: “What he asked of the land 
was all it had. He had hardly got his first crop in the ground before he began to say things critical 
of Athey and his ways. ‘Why, hell!’ he would say, “’it’s hard to tell what that old place would 
produce if he would just plow it.”525  Troy acts as if he transcends the earth as a disembedded 
self and pursues the technology that will help him employ his dominance and mastery over-and-
against the land. Like Athey, Troy is motivated by desire and imagination; however, his desire is 
for selfish gain rather than service and his imagination is of limitless wealth rather than ongoing 
health with marginal returns. Troy embodies the “new way” of twentieth century farming as 
science-industry-technology in service to a totalizing economy: “The new way of farming was a 
way of dependence, not on land and creatures and neighbors but on machines and fuel and 
chemicals of all sorts, bought things, and on the sellers of bought things—which made it finally a 
 
 522 Ibid, 181. 
 523 Ibid, 135. 
 524 Ibid, 181. 
 525 Ibid. 
 206 
dependence on credit.”526 Troy’s tractors help him work beyond the limits of the sun, into the 
night, and his debt forces him to work beyond the limits of what the land can produce. Rather 
than serving his work and the land through his work, Troy soon has to serve the interest on his 
debt and becomes a wage-slave to a farm that must produce more and grow larger.527  
 As Troy works, Jayber notices that he is embodying an entirely new “way” of being in 
the world, a “way” that I have connected to the myth of disenchantment that detaches individuals 
from one another and from the earth: 
The work of the farm now went on at two different rates of speed and power and 
endurance. It became hard to cooperate, not because cooperation was impossible but 
because the tractor and the teams embodied two different kinds of will, almost two 
different intentions.528 
Athey and Troy represent two imaginations and two desires for the land that are in stark contrast. 
As Jayber finds his uneasy place in the membership of Port William, he needs to learn how to 
grow into the form of life that will bring health or destruction. And in addition to the books he 
has read, he also has to choose between the way of Troy and the way of Athey. And as becomes 
clear, Jayber’s inclusion into a way of love all returns back to his particularly Christian vision of 
a re-enchanted world. That is, his ability to love his place, his community, and Mattie properly as 
a creature are ways that he can participate in a world that is not only sustained by God’s attention 
but also, as Berry argues, God’s enduring love.  
For Jayber, finding a way to dwell ecologically in the world through love centers upon 
the place of Port William and the person of Mattie Keith Chatham, the wife of Troy and the 
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daughter of Athey. In a way that is reminiscent of Dante first meeting the young Beatrice as told 
in Vita Nuova—the New Life—Jayber sees Mattie Keith and is “moved by her prettiness” and 
recalls how her “brief, laughing look that she had given [him] made [him] feel extraordinarily 
seen, as if after that [he] might be visible in the dark.”529 Later Jayber again reflects on Mattie’s 
eyes and smile, remembering that she “was a clear-spirited girl with all her feeling right there in 
her eyes […] and with a good openhearted smile.”530 Again, Berry’s use of Dante as a key 
intertext531 is important, particularly as it introduces a form of Medieval beatific vision common 
in the enchanted Middle Ages. The smile of Beatrice becomes the vehicle by which Dante is 
moved both to a love for Beatrice and to the source of love for which Beatrice is only a 
vehicle.532 Through his journey, Dante learns, paradoxically, that the love he experiences for 
Beatrice—one that is at first erotic, but then allegorical and symbolic—participates in the same 
love that moves the cosmos. Berry, writing in the secular age of the late twentieth century, tries 
to recover a Dantean vision of the world through his wandering pilgrim Jayber.  
Like Dante, Jayber’s love for a woman already married is likely bound to be frustrated or 
become grounds for an affair that would be precisely the limitless freedom Berry believes is so 
destructive not only to marriages but also to the earth.533And indeed, Jayber must slowly 
cultivate his desire to restrain it from such reckless and destructive action. Before he truly falls in 
love with Mattie, Jayber starts to see a young waitress, Clydie where for a couple years they 
meet up for weekend escapes. There is no commitment, and Jayber’s relationship to Clydie is 
free and made possible by his car that allows him to leave Port William for some weekend 
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excitement. Jayber’s relationship with Clydie is associated with his mobility and freedom and it 
provides him a happiness that is not tethered to any real obligation. 
His fling with Clydie ends, however, when one night they are dancing and Jayber sees 
Troy there dancing with another woman other than his wife, Mattie. Troy sees Jayber and “raises 
his hand to [him] with the thumb and forefinger joined in a circle”534 as if he and Jayber had 
some secret pact. Troy’s sign of the circle alludes the infernal rings of hell’s architecture, which, 
later, Jayber recalls again noting the diabolical power of discontentment in one’s given place and 
circumstances: “There is always a better place for a person to live, a better work to do, a better 
spouse to wed, better friends to have. This surely describes one of the circles of Hell, and who 
hasn’t traveled around it a time or two?”535 Jayber understands that Troy’s infidelity to be a 
betrayal of Mattie, yet he also recognizes that perhaps he is not as different from Troy as he 
would like to believe. Sick to his stomach, Jayber escapes from the dance hall and leaves Clydie 
(and eventually his automobile) behind forever.  
After Jayber is “overcome with a love for [Mattie]”536 he still must temper his 
imagination which starts to delude him into caricatures of both Troy’s evil and his own 
worthiness. His disordered imagination fantasizes about escaping with Mattie in his car to be 
“free of all its [i.e. The world’s] claims.”537 Jayber’s car is an important feature of his vision, for 
it represents the “speed and violence” that were the “full expression of [his] love.”538 In a sense, 
Jayber’s image of Mattie parallel Troy’s image of his farm. Both are untethered from the realities 
and limits of the giveness of their place and circumstances; both seek to transcend these real 
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limits into the false imaginations and fantasies of a no place and a no one. However, unlike Troy, 
Jayber realizes his error: “I would have been asking for her life, for the power to change her into 
what could not be foreseen. If I destroyed what already existed, what would I replace it with? For 
something always exists before you get there with your desires and visions…”539 Troy, on the 
other hand, remains “incoherent and obscure within himself […] a wishful thinker. A dreamer. 
His mere dream had led him into the reality of endless work and struggle. […] He was an 
escapee.”540 Realizing this, Jayber starts to become “a man unimaginable to Troy Chatham, a 
man he could not imagine raising his hand to with the thumb and forefinger circled”; yet in order 
to do this, he must also “become a man yet unimaginable to [him]self.”541 Jayber begins to love 
in a way that accepts the given world beyond his own ego. He is not simply able to love and 
manipulate and control the world as a deluded dreamer; rather, he must attend to its giveness and 
respond within its boundaries through a selfless love meant to serve the greater common good, 
even if that means foregoing certain pleasures and happiness in the present.  
Jayber puts aside his delusions, largely because he realizes how hopeless they are, and 
begins to become an interdependent, healthy member of Port William: “I saw myself as I was 
and my circumstances as they were, I loved her more, and more clearly than I did before. I 
became able to imagine her as she was and not as a subject of a dream. […] I seemed to see her 
whole.”542 He then goes on to promise to become the “faithful husband” of Mattie that Troy will 
never be. Jayber’s declaration of a true, healing love here is once again attended by a vision of a 
world enchanted along Christian parameters. Jayber is not the source of meaning and the words 
he speaks and the thoughts he has are held accountable to something other than himself and even 
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other than the Port William membership: “I tremble to say so,” Jayber writes, “but when I had 
given that assent, it seemed that there were watchers watching in the dark who all of a sudden 
could see me.”543 It is no coincidence that Jayber’s sense of being seen here is paralleled to his 
earlier sense of “being seen” by the laughing eyes of Mattie. Berry is revealing here that Jayber’s 
responsibility—his ability to respond—is not simply to one’s place or community (although it is 
that too), but ultimately to the unseen God whose love animates the world and whose Being 
comprehends its creatures.  
While Jayber’s doubts in Christianity remain, and while the Port William “believers” are 
still confronted with otherworldly theologies of excarnation, Jayber starts to understand that his 
own desire to be a committed, loving husband to Mattie (unbeknownst to her) puts him on the 
“way of love.”544 And this love, much like Berry’s own novel, eludes the grasp of utilitarian 
reason: “Love is always more than a little strange. It is not explainable or even justifiable. We do 
not make it. If it did not happen to us, we could not imagine it. […] It is in the world but is not 
altogether of it. It is of eternity. It takes us there when it most holds us here.”545 It does not (or 
should not) draw one away from the world as an escapee but helps one to fix one’s eyes with 
attention and affection to the time and place in which one finds oneself. Jayber’s revelation is 
followed by a return, albeit an uneasy one, to his native faith. After all his wanderings and his 
doubts, Jayber begins to pray the prayer that so troubled him during his seminary days: “Thy 
[God’s] will be done.”546 Jayber notes that “not a single one of my doubts ever left me. They 
had, in fact, got worse.”547 But what I argue is his postsecular condition leads Jayber to 
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appreciate the this-worldly love God has for the physical world, and for particular persons and 
places: “‘God loves Port William as it is,’ I thought, ‘Why else should He want it to be better 
than it is?’”548 
Jayber realizes that Christian preachers, by focusing only on the second part of John 3:16 
(“For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in 
Him should not perish, but have everlasting life”) were fixated on an otherworldly salvation. 
However, Jayber realizes, 
[I]f God loved the world even before the event at Bethlehem, that meant he loved it as it 
was, with all its fault. […] That His love contains all the world does not show that the 
world does not matter, or that He and we do not suffer it unto death; it shows that the world 
is Hell only in part. But his love can contain it only by compassion and mercy which, if not 
Hell entirely, would be at least a crucifixion.549 
Jayber then imagines—and Berry asks his readers to imagine—“God looking down upon [Port 
William], its lives living by His spirit, breathing by His breath, knowing by His light, but each 
life living also inescapably by its own will—His own body given to be broken.”550 Jayber 
remarks that this is his conversion, a typical moment in postsecular narratives: “…there was no 
longer with me any question of what is called “belief.” It was not a “conversion” in the usual 
sense, as thought I had been altogether out and now was altogether in. It was more as though I 
had been in a house and a storm had blown off the roof. […] I had changed, and the sign of it 
was only that my own death now seemed to me by far the least important thing in my life.”551 
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 And death comes, the key moment, Charles Taylor suggests, of fragilization and cross-
pressure in the disenchanted world. It is the limit of the known for creaturely life. Not even 
Jayber’s belief can fully comprehend it. The story of Jayber Crow is filled with death: the death 
of the small town of Port William, the death of the agrarian way of life, and the death of Mattie 
Chatham. All of these things “disintegrate” over the course of the twentieth century that spans 
Jayber’s life. While Wendell Berry’s vision of a re-enchanted world does offer a counter-voice to 
the myth of disenchantment that continues to linger, he is far from naively optimistic that it can 
undo the momentum of an Anthropocene world where industrialized technologies in service to a 
Global economy. Indeed, as Jayber Crow comes to a close the township of Port William is all 
but gone and the Nest Egg—a tract of untouched land—owned by Athey Keith and given to 
Mattie is being logged by Troy as Mattie lies dying in a hospital.  
 The “Nest Egg” was “fifty or so acres of big timber”552 where “everything seemed to 
belong where it was.”553 This is the ordered, coherent material world, uncultivated by man. In 
“Two Economies,” Berry calls this realm of nature the “Kingdom of God” because it “includes 
everything; in it, the fall of every sparrow is a significant event. We are in it whether we know it 
or not and whether we wish to be or not.”554 The “Nest Egg” becomes a place of refuge for both 
Mattie and Jayber in their old age, and it’s a place where, again, the world is rendered to be an 
enchanted, communicative reality: “The place spoke for us and was a kind of speech.”555 Yet 
even this place is not free from the power and “arrogant ignorance” that leads Troy to desecrate 
and destroy it.  
 
 552 Ibid, 344. 
 553 Ibid, 346. 
 554 Wendell Berry, “Two Economies,” Home Economics (New York: North Point, 1987), 186. 
 555 Jayber Crow, 349.  
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 Ultimately, Jayber’s decision to live according to the way of love and to imitate Christ by 
loving particular people and particular places in all their givenness seems futile. Despite all this, 
Jayber still claims “this is a book about Heaven” but he also notes “it has been a close call; Hell 
would be, for Jayber, the failure “to love one another” and “where there is such a groaning 
travail of selfishness in all its forms” that there is nothing but destruction. 556 But Jayber provides 
a postsecular call to continue hoping despite the malaise of our Anthropocene moment, and to 
have faith where understanding fails: “Faith is not necessarily, or not soon, a resting place. Faith 
puts you out on a wide river in a little boat, in the fog, in the dark.”557 In other words, Jayber has 
journeyed to his end and arrived at his beginning, but now sees it more clearly. Like the man in 
the well Jayber talks about, his “belief is a kind of knowledge beyond any way of knowing” that 
challenges the claims of a secular age beholden to a reductionist form of reason. This belief 
urges him to go on loving the creatures all around him in whose life he shares, attentive to their 
needs, responsive to their lives.  
Berry’s vision of a reenchanted world in Jayber Crow urges us to become re-embedded 
in our places, remembering their stories and stewarding the good gifts that they are responsibly 
but not naively. In many ways, the novel is the enactment of the argument Berry makes in Life is 
a Miracle. By attending to the world and living, ironically, into the way of ignorance, Jayber 
suddenly knows himself as a creature who belongs to the membership of Port William. 
Attending carefully to the mysterious and miraculous life upon which all human culture depends, 
Berry’s prose and novels urge us to consider imagining the earth’s wholeness, holiness, and 
health while we undertake the work necessary of making this good earth our home.    
 
 
 556 Ibid, 354. 





Over a year ago, during the completion of this project in fact, my wife and I along with 
our four children (and one Labrador retriever) moved to a small acreage just outside of Hamilton 
in the small farming town of Binbrook. The move in conjunction with the project forced me to 
confront several uncomfortable ironies: How might I care for this tangible, physical place 
through something as abstract as academic work? How could I champion local places while 
writing as a Canadian about American literature? And of course: what does my Christian faith, 
after all of this, actually even mean for how I—how we—will dwell in this place? 
In the preface I noted that I grew up in a rural, largely agrarian community. In many 
ways, what I learned about yard work and Christianity—for better and for worse—was cultivated 
in Niagara, by my family and larger community. But to have your own house and property is to 
enter into new forms of responsibility. This place is now, for whatever time we have it, one that I 
want to know and care for. I want it to become our home. 
There is a small creek which runs through our property. It is actually a drainage swale 
from about four hundred acres of surrounding fields. I looked on the map to see if this creek had 
a name or fed any larger bodies of water. It turns out that the creek is nameless but is one of 
many tributaries that eventually leads to Chippewa Creek, which leads to the Grand River, then 
to Lake Erie and on to Lake Ontario and, finally, out to the Atlantic Ocean. My son, Jackson, 
decided one day to name our tiny contribution to the great oceans “Frog Creek,” in honour of the 
hours he spends catching bullfrogs and tree frogs there.  
I was struck by this innate human desire we have to name things. What is it that makes us 
see water trickle with the force of gravity and to provide a name for it? In our first year here, we 
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bought animal and insect guides and downloaded apps to identify tree species by bark and leaf 
patterns. We learned that the trees in our backyard were actually English Oak and Shagbark 
Hickory, Red Maple and Curly Willow and Trembling Aspen. The birds who lived here or were 
just migrating through were orioles, Cooper’s hawks, nuthatches, finches, and even barn owls. 
There were coyotes and minks, possums and racoons. There were names everywhere. 
To name the place and its inhabitants was a way of becoming attached to it and the whole 
invisible community of people who shared such names. Some of the names were ours, a sign of 
our unique relationship with “our” place. But most other names were like old growth forests of 
the mind, names passed down for centuries that helped identify the plants and animals who 
shared our surroundings. This was their home too. 
But to name a place is not to know it. At least not completely. We also learned that some 
of the species (like Red Maple and Wild Grape Vine) were invasive and destructive. The gypsy 
moths with their iridescent, dusty wings were beautiful to behold, but terrible in their destructive 
potential. A beautiful English Oak was completely defoliated in late August. To name the world 
was only the beginning of our response-ability. What does it mean when “Frog Creek” bursts it 
banks (as it did in our first Fall) and the soil erosion threatens your neighbour’s home? What 
happens to the plant life under the domineering canopy of the Red Maple or the tangled mess of 
Grape Vine? What does it mean when the stagnant waters of the creek in July grow a bubbly film 
on the surface? 
That the land is not simply something we speak to, but something we hear is to 
acknowledge the world as a particularly enchanted place. The beauty of it—given with such wild 
abandon—arrests our attention and humbles us in all its miraculous complexity. There is such a 
profusion of life forms in constant states of change. Each season unfolds layers of life and 
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entangled relationships to which we are simply ignorant, bumbling witnesses. Yet the world also 
groans and its desecration—at our hands or the hands of others—cries out. But one needs the 
ears to hear and the eyes to look and see. The creek near our home is awash in the chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides that runoff from the surrounding industrial farms. The forests ache 
under the neglect that allows grapevine to strangle and topple mighty Oak trees and soft, pulpy 
Birch. And learning to listen and then hear some of these cries ineluctably leads one to a 
distinctly human choice: do we partake in healing or destructive work. 
In the past year we have repaired a crumbled foundation, installed a new septic system 
that was polluting the waterway, regraded the entire property and sowed new grass to stop 
erosion. We continue to look for ways in which life—not just ours—might thrive here building 
owl boxes and bat boxes. As we did much of this work, I was struck particularly by the writing 
of Marilynne Robinson and her Calvinist rumination that the entire world—even our little speck 
of earth in Binbrook—is part of the vast theater of God’s glory. As a Christian—even one with 
Calvinist disposition— I tried to see our little place in the world through this lens. What does it 
mean to live, I wondered, as if this were true? It was hard. I want to see this land as mine. 
My grandfather was a superb gardener. He passed that on to my mother and, I think, to 
most of her children. He died over a decade ago now and the other day my wife and I drove up to 
the house where he and my “Oma” lived for decades. The gardens he had were the stuff of 
fantasy and legend in my young mind. But when we drove up to this home, the entire yard was in 
disarray. The house was shabby and unkempt. The gardens were wild and overgrown. There was 
no sign of life or love there at all. 
To experience a place as part of God’s theatre is in a way to reconfigure your own work 
as a responsive participation in the work God is always, already doing without you. The world is 
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no less God’s theatre in my grandfather’s neglected yard than it was in its glory years where he 
was diligently stewarding his home. Such a theocentric view—one we see particularly in Berry 
and Robinson and Wiman’s work—forces one to imagine the world as a place that can do 
without them. Or as Wiman and Pastor Ames might frame it, it is to allow our deaths to give 
shape and form to our life. This home I now call mine was, strangely enough, unknown to me 
not even three years ago. Whatever damage and good I inherit from its previous tenants need my 
response here and now. Whatever damage or good I do, will be passed on to someone else. But 
ultimately in a century, who knows what will become of this place. It might, like my 
grandfather’s be overtaken by weeds and neglect. It might be stewarded by some great-
grandchild. I don’t know. 
But if the world is God’s theatre, the troubling fact of my work’s seeming futility also 
comes as a certain form relief. It is not to say it makes one optimistic, but rather that it 
circumscribes the hubris with which we—with which I—am tempted to approach my 
relationship to my place: as if home making on his strange wild planet in all the eons of time all 
depended on me and my family. As if the world’s value was contingent on what humans do to it. 
Understanding work as the stewarding of God’s theatre is simultaneously to dignify the power of 
work and to humble it in the acknowledgment of its final powerlessness. 
At the opening of this project I noted that the world’s desecration creates a certain 
uneasiness, a certain malaise, in the Anthropocene era in which we live. To understand the world 
as God’s, I argue, relieves that malaise through a new myth of re-enchantment. It gives us a 
different story from which to perceive, experience, and act in the natural world. The world, from 
this story, is to be approached as a gift. The world exceeds our human grasp and calls us into 
affectionate work to care for it within the radius of our competence and ability. It demands a 
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particular response. Re-enchantment is not—or should not be—an abstract notion, but a set of 
particular practices borne out of an entire form of life, shaped by a story. 
However, such a Christian myth of re-enchantment leaves one with a different malaise. 
The uneasiness comes with the realization that humans are not, finally, the center of it all. All of 
us, even with our homes and our lineages, are just so many pilgrims passing through. The home 
is nothing but a road. We are constantly in motion towards a world in which we are not. This 
leads one, ineluctably, to the cross-pressure of belief in the secular age. Because all paths 
eventually lead us beyond all the familiar landmarks of existence and experience and towards an 
unknown of what (if anything) lies beyond mortal limits. 
As I watch my children work alongside me, I am preparing them, ultimately, for a world 
in which I am not. In fact, I am also preparing them for a world in which they are not. I don’t 
know in fifty years let alone one hundred what will become of this place, myself, or even them. 
It’s unnerving, to be sure. As I type these final notes, the leaves have (once again) fallen, they are 
golden and scattered and dying. My children and I have gathered some of them and, with some 
water and some topsoil, we’re hoping that they will compost and be the start of our vegetable 
garden next spring. What we get out will be a matter of what we put in. This is a basic truth, 
Berry says, of agriculture. No culture survives without attending to this simple, mundane 
miracle.  
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